Insights into the Fallback Path of Best-Effort Hardware Transactional Memory Systems

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43659-3Current industry proposals for Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) focus on best-effort solutions (BE-HTM) where hardware limits are imposed on transactions. These designs may show a significant performance degradation due to high contention scenarios and different hardware and operating system limitations that abort transactions, e.g. cache overflows, hardware and software exceptions, etc. To deal with these events and to ensure forward progress, BE-HTM systems usually provide a software fallback path to execute a lock-based version of the code. In this paper, we propose a hardware implementation of an irrevocability mechanism as an alternative to the software fallback path to gain insight into the hardware improvements that could enhance the execution of such a fallback. Our mechanism anticipates the abort that causes the transaction serialization, and stalls other transactions in the system so that transactional work loss is mini- mized. In addition, we evaluate the main software fallback path approaches and propose the use of ticket locks that hold precise information of the number of transactions waiting to enter the fallback. Thus, the separation of transactional and fallback execution can be achieved in a precise manner. The evaluation is carried out using the Simics/GEMS simulator and the complete range of STAMP transactional suite benchmarks. We obtain significant performance benefits of around twice the speedup and an abort reduction of 50% over the software fallback path for a number of benchmarks.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

Optimal Search Auctions

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.optimal auctions, search cost, search mechanism