136,662 research outputs found

    Theological Implications of the Simulation Argument

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    Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument (SA) has many intriguing theological implications. We work out some of them here. We show how the SA can be used to develop novel versions of the Cosmological and Design Arguments. We then develop some of the affinities between Bostrom's naturalistic theogony and more traditional theological topics. We look at the resurrection of the body and at theodicy. We conclude with some reflections on the relations between the SA and Neoplatonism (friendly) and between the SA and theism (less friendly)

    Inference, Learning, and Population Size: Projectivity for SRL Models

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    A subtle difference between propositional and relational data is that in many relational models, marginal probabilities depend on the population or domain size. This paper connects the dependence on population size to the classic notion of projectivity from statistical theory: Projectivity implies that relational predictions are robust with respect to changes in domain size. We discuss projectivity for a number of common SRL systems, and identify syntactic fragments that are guaranteed to yield projective models. The syntactic conditions are restrictive, which suggests that projectivity is difficult to achieve in SRL, and care must be taken when working with different domain sizes

    An alternative Gospel of structure: order, composition, processes

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    We survey some basic mathematical structures, which arguably are more primitive than the structures taught at school. These structures are orders, with or without composition, and (symmetric) monoidal categories. We list several `real life' incarnations of each of these. This paper also serves as an introduction to these structures and their current and potentially future uses in linguistics, physics and knowledge representation.Comment: Introductory chapter to C. Heunen, M. Sadrzadeh, and E. Grefenstette. Quantum Physics and Linguistics: A Compositional, Diagrammatic Discourse. Oxford University Press, 201

    Integrating a Global Induction Mechanism into a Sequent Calculus

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    Most interesting proofs in mathematics contain an inductive argument which requires an extension of the LK-calculus to formalize. The most commonly used calculi for induction contain a separate rule or axiom which reduces the valid proof theoretic properties of the calculus. To the best of our knowledge, there are no such calculi which allow cut-elimination to a normal form with the subformula property, i.e. every formula occurring in the proof is a subformula of the end sequent. Proof schemata are a variant of LK-proofs able to simulate induction by linking proofs together. There exists a schematic normal form which has comparable proof theoretic behaviour to normal forms with the subformula property. However, a calculus for the construction of proof schemata does not exist. In this paper, we introduce a calculus for proof schemata and prove soundness and completeness with respect to a fragment of the inductive arguments formalizable in Peano arithmetic.Comment: 16 page

    A Logic for True Concurrency

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    We propose a logic for true concurrency whose formulae predicate about events in computations and their causal dependencies. The induced logical equivalence is hereditary history preserving bisimilarity, and fragments of the logic can be identified which correspond to other true concurrent behavioural equivalences in the literature: step, pomset and history preserving bisimilarity. Standard Hennessy-Milner logic, and thus (interleaving) bisimilarity, is also recovered as a fragment. We also propose an extension of the logic with fixpoint operators, thus allowing to describe causal and concurrency properties of infinite computations. We believe that this work contributes to a rational presentation of the true concurrent spectrum and to a deeper understanding of the relations between the involved behavioural equivalences.Comment: 31 pages, a preliminary version appeared in CONCUR 201

    Introduction to the Ontology of Knowledge iss. 20211125

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    We can only know what determines us as being and by the fact that it determines us as being. Our knowledge is therefore logically limited to what determines us as being. Since representation is defined as the act that makes knowledge dicible, our representation is logically limited to what dynamically determines us as being. Our representation is included in our becoming. Nothing that we represent, no infinite, can exceed the mere necessity of our becoming. The world, my physical being and my consciousness are subsumed by the necessity of my becoming. We know nothing but “we become”  To the question "Is there anything else to know?" we can give no logical answer Summary: Reality is pure logical interdependence, immanent, formless, unspeakable. Logos is a principle of order in this interdependence. Individuation is the necessary asymptote of any instance of the Logos. Each knowing subject is Individuation, a mode of order among infinites of infinites of possible modes of order. Everything that appears to the subject as Existing participates in his Individuation. This convergence into Individuation defines a perspective that gives meaning. The subject is representation. It is in this representation that exist the subject, objects and laws of the world. Without subject there are no objects, no laws, no framework. The representation is not isomorphism but morphogenesis. The physical world and the Spirit have the same logical nature: they are categories of representation. The representation is animated because meaning is an Act. Representation is limited by a horizon of meaning. Below this horizon the subject represents the universe and itself. Beyond this horizon there is no prevailing space, time or form. The predicate expresses, below the horizon of meaning, a necessity whose source is beyond this horizon, unfathomable. The OK is neither materialism nor idealism and frees itself from any psychological preconceptions. The OK does not propose an "other reality" than that described by common sense or science, but another mode of representation. The OK is compatible with the current state of science, while offering new interpretive avenues. The OK differs from ontic structural realism (OSR) in various ways: Just like being, the relationship is representation, The knowing subject is present in any representation, the real is non-founded
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