On the deduction of species relationships: a prÉcis

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72495/1/j.1096-0031.2003.tb00366.x.pd

On the deduction of species relationships: a précis

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72495/1/j.1096-0031.2003.tb00366.x.pd

What Foundations for Statistical Modeling and Inference?

The primary aim of this article is to review the above books in a comparative way from the standpoint of my perspective on empirical modeling and inference. 1 Hacking (1965). Logic of Statistical Inference 2. Mayo (2018). Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars 3. Conclusion

Philosophy of Probability and Statistical Modeling

This book has two main aims. The first one (chapters 1-7) is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim (chapters 8-13) focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the ‘complex nexus of chance’

On the invisibility and impact of Robert Hooke’s theory of gravitation

Robert Hooke\u2019s theory of gravitation is a promising case study for probing the fruitfulness of Menachem Fisch\u2019s insistence on the centrality of trading zone mediators for rational change in the history of science and mathematics. In 1679, Hooke proposed an innovative explanation of planetary motions to Newton\u2019s attention. Until the correspondence with Hooke, Newton had embraced planetary models, whereby planets move around the Sun because of the action of an ether filling the interplanetary space. Hooke\u2019s model, instead, consisted in the idea that planets move in the void space under the influence of a gravitational attraction directed toward the sun. There is no doubt that the correspondence with Hooke allowed Newton to conceive a new explanation for planetary motions. This explanation was proposed by Hooke as a hypothesis that needed mathematical development and experimental confirmation. Hooke formulated his new model in a mathematical language which overlapped but not coincided with Newton\u2019s who developed Hooke\u2019s hypothetical model into the theory of universal gravitation as published in the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687). The nature of Hooke\u2019s contributions to mathematized natural philosophy, however, was contested during his own lifetime and gave rise to negative evaluations until the last century. Hooke has been often contrasted to Newton as a practitioner rather than as a \u201cscientist\u201d and unfavorably compared to the eminent Lucasian Professor. Hooke\u2019s correspondence with Newton seems to me an example of the phenomenon, discussed by Fisch in his philosophical works, of the invisibility in official historiography of \u201ctrading zone mediators,\u201d namely, of those actors that play a role, crucial but not easily recognized, in promoting rational scientific framework change

Adjusting Inferential Thresholds to Reflect Nonepistemic Values

Many philosophers have challenged the ideal of value-free science on the grounds that social or moral values are relevant to inferential thresholds. But given this view, how precisely and to what extent should scientists adjust their inferential thresholds in light of nonepistemic values? We suggest that signal detection theory provides a useful framework for addressing this question. Moreover, this approach opens up further avenues for philosophical inquiry and has important implications for philosophical debates concerning inductive risk. For example, the signal detection theory framework entails that considerations of inductive risk and inferential-threshold placement cannot be conducted in isolation from base-rate information