UNFOLDING FINITIST ARITHMETIC

The concept of the (full) unfolding \user1{{\cal U}}(S) of a schematic system $S$ is used to answer the following question: Which operations and predicates, and which principles concerning them, ought to be accepted if one has accepted $S$? The program to determine \user1{{\cal U}}(S) for various systems $S$ of foundational significance was previously carried out for a system of nonfinitist arithmetic, $NFA$; it was shown that \user1{{\cal U}}(NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to predicative analysis. In the present paper we work out the unfolding notions for a basic schematic system of finitist arithmetic, $FA$, and for an extension of that by a form $BR$ of the so-called Bar Rule. It is shown that \user1{{\cal U}}(FA) and \user1{{\cal U}}(FA + BR) are proof-theoretically equivalent, respectively, to Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, $PRA$, and to Peano Arithmetic, $PA

The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism and the universal algorithm

I investigate the modal commitments of various conceptions of the philosophy of arithmetic potentialism. Specifically, I consider the natural potentialist systems arising from the models of arithmetic under their natural extension concepts, such as end-extensions, arbitrary extensions, conservative extensions and more. In these potentialist systems, I show, the propositional modal assertions that are valid with respect to all arithmetic assertions with parameters are exactly the assertions of S4. With respect to sentences, however, the validities of a model lie between S4 and S5, and these bounds are sharp in that there are models realizing both endpoints. For a model of arithmetic to validate S5 is precisely to fulfill the arithmetic maximality principle, which asserts that every possibly necessary statement is already true, and these models are equivalently characterized as those satisfying a maximal $\Sigma_1$ theory. The main S4 analysis makes fundamental use of the universal algorithm, of which this article provides a simplified, self-contained account. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the philosophical differences of several fundamentally different potentialist attitudes---linear inevitability, convergent potentialism and radical branching possibility---are expressed by their corresponding potentialist modal validities.Comment: 38 pages. Inquiries and commentary can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/arithmetic-potentialism-and-the-universal-algorithm. Version v3 has further minor revisions, including additional reference

On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems

A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results

Existential witness extraction in classical realizability and via a negative translation

We show how to extract existential witnesses from classical proofs using Krivine's classical realizability---where classical proofs are interpreted as lambda-terms with the call/cc control operator. We first recall the basic framework of classical realizability (in classical second-order arithmetic) and show how to extend it with primitive numerals for faster computations. Then we show how to perform witness extraction in this framework, by discussing several techniques depending on the shape of the existential formula. In particular, we show that in the Sigma01-case, Krivine's witness extraction method reduces to Friedman's through a well-suited negative translation to intuitionistic second-order arithmetic. Finally we discuss the advantages of using call/cc rather than a negative translation, especially from the point of view of an implementation.Comment: 52 pages. Accepted in Logical Methods for Computer Science (LMCS), 201

Retrieving the Mathematical Mission of the Continuum Concept from the Transfinitely Reductionist Debris of Cantor’s Paradise. Extended Abstract

What is so special and mysterious about the Continuum, this ancient, always topical, and alongside the concept of integers, most intuitively transparent and omnipresent conceptual and formal medium for mathematical constructions and the battle field of mathematical inquiries ? And why it resists the century long siege by best mathematical minds of all times committed to penetrate once and for all its set-theoretical enigma ? The double-edged purpose of the present study is to save from the transfinite deadlock of higher set theory the jewel of mathematical Continuum -- this genuine, even if mostly forgotten today raison d'etre of all set-theoretical enterprises to Infinity and beyond, from Georg Cantor to W. Hugh Woodin to Buzz Lightyear, by simultaneously exhibiting the limits and pitfalls of all old and new reductionist foundational approaches to mathematical truth: be it Cantor's or post-Cantorian Idealism, Brouwer's or post-Brouwerian Constructivism, Hilbert's or post-Hilbertian Formalism, Goedel's or post-Goedelian Platonism. In the spirit of Zeno's paradoxes, but with the enormous historical advantage of hindsight, we claim that Cantor's set-theoretical methodology, powerful and reach in proof-theoretic and similar applications as it might be, is inherently limited by its epistemological framework of transfinite local causality, and neither can be held accountable for the properties of the Continuum already acquired through geometrical, analytical, and arithmetical studies, nor can it be used for an adequate, conceptually sensible, operationally workable, and axiomatically sustainable re-creation of the Continuum. From a strictly mathematical point of view, this intrinsic limitation of the constative and explicative power of higher set theory finds its explanation in the identified in this study ultimate phenomenological obstacle to Cantor's transfinite construction, similar to topological obstacles in homotopy theory and theoretical physics: the entanglement capacity of the mathematical Continuum

Hilbert Mathematics Versus Gödel Mathematics. IV. The New Approach of Hilbert Mathematics Easily Resolving the Most Difficult Problems of Gödel Mathematics

