Reconsidering the Necessary Beings of Aquinas’s Third Way

Surprisingly few articles have focused on Aquinas’s particular conception of necessary beings in the Third Way, and many scholars have espoused inaccurate or incomplete views of that conception. My aim in this paper is both to offer a corrective to some of those views and, more importantly, to provide compelling answers to the following two questions about the necessary beings of the Third Way. First, how exactly does Aquinas conceive of these necessary beings? Second, what does Aquinas seek to accomplish in the third stage of the Third Way? In answering these questions, I challenge prominent contemporary understandings of the necessary beings of the Third Way

Personal Ideals as Metaphors

What is it to have and act on a personal ideal? Someone who aspires to be a philosopher might imaginatively think “I am a philosopher” by way of motivating herself to think hard about a philosophical question. But doing so seems to require her to act on an inaccurate self-description, given that she isn’t yet what she regards herself as being. J. David Velleman develops the thought that action-by-ideal involves a kind of fictional self-conception. My aim is to expand our thinking about personal ideals by developing another way of understanding them. On this view action-by-ideal involves a kind of metaphorical self-conception. I investigate some salient differences between these views with the aim of understanding the different perspectives they take on the rationality of action-by-ideal. Where the fiction view runs into problems of literary coherence, the metaphor view exploits the richness of poetic invention. But action-by-ideal is a complex phenomenon about which there may be no tidy story to be told. This paper is an attempt to clarify and understand more of this messy terrain

Science, substance and spatial appearances

According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance, with sharply defined boundaries, which wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents or indicates that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in experience conflicts with the deliverances of our best current scientific theories in the following respect: perceptual experience would be intrinsically misleading concerning the structure of physical matter. I argue against this further claim. Experience in itself is not committed to, nor does it provide evidence for, any such conception of the nature of physical matter. The naïve/folk conception of matter in question cannot simply be ‘read-off’ from perceptual appearances

Defining a New Ethical Standard for Human in Vitro Embryos in the Context of Stem Cell Research

This iBrief discusses some of the social, ethical and legal considerations surrounding the use of unimplanted, in vitro embryos in stem cell research. It proposes that a new ethical standard be elucidated for these embryos. The iBrief gives an overview of two proposals for such a standard at opposite ends of the spectrum: treating the in vitro embryo as a legal person versus treating it as mere property. It argues against both approaches. The former can have undesirable social implications including undue interference with female reproductive autonomy, while the latter would objectify potential human life and reproductive potential. The iBrief proposes an intermediate approach that treats the embryo as a special entity. It warns against a model whereby the respect accorded to embryos is made dependent on the attainment of various qualitative or developmental criteria. The complexities surrounding human life, it argues, are too uncertain. What is certain is the embryo\u27s unique potential for human life, at any developmental stage. This, the iBrief proposes, should be the sole criterion for an embryo\u27s special status, a status that should be confined within constitutional limits

A Critique of “A Critique of Lester’s Account of Liberty”: A reply to Frederick 2013

Frederick 2013 (the critique) offers criticisms of the Escape from Leviathan (EfL) theory of libertarian liberty and also of its compatibility with preference-utilitarian welfare and private-property anarchy. This reply to the critique first explains the underlying philosophical problem with libertarian liberty and EfL’s proposed solution. It then goes through the critique in detail showing that it does not grasp the problem or the solution and offers only misrepresentations and unsound criticisms

Undergraduate engineering students’ understanding of complex circuit concepts: An investigation of the intersection of students’ prior knowledge, design of learning environments and the nature of the content

Research focused on increasing students’ conceptual understanding of electric circuits discuss this concept as difficult to not only teach but for students to grasp. This difficulty has been attributed to the fact that students tend to hold inaccurate pre-conceptions of electricity which becomes problematic as the level of complexity increases from the most basic to more advanced circuit concepts. The combination of inaccurate and inadequate prior knowledge has the potential to prevent students from being able to assimilate new material they come in contact with when instructed about electric circuit concepts in formal settings. Often times, students’ inability to associate this new concept with correct pre-existing conception or prior knowledge leads to the development of misconceptions about the nature of electricity. With these issues in mind, this study focused on exploring undergraduate engineering students’ conceptual understanding of electric circuits through an investigation of three interconnected areas. The overall purpose of this study was to give a descriptive account of learning complex circuits

Introduction to the material study of global constitutional law

The article addresses the question of how to study global constitutional law by suggesting a material methodology. Drawing from previous studies of the notion of the material constitution, both from materialist and institutionalist types (Marx, Mortati, Poulantzas), the article proposes to look at the development of global constitutional law, in its many instantiations, in terms of its relation with the state. Accounts of the autonomy of global constitutional law are requalified in terms of relative autonomy. More specifically, global constitutional law is conceived as a legal construction functional to the transformation of the contemporary state. From the perspective of the material study of constitutional law, the state is still deemed to be the main unit of analysis, but, at the same time, state-centred accounts based on an exceptionalist understanding of sovereignty are rejected as reductive and, at times, inaccurate

The information effect: Constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

Cataloged from PDF version of article.The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader “information effect”

The Character of Eve and Interpretive Misconceptions

This paper won an honorable mention writing flag award in the critical/persuasive category. Mae McConley, writing for Jaimie Gunderson’s CTI 304 class, “The Bible and Its Interpreters”.Gunderson, JaimieUndergraduate Studie