42,347 research outputs found
The Mode of Computing
The Turing Machine is the paradigmatic case of computing machines, but there
are others, such as Artificial Neural Networks, Table Computing,
Relational-Indeterminate Computing and diverse forms of analogical computing,
each of which based on a particular underlying intuition of the phenomenon of
computing. This variety can be captured in terms of system levels,
re-interpreting and generalizing Newell's hierarchy, which includes the
knowledge level at the top and the symbol level immediately below it. In this
re-interpretation the knowledge level consists of human knowledge and the
symbol level is generalized into a new level that here is called The Mode of
Computing. Natural computing performed by the brains of humans and non-human
animals with a developed enough neural system should be understood in terms of
a hierarchy of system levels too. By analogy from standard computing machinery
there must be a system level above the neural circuitry levels and directly
below the knowledge level that is named here The mode of Natural Computing. A
central question for Cognition is the characterization of this mode. The Mode
of Computing provides a novel perspective on the phenomena of computing,
interpreting, the representational and non-representational views of cognition,
and consciousness.Comment: 35 pages, 8 figure
Perspectives on the Neuroscience of Cognition and Consciousness
The origin and current use of the concepts of computation, representation and information in Neuroscience are examined and conceptual flaws are identified which vitiate their usefulness for addressing problems of the neural basis of Cognition and Consciousness. In contrast, a convergence of views is presented to support the characterization of the Nervous System as a complex dynamical system operating in the metastable regime, and capable of evolving to configurations and transitions in phase space with potential relevance for Cognition and Consciousness
‘The Action of the Brain’. Machine Models and Adaptive Functions in Turing and Ashby
Given the personal acquaintance between Alan M. Turing and W. Ross Ashby and the partial proximity of their research fields, a comparative view of Turing’s and Ashby’s work on modelling “the action of the brain” (letter from Turing to Ashby, 1946) will help to shed light on the seemingly strict symbolic/embodied dichotomy: While it is clear that Turing was committed to formal, computational and Ashby to material, analogue methods of modelling, there is no straightforward mapping of these approaches onto symbol-based AI and embodiment-centered views respectively. Instead, it will be demonstrated that both approaches, starting from a formal core, were at least partly concerned with biological and embodied phenomena, albeit in revealingly distinct ways
Chance in the Modern Synthesis
The modern synthesis in evolutionary biology is taken to be that period in
which a consensus developed among biologists about the major causes of
evolution, a consensus that informed research in evolutionary biology for
at least a half century. As such, it is a particularly fruitful period to consider
when reflecting on the meaning and role of chance in evolutionary explanation.
Biologists of this period make reference to “chance” and loose cognates
of “chance,” such as: “random,” “contingent,” “accidental,” “haphazard,” or
“stochastic.” Of course, what an author might mean by “chance” in any specific context varies.
In the following, we first offer a historiographical note on the synthesis.
Second, we introduce five ways in which synthesis authors spoke about
chance. We do not take these to be an exhaustive taxonomy of all possible
ways in which chance meaningfully figures in explanations in evolutionary
biology. These are simply five common uses of the term by biologists at this
period. They will serve to organize our summary of the collected references to
chance and the analysis and discussion of the following questions:
• What did synthesis authors understand by chance?
• How did these authors see chance operating in evolution?
• Did their appeals to chance increase or decrease over time during the synthesis?
That is, was there a “hardening” of the synthesis, as Gould claimed
(1983)
Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science, and the Philosophy of Mind
Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent–world interactions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind
Deterministic Dynamics and Chaos: Epistemology and Interdisciplinary Methodology
We analyze, from a theoretical viewpoint, the bidirectional interdisciplinary
relation between mathematics and psychology, focused on the mathematical theory
of deterministic dynamical systems, and in particular, on the theory of chaos.
On one hand, there is the direct classic relation: the application of
mathematics to psychology. On the other hand, we propose the converse relation
which consists in the formulation of new abstract mathematical problems
appearing from processes and structures under research of psychology. The
bidirectional multidisciplinary relation from-to pure mathematics, largely
holds with the "hard" sciences, typically physics and astronomy. But it is
rather new, from the social and human sciences, towards pure mathematics
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