On a Perceived Expressive Inadequacy of Principia Mathematica

This paper deploys a Cantor-style diagonal argument which indicates that there is more possible mathematical content than there are propositional functions in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and similar formal systems. This technical result raises a historical question: "How did Russell, who was himself an expert in diagonal arguments, not see this coming?" It turns out that answering this question requires an appreciation of Russell's understanding of what logic is, and how he construed the relationship between logic and Principia Mathematica

On the duality between existence and information

Recent developments in pure mathematics and in mathematical logic have uncovered a fundamental duality between "existence" and "information." In logic, the duality is between the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of quotient sets, equivalence relations, or partitions. The analogue to an element of a subset is the notion of a distinction of a partition, and that leads to a whole stream of dualities or analogies--including the development of new logical foundations for information theory parallel to Boole's development of logical finite probability theory. After outlining these dual concepts in mathematical terms, we turn to a more metaphysical speculation about two dual notions of reality, a fully definite notion using Boolean logic and appropriate for classical physics, and the other objectively indefinite notion using partition logic which turns out to be appropriate for quantum mechanics. The existence-information duality is used to intuitively illustrate these two dual notions of reality. The elucidation of the objectively indefinite notion of reality leads to the "killer application" of the existence-information duality, namely the interpretation of quantum mechanics

A notion of selective ultrafilter corresponding to topological Ramsey spaces

We introduce the relation of "almost-reduction" in an arbitrary topological Ramsey space R, as a generalization of the relation of "almost-inclusion" on the space of infinite sets of natural numbers (the Ellentuck space). This leads us to a type of ultrafilter U on the set of first approximations of the elements of R which corresponds to the well-known notion of "selective ultrafilter" on N, the set of natural numbers. The relationship turns out to be rather exact in the sense that it permits us to lift several well-known facts about selective ultrafilters on N and the Ellentuck space to the ultrafilter U and the Ramsey space R. For example, we prove that the Open Coloring Axiom holds in M[U], where M is a Solovay model. In this way we extend a result due to Di Prisco and Todorcevic which gives the same conclusion for the Ellentuck space.Comment: 24 pages; submitted to Mathematical Logic Quarterl

Twin Paradox and the logical foundation of relativity theory

We study the foundation of space-time theory in the framework of first-order logic (FOL). Since the foundation of mathematics has been successfully carried through (via set theory) in FOL, it is not entirely impossible to do the same for space-time theory (or relativity). First we recall a simple and streamlined FOL-axiomatization SpecRel of special relativity from the literature. SpecRel is complete with respect to questions about inertial motion. Then we ask ourselves whether we can prove usual relativistic properties of accelerated motion (e.g., clocks in acceleration) in SpecRel. As it turns out, this is practically equivalent to asking whether SpecRel is strong enough to "handle" (or treat) accelerated observers. We show that there is a mathematical principle called induction (IND) coming from real analysis which needs to be added to SpecRel in order to handle situations involving relativistic acceleration. We present an extended version AccRel of SpecRel which is strong enough to handle accelerated motion, in particular, accelerated observers. Among others, we show that the Twin Paradox becomes provable in AccRel, but it is not provable without IND.Comment: 24 pages, 6 figure

Hilbert's Metamathematical Problems and Their Solutions

This dissertation examines several of the problems that Hilbert discovered in the foundations of mathematics, from a metalogical perspective. The problems manifest themselves in four different aspects of Hilbert’s views: (i) Hilbert’s axiomatic approach to the foundations of mathematics; (ii) His response to criticisms of set theory; (iii) His response to intuitionist criticisms of classical mathematics; (iv) Hilbert’s contribution to the specification of the role of logical inference in mathematical reasoning. This dissertation argues that Hilbert’s axiomatic approach was guided primarily by model theoretical concerns. Accordingly, the ultimate aim of his consistency program was to prove the model-theoretical consistency of mathematical theories. It turns out that for the purpose of carrying out such consistency proofs, a suitable modification of the ordinary first-order logic is needed. To effect this modification, independence-friendly logic is needed as the appropriate conceptual framework. It is then shown how the model theoretical consistency of arithmetic can be proved by using IF logic as its basic logic. Hilbert’s other problems, manifesting themselves as aspects (ii), (iii), and (iv)—most notably the problem of the status of the axiom of choice, the problem of the role of the law of excluded middle, and the problem of giving an elementary account of quantification—can likewise be approached by using the resources of IF logic. It is shown that by means of IF logic one can carry out Hilbertian solutions to all these problems. The two major results concerning aspects (ii), (iii) and (iv) are the following: (a) The axiom of choice is a logical principle; (b) The law of excluded middle divides metamathematical methods into elementary and non-elementary ones. It is argued that these results show that IF logic helps to vindicate Hilbert’s nominalist philosophy of mathematics. On the basis of an elementary approach to logic, which enriches the expressive resources of ordinary first-order logic, this dissertation shows how the different problems that Hilbert discovered in the foundations of mathematics can be solved

Synonymy and Identity of Proofs - A Philosophical Essay

The main objective of the dissertation is to investigate from a strictly philosophical perspective different approaches and results related to the problem of identity of proofs, which is a problem of general proof theory at the intersection of mathematics and philosophy. The author characterizes,compares and evaluates a range of formal criteria of proof-identity that have been proposed in the proof-theoretic literature. While these proposals come from mathematical logicians, the author’s background in both mathematical logic and philosophy allows him to present and discuss these proposals in a manner that is accessible to and fruitful for philosophers, especially those working in logic and philosophy of mathematics, as well as mathematical logicians. The dissertation is structured into a prologue and five sections. In the prologue, the author traces the development of the concept of a proof in ancient philosophy, culminating in the work of Aristotle. In Section I, the author turns to the roots of proof theory in modern philosophy, offering a detailed interpretation of Kant’s “Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren”, which uncovers interesting links between Kant’s inferences of understanding and of reason and modern proof-theoretic semantics. In Section II, the author turns from historical to systematic considerations concerning different kinds of identity-criteria of proofs, ranging from overly liberal criteria that trivialize proof identity to overly strict, syntactical criteria. In Section III, the heart of the dissertation, the author offers a thorough philosophical discussion of the normalisation thesis. In Section IV, the author considers the difficulties encountered in his discussion of identity of proofs --- particularly of the normalisation thesis --- through the lens of a discussion of the notion of synonymy, and compares this thesis with other possible formal accounts of identity of proofs. In particular, by recourse to Carnap’s notion of synonymy, developed in “Meaning and Necessity”, the author proposes a notion of synonymy of proofs. In Section V, the final substantial section, the author compares the normalisation thesis to the Church-Turing thesis, thereby adducing another dimension of evaluation of the former