Triangle packing with constraint programming

In vertex disjoint triangle packing we are given a simple undirected graph G and we have to select the maximum number of triangles such that each triangle is composed of three adjacent vertices and each pair of triangles selected has no vertex in common. The problem is NP-hard and APX-complete. We present three constraint models and apply them to the optimisation and decision problem (attempting to pack n/3 triangles in a graph with n vertices). In the decision problem we observe a phase transition from satisfiability to unsatisfiability, with a complexity peak at the point where 50% of instances are satisfiable, and this is expected. We characterise this phase transition theoretically with respect to constrainedness. However, when we apply a mixed integer programming model to the decision problem the complexity peak disappears

Bin Packing and Related Problems: General Arc-flow Formulation with Graph Compression

We present an exact method, based on an arc-flow formulation with side constraints, for solving bin packing and cutting stock problems --- including multi-constraint variants --- by simply representing all the patterns in a very compact graph. Our method includes a graph compression algorithm that usually reduces the size of the underlying graph substantially without weakening the model. As opposed to our method, which provides strong models, conventional models are usually highly symmetric and provide very weak lower bounds. Our formulation is equivalent to Gilmore and Gomory's, thus providing a very strong linear relaxation. However, instead of using column-generation in an iterative process, the method constructs a graph, where paths from the source to the target node represent every valid packing pattern. The same method, without any problem-specific parameterization, was used to solve a large variety of instances from several different cutting and packing problems. In this paper, we deal with vector packing, graph coloring, bin packing, cutting stock, cardinality constrained bin packing, cutting stock with cutting knife limitation, cutting stock with binary patterns, bin packing with conflicts, and cutting stock with binary patterns and forbidden pairs. We report computational results obtained with many benchmark test data sets, all of them showing a large advantage of this formulation with respect to the traditional ones

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round

Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But how good are these algorithms as mechanisms? Truthful reporting of valuations is typically not a dominant strategy (certainly not with a pay-your-bid, first-price rule, but it is likely not a good strategy even with a critical value, or second-price style rule either). Our goal is to show that a wide class of approximation algorithms yields this way mechanisms with low Price of Anarchy. The seminal result of Lucier and Borodin [SODA 2010] shows that combining a greedy algorithm that is an $\alpha$-approximation algorithm with a pay-your-bid payment rule yields a mechanism whose Price of Anarchy is $O(\alpha)$. In this paper we significantly extend the class of algorithms for which such a result is available by showing that this close connection between approximation ratio on the one hand and Price of Anarchy on the other also holds for the design principle of relaxation and rounding provided that the relaxation is smooth and the rounding is oblivious. We demonstrate the far-reaching consequences of our result by showing its implications for sparse packing integer programs, such as multi-unit auctions and generalized matching, for the maximum traveling salesman problem, for combinatorial auctions, and for single source unsplittable flow problems. In all these problems our approach leads to novel simple, near-optimal mechanisms whose Price of Anarchy either matches or beats the performance guarantees of known mechanisms.Comment: Extended abstract appeared in Proc. of 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'15