3 research outputs found
Privacy protocols
Security protocols enable secure communication over insecure channels.
Privacy protocols enable private interactions over secure channels. Security
protocols set up secure channels using cryptographic primitives. Privacy
protocols set up private channels using secure channels. But just like some
security protocols can be broken without breaking the underlying cryptography,
some privacy protocols can be broken without breaking the underlying security.
Such privacy attacks have been used to leverage e-commerce against targeted
advertising from the outset; but their depth and scope became apparent only
with the overwhelming advent of influence campaigns in politics. The blurred
boundaries between privacy protocols and privacy attacks present a new
challenge for protocol analysis. Covert channels turn out to be concealed not
only below overt channels, but also above: subversions, and the level-below
attacks are supplemented by sublimations and the level-above attacks.Comment: 38 pages, 6 figure
Towards the Correctness of Security Protocols
AbstractIn [19], the authors presented a type-theoretic approach to the verification of security protocols. In this approach, a universal type system is proposed to capture in a finite way all the possible computations (internal actions or protocol instrumentations) that could be performed by a smart malicious intruder. This reduces the verification of cryptographic protocols to a typing problem where types are attack scenarios. In this paper, we recall this type system and we prove its completeness i.e. if the intruder can learn a message from a given protocol instrumentation, then this message could be infered from the type system. A significant result of this paper is the presentation of a new transformation that allows us to abstract a non-terminating type inference system into a terminating deductive proof system. We demonstrate how these results could be used to establish the security of cryptographic protocols from the secrecy standpoint. Finally, the usefulness and the efficiency of the whole approach is illustrated by proving the correctness of a new version of the Needham-Shoreder protocol with respect to the secrecy property
Abstractions pour la vérification de propriétés de sécurité de protocoles cryptographiques
Since the development of computer networks and electronic communications, it becomes important for the public to use secure electronic communications. Cryptographic considerations are part of the answer to the problem and cryptographic protocols describe how to integrate cryptography in actual communications. However, even if the encryption algorithms are robust, there can still remain some attacks due to logical flaw in protocols and formal verification can be used to avoid such flaws. In this thesis, we use abstraction techniques to formally prove various types of properties : secrecy and authentication properties, fairness properties and anonymity.Depuis le développement de l'utilisation des réseaux informatiques et de l'informatisation des communications, il est apparu pour le public un besoin de sécuriser les communications électroniques. Les considérations cryptographiques constituent un élément de réponse au problème de la sécurité des communications et les protocoles cryptographiques décrivent comment intégrer la cryptographie à l'intérieur de communications réelles. Cependant, même dans le cas où les algorithmes de chiffrement sont supposés robustes, les protocoles peuvent présenter des failles de conception exploitables (failles logiques), entrainant un besoin de vérification formelle. Dans cette thèse, nous utilisons des techniques d'abstraction afin de prouver formellement divers types de propriétés. les propriétés de secret et d'authentification, les propriétés de type équité et des propriétés de type anonymat