The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation

The theory of fair allocation is often favourably contrasted with the social choice theory in the search for escape routes from Arrow's impossibility theorem. Its success is commonly attributed to the fact that it is modest in its goal vis-a-vis social choice theory, since it does not aspire for a full-fledged ordering of options, and settles with a subset of "fair" options. We show that its success may rather be attributable to a broadened informational basis thereof. To substantiate this claim, we compare the informational basis of the theory of fair allocation with the informational requirements of social choice theory.

Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments

Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a unified approach covering the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation, we investigate how much information is needed to rank a pair of allocations by social ordering functions and by allocation rules satisfying the Pareto principle and anonymity. In the standard model of division of commodities, we show that knowledge of a good portion of indifference hypersurfaces is needed for social ordering functions, whereas allocation rules require only knowledge of marginal rates of substitution.

Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments

Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a unified approach covering the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation, we investigate how much information is needed to rank a pair of allocations by social ordering functions and by allocation rules satisfying the Pareto principle and anonymity. In the standard model of division of commodities, we show that knowledge of a good portion of indifference hypersurfaces is needed for social ordering functions, whereas allocation rules require only knowledge of marginal rates of substitution.

The motives of organizational justice

The article proposes an answer to the question of why people care about justice in the workplace.models of organizational justice; material benefits; relational benefits; the fair process effect; the fair outcome effect; the interactive effect; the fairness preference effect; motives of organizational justice; controlled and cognitively driven justice judgements; automatic and emotionally driven justice judgments.

Introduction to social choice and welfare

Social choice theory is concerned with the evaluation of alternative methods of collective decision-making, as well as with the logical foundations of welfare economics. In turn, welfare economics is concerned with the critical scrutiny of the performance of actual and/or imaginary economic systems, as well as with the critique, design and implementation of alternative economic policies. The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, which is edited by Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura, presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. This paper is written as an extensive introduction to the Handbook with the purpose of placing the broad issues examined in the two volumes in better perspective, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory.social choice theory, welfare economics, socialist planning controversy, social welfare function, Arrovian impossibility theorems, voting schemes, implementation theory, equity and justice, welfare and rights, functioning and capability, procedural fairness

Bargaining Theory over Opportunity Assignments and the Egalitarian Solution

This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the principle of "equal opportunity" for all players to make the recommendation on resource allocations. A framework in such a context is developed and the egalitarian solution to standard bargaining problems is reformulated and axiomatically characterized.Opportunity sets, bargaining over opportunity assignments, egalitarian solution

Social Choice and Just Institutions:New Perspectives

It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis of optimal second-best institutions was thought to require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In particular, this approach turns out to be especially suitable for the application of recent philosophical theories of justice formulated in terms of fairness, such as equality of resources.social choice, theories of justice

A Normative Framework of Justice in Climate Change

The more the various dimensions of climate change are just, the more an international agreement is in principle attainable. That is the reason why justice plays a major role in favouring collective action against global warming. In this article I spell out the dominant notions of justice and the consequent criteria of equity for the main domains of global warming negotiations, in order to identify a normative ethical framework. As far as mitigation is concerned, for the definition of a just initial allocation of endowments the reference point should be a per capita distribution corrected by a factor which takes into account all undeserved inequalities, as suggested by Rawls’ theory of justice. With regard to the subsequent exchange of endowments, I consider the Pareto principle supplemented by the envy-freeness one as the most viable option. Turning to adaptation, my point is that the criterion of responsibility based on historical accountability is inevitable. The related underpinning of justice can be found in principle I of Rawls’ theory of justice. Finally, for the issues raised by the just allocation of compensations for climate related damages I consider Sen’s capability approach the soundest option.adaptation, climate change, equity, justice, international climate agreements, mitigation

Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Opportunity Assignments

This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the principle of "equal opportunity" for all players to make the recommendation on re- source allocations. A framework in such a context is developed and several classical solutions to standard bargaining problems are reformulated and axiomatically characterized. Working Paper 06-4