Dagstuhl Reports : Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2011

Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Internet (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 11061) : Simone Fischer-Hübner, Chris Hoofnagle, Kai Rannenberg, Michael Waidner, Ioannis Krontiris and Michael Marhöfer Self-Repairing Programs (Dagstuhl Seminar 11062) : Mauro Pezzé, Martin C. Rinard, Westley Weimer and Andreas Zeller Theory and Applications of Graph Searching Problems (Dagstuhl Seminar 11071) : Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud, Stephan Kreutzer and Dimitrios M. Thilikos Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Sequence Processing (Dagstuhl Seminar 11081) : Maxime Crochemore, Lila Kari, Mehryar Mohri and Dirk Nowotka Packing and Scheduling Algorithms for Information and Communication Services (Dagstuhl Seminar 11091) Klaus Jansen, Claire Mathieu, Hadas Shachnai and Neal E. Youn

Scheduling for a Processor Sharing System with Linear Slowdown

We consider the problem of scheduling arrivals to a congestion system with a finite number of users having identical deterministic demand sizes. The congestion is of the processor sharing type in the sense that all users in the system at any given time are served simultaneously. However, in contrast to classical processor sharing congestion models, the processing slowdown is proportional to the number of users in the system at any time. That is, the rate of service experienced by all users is linearly decreasing with the number of users. For each user there is an ideal departure time (due date). A centralized scheduling goal is then to select arrival times so as to minimize the total penalty due to deviations from ideal times weighted with sojourn times. Each deviation is assumed quadratic, or more generally convex. But due to the dynamics of the system, the scheduling objective function is non-convex. Specifically, the system objective function is a non-smooth piecewise convex function. Nevertheless, we are able to leverage the structure of the problem to derive an algorithm that finds the global optimum in a (large but) finite number of steps, each involving the solution of a constrained convex program. Further, we put forward several heuristics. The first is the traversal of neighbouring constrained convex programming problems, that is guaranteed to reach a local minimum of the centralized problem. This is a form of a "local search", where we use the problem structure in a novel manner. The second is a one-coordinate "global search", used in coordinate pivot iteration. We then merge these two heuristics into a unified "local-global" heuristic, and numerically illustrate the effectiveness of this heuristic

Learning to improve iterative repair scheduling

This paper presents a general learning method for dynamically selecting between repair heuristics in an iterative repair scheduling system. The system employs a version of explanation-based learning called Plausible Explanation-Based Learning (PEBL) that uses multiple examples to confirm conjectured explanations. The basic approach is to conjecture contradictions between a heuristic and statistics that measure the quality of the heuristic. When these contradictions are confirmed, a different heuristic is selected. To motivate the utility of this approach we present an empirical evaluation of the performance of a scheduling system with respect to two different repair strategies. We show that the scheduler that learns to choose between the heuristics outperforms the same scheduler with any one of two heuristics alone

Mechanism design for aggregating energy consumption and quality of service in speed scaling scheduling

We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job's deadline multiplied by a priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the proportional cost share which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the marginal cost share, which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor

Games and Mechanism Design in Machine Scheduling – An Introduction

In this paper, we survey different models, techniques, and some recent results to tackle machine scheduling problems within a distributed setting. In traditional optimization, a central authority is asked to solve a (computationally hard) optimization problem. In contrast, in distributed settings there are several agents, possibly equipped with private information that is not publicly known, and these agents need to interact in order to derive a solution to the problem. Usually the agents have their individual preferences, which induces them to behave strategically in order to manipulate the resulting solution. Nevertheless, one is often interested in the global performance of such systems. The analysis of such distributed settings requires techniques from classical Optimization, Game Theory, and Economic Theory. The paper therefore briefly introduces the most important of the underlying concepts, and gives a selection of typical research questions and recent results, focussing on applications to machine scheduling problems. This includes the study of the so-called price of anarchy for settings where the agents do not possess private information, as well as the design and analysis of (truthful) mechanisms in settings where the agents do possess private information.computer science applications;