The paper continues the consideration of Hilbert mathematics to mathematics itself as an additional “dimension” allowing for the most difficult and fundamental problems to be attacked in a new general and universal way shareable between all of them. That dimension consists in the parameter of the “distance between finiteness and infinity”, particularly able to interpret standard mathematics as a particular case, the basis of which are arithmetic, set theory and propositional logic: that is as a special “flat” case of Hilbert mathematics. The following four essential problems are considered for the idea to be elucidated: Fermat’s last theorem proved by Andrew Wiles; Poincaré’s conjecture proved by Grigori Perelman and the only resolved from the seven Millennium problems offered by the Clay Mathematics Institute (CMI); the four-color theorem proved “machine-likely” by enumerating all cases and the crucial software assistance; the Yang-Mills existence and mass gap problem also suggested by CMI and yet unresolved. They are intentionally chosen to belong to quite different mathematical areas (number theory, topology, mathematical physics) just to demonstrate the power of the approach able to unite and even unify them from the viewpoint of Hilbert mathematics. Also, specific ideas relevant to each of them are considered. Fermat’s last theorem is shown as a Gödel insoluble statement by means of Yablo’s paradox. Thus, Wiles’s proof as a corollary from the modularity theorem and thus needing both arithmetic and set theory involves necessarily an inverse Grothendieck universe. On the contrary, its proof in “Fermat arithmetic” introduced by “epoché to infinity” (following the pattern of Husserl’s original “epoché to reality”) can be suggested by Hilbert arithmetic relevant to Hilbert mathematics, the mediation of which can be removed in the final analysis as a “Wittgenstein ladder”. Poincaré’s conjecture can be reinterpreted physically by Minkowski space and thus reduced to the “nonstandard homeomorphism” of a bit of information mathematically. Perelman’s proof can be accordingly reinterpreted. However, it is valid in Gödel (or Gödelian) mathematics, but not in Hilbert mathematics in general, where the question of whether it holds remains open. The four-color theorem can be also deduced from the nonstandard homeomorphism at issue, but the available proof by enumerating a finite set of all possible cases is more general and relevant to Hilbert mathematics as well, therefore being an indirect argument in favor of the validity of Poincaré’s conjecture in Hilbert mathematics. The Yang-Mills existence and mass gap problem furthermore suggests the most general viewpoint to the relation of Hilbert and Gödel mathematics justifying the qubit Hilbert space as the dual counterpart of Hilbert arithmetic in a narrow sense, in turn being inferable from Hilbert arithmetic in a wide sense. The conjecture that many if not almost all great problems in contemporary mathematics rely on (or at least relate to) the Gödel incompleteness is suggested. It implies that Hilbert mathematics is the natural medium for their discussion or eventual solutions

Halfway Up To the Mathematical Infinity I: On the Ontological & Epistemic Sustainability of Georg Cantor’s Transfinite Design

Georg Cantor was the genuine discoverer of the Mathematical Infinity, and whatever he claimed, suggested, or even surmised should be taken seriously -- albeit not necessary at its face value. Because alongside his exquisite in beauty ordinal construction and his fundamental powerset description of the continuum, Cantor has also left to us his obsessive presumption that the universe of sets should be subjected to laws similar to those governing the set of natural numbers, including the universal principles of cardinal comparability and well-ordering -- and implying an ordinal re-creation of the continuum. During the last hundred years, the mainstream set-theoretical research -- all insights and adjustments due to Kurt G\"odel's revolutionary insights and discoveries notwithstanding -- has compliantly centered its efforts on ad hoc axiomatizations of Cantor's intuitive transfinite design. We demonstrate here that the ontological and epistemic sustainability} of this design has been irremediably compromised by the underlying peremptory, Reductionist mindset of the XIXth century's ideology of science

Classical and Intuitionistic Arithmetic with Higher Order Comprehension Coincide on Inductive Well-Foundedness

Assume that we may prove in Classical Functional Analysis that a primitive recursive relation R is well-founded, using the inductive definition of well-founded. In this paper we prove that such a proof of well-foundation may be made intuitionistic. We conclude that if we are able to formulate any mathematical problem as the inductive well-foundation of some primitive recursive relation, then intuitionistic and classical provability coincide, and for such a statement of well-foundation we may always find an intuitionistic proof if we may find a proof at all. The core of intuitionism are the methods for computing out data with given properties from input data with given properties: these are the results we are looking for when we do constructive mathematics. Proving that a primitive recursive relation R is inductively well-founded is a more abstract kind of result, but it is crucial as well, because once we proved that R is inductively well-founded, then we may write programs by induction over R. This is the way inductive relation are currently used in intuitionism and in proof assistants based on intuitionism, like Coq. In the paper we introduce the comprehension axiom for Functional Analysis in the form of introduction and elimination rules for predicates of types Prop, Nat->Prop, ..., in order to use Girard\u27s method of candidates for impredicative arithmetic

Some Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics

Drawing mainly from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and his middle period writings, strategic issues and problems arising from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Topics have been so chosen as to assist mediation between the perspective of philosophers and that of mathematicians on their developing discipline. There is consideration of rules within arithmetic and geometry and Wittgenstein’s distinctive approach to number systems whether elementary or transfinite. Examples are presented to illuminate the relation between the meaning of an arithmetical generalisation or theorem and its proof. An attempt is made to meet directly some of Wittgenstein’s critical comments on the mathematical treatment of infinity and irrational numbers