251,229 research outputs found

    Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan dan Struktur Dana Pihak Ketiga Terhadap Pengungkapan Tata Kelola Pada Perbankan Syariah di Indonesia

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    This study aims to examine the influence of ownership structure and third party funds on corporate governance disclosure. The dependent variable used in this research is corporate governance disclosure measured by Islamic Corporate Governance (ICG). The independent variable in this research is ownership structure measured by blockholders ownership and third party funds measured by Restricted Profit Sharing Investment Account (RPSIA). The population in this study is the sharia banking industry registered in the Financial Services Authority (OJK) period 2012-2018. The sample in this research is 11 Sharia. The data analysis method used in this study is multiple linear regression. The results showed that: (1) ownership structure has a significant positive effect on corporate governance disclosure. (2) third party funds has a significant positive effect on corporate governance disclosure

    Disclosure with Respect to Third-Party Actions

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    Disclosure with Respect to Third-Party Actions

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    Disclosure of Islamic Values and Their Impact on Third-Party Funds and Islamic Bank Financing

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    This study investigates how the disclosure of Islamic values may contribute to third-party funds and financing in Islamic-compliant banks. This study employs a sample of 12 Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia with panel data from 2015 to 2020. Weights, based on expert assessments to determine the level of Islamic values, present as the academic contribution of this research. The finding reports that exposure to Islamic values negatively and significantly impacts financing. Third-party funds provide an indirect positive relationship between the disclosure of Islamic values and financing. These findings further consider the importance of implementing and disclosing Islamic values for investors.This study investigates how the disclosure of Islamic values may contribute to third-party funds and financing in Islamic-compliant banks. This study employs a sample of 12 Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia with panel data from 2015 to 2020. Weights, based on expert assessments to determine the level of Islamic values, present as the academic contribution of this research. The finding reports that exposure to Islamic values negatively and significantly impacts financing. Third-party funds provide an indirect positive relationship between the disclosure of Islamic values and financing. These findings further consider the importance of implementing and disclosing Islamic values for investors

    An Automated Approach to Auditing Disclosure of Third-Party Data Collection in Website Privacy Policies

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    A dominant regulatory model for web privacy is "notice and choice". In this model, users are notified of data collection and provided with options to control it. To examine the efficacy of this approach, this study presents the first large-scale audit of disclosure of third-party data collection in website privacy policies. Data flows on one million websites are analyzed and over 200,000 websites' privacy policies are audited to determine if users are notified of the names of the companies which collect their data. Policies from 25 prominent third-party data collectors are also examined to provide deeper insights into the totality of the policy environment. Policies are additionally audited to determine if the choice expressed by the "Do Not Track" browser setting is respected. Third-party data collection is wide-spread, but fewer than 15% of attributed data flows are disclosed. The third-parties most likely to be disclosed are those with consumer services users may be aware of, those without consumer services are less likely to be mentioned. Policies are difficult to understand and the average time requirement to read both a given site{\guillemotright}s policy and the associated third-party policies exceeds 84 minutes. Only 7% of first-party site policies mention the Do Not Track signal, and the majority of such mentions are to specify that the signal is ignored. Among third-party policies examined, none offer unqualified support for the Do Not Track signal. Findings indicate that current implementations of "notice and choice" fail to provide notice or respect choice

    DISCLOSURE OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE EXISTENCE OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDERS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

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    Third-party funding has been commonly used in International Investment Arbitration. Third-party funders increasingly usually finance the claimant who either (i) does not have sufficient funding to start legal proceedings, or (ii) adequately capitalized, but seek funding in order to minimize cash flow disruption and share risk during their arbitration proceedings. However, the notion of third-party funding gives rise to several issues; first, should funded parties be required to disclose their funding arrangements? Following the first research question, when does the funded party need to disclose the existence of a third-party funder? Then what legal measures can be taken to tackle the concern of transparency and disclosure in cases involving third-party funding? This research concentrates on the transparency and disclosure requirements, which is the central issue that influences further development and use of third-party funding arrangements in international arbitration. Analysis of relevant treaties, laws, guidelines, and case laws drives us to the conclusion that there exist measures and several drains the current international arbitration system that will serve a transparency system to control third-party funding. Hence, it would be appropriate for arbitration institute or investment treaties to take these tools into account in order to provide legal certainty for the disputing parties, arbitral tribunal, and ultimately, for the legal framework of third-party funding in investment arbitration.

    Third party funding in international arbitration : legal problems and global trends with a focus on disclosure requirement

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    This article deals with the problem of third party funding in international commercial and investment arbitration. It analyses the basic concept of third party funding, identifies the main areas of challenge as well as presents recent changes and innovations associated with this concept. The article concentrates on transparency and disclosure requirements, which is, according to us, the major issue that influences further development and use of funding arrangements. The conducted analysis and case study drive us to the conclusion that third party funding is "here to stay" in international arbitration and will progress to the benefit of the arbitral community, but up-on a condition of regulated, imposed and observed principle of disclosure

    Controlling access by tagging data

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    A customer (first party) uses an application developed by an application service provider (second party). A third party needs legitimate access to data of the customer stored on a server operated by the application service provider. In such a scenario, the third party requests the customer to permit the third party to access to such data. However, in some instances, the type of access requested by the third party is broad. This disclosure describes techniques to restrict the types of data that are made available to the third party by enabling a customer to tag data stored by the provider. Further, the customer can specify rules that govern sharing of tagged data with the third party. Controlling access by tagging dat

    Disclosure of Third-Party Funding in Commercial Arbitration

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    Third-party funding used to be an unknown phenomenon to themajority of arbitration scholars and practitioners but, over the past decade,the phenomenon has entered the arbitration scene and become subject tosignificant attention. Today, arbitral proceedings may involvesophisticated funding arrangements. Such arrangements may promoteaccess to arbitration and entail other advantages, but when they remainunknown to the arbitrators and the funded party’s opponents, they maygive rise to a series of practical issues concerning, inter alia, costs andconflicts of interest. When a party has raised funding from a third-partyfunder, the arbitrators and opponents need to know about it. A series ofpractitioners and academics have contributed to the general field of thirdpartyfunding in arbitration. They have examined the prevalence of thephenomenon and identified the issues associated with it. However, only afew have provided practical and operational solutions to these issues. Thearticle explains how to solve the issues by way of disclosure. It examinesthe consequences of compelling a funded party to disclose its fundingarrangements, and it examines how to adopt and construct a duty ofdisclosure in the most feasible manner. The article thereby contributes tothe development of legal and institutional tools to tackle the issuesassociated with third-party funding in arbitration

    The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party

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    In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining postures endogenously evolve over time. A privately informed long-lived player bargains with a sequence of short-lived players, one at a time. Should the players fail to reach an agreement, an unbiased yet imperfect third party is called upon to make a judgement. The uninformed short-lived players learn through two channels: observed behavior of the informed player (\soft" information) and, if any, verdicts of the third party (\hard" information). The long-lived player wants to guard his private information by bargaining tough but at the expense of more information disclosure from the third party. As a result of the strategic use of these two sources of information, the players' bargaining postures change as the uninformed players' beliefs evolve. Interestingly, as third party information becomes more precise, the players adopt tough bargaining postures for a wider range of beliefs. Many repeated bargaining problems can be analyzed in this framework. In particular, the equilibrium dynamics provide an explanation for the puzzling contrast between the bargaining postures of Merck and Pfizer in their recent high-profile product liability litigations. The results also help us understand several other phenomena documented in the related literature.bargaining posture, repeated bargaining, third party information, reputation
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