On the impossibility of representing infinite utility streams

We show that, independently of the topology chosen on the set of all infinity utility streams, there is no Social Welfare Function preserving the von Weizsäcker’s overtaking criterion. With our proof we extend the impossibility result of Basu and Mitra

On the impossibility of representing infinite utility streams

We show that, independently of the topology chosen on the set of all infinity utility streams, there is no Social Welfare Function preserving the von Weizsäcker’s overtaking criterion. With our proof we extend the impossibility result of Basu and Mitra.

Inequality averse criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams: The impossibility of Weak Pareto

This paper investigates ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams by representable social welfare relations. We prove that the Hammond Equity postulate and other variations of it like the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle are incompatible with positive responsiveness to welfare improvements by every generation. The case of Hammond Equity for the Future is investigated too.Social welfare function; Equity; Inequality aversion; Pareto axiom; Intergenerational justice

Impossibilities of Paretian Social Welfare Functions for Infinite Utility Streams with Distributive Equity

This paper examines the logical relationship between distributive equity and efficiency in aggregating infinite utility streams. Our main results show that there exist social welfare functions which satisfy the axioms of Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle and a weak version of efficiency, but there exists no social welfare function which satisfies all of the distributive equity requirements and Weak Pareto Principle at the same time. Thus, we can prove that no Paretian ranking can satisfy the numerical representability and all of the distributive equity properties in the setting of intertemporal social choice.

On the Possibility of Continuous, Paretian and Egalitarian Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams

There exists a utilitarian tradition à la Sidgwick of treating equal generations equally in the form of anonymity. Diamond showed that no social evaluation ordering over infinite utility streams satisfying the Pareto principle, Sidgwick's equity principle, and the axiom of continuity exists. We introduce two versions of egalitarianism in the spirit of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and the Lorenz domination principle, and examine their compatibility with the weak Pareto principle in the presence of a semi-continuity axiom. The social evaluation relation is not assumed to be either complete or transitive, yet Diamond's impossibility strenuously resurfaces.

Liberal approaches to ranking infinite utility streams: When can we avoid interferences?

In this work we analyse social welfare relations on sets of infinite utility streams that verify various types of liberal non-interference principles. Earlier contributions have established that (finitely) anonymous and strongly Paretian quasiorderings exist that agree with axioms of that kind together with weak preference continuity and further consistency. Nevertheless Mariotti and Veneziani prove that a fully liberal non-interfering view of a finite society leads to dictatorship if weak Pareto optimality is imposed. We first prove that extending the horizon to infinity produces a reversal of such impossibility result. Then we investigate a related problem: namely, the possibility of combining “standard” semicontinuity with efficiency in the presence of non-interference. We provide several impossibility results that prove that there is a generalised incompatibility between continuity and non-interference principles, both under ordinal and cardinal views of the problem. Our analysis ends with some insights on the property of representability in the presence of non-interference assumptions. In particular we prove that all social welfare functions that verify a very mild efficiency property must exert some interference (penalising both adverse and favorable changes) on the affairs of particular generations.Pareto axiom; Intergenerational justice; Social welfare relation; Non-interference; Continuity

A concept of progress for normative economics

On se demande en quel sens il serait permis de décrire comme progressives les transformations qu'a connues l'économie normative du 20ème siècle. On propose alors un critère simple de progrès qui convienne aux séquences de théories normatives, et on le fait jouer sur la transition historique de la nouvelle économie du bien-être à la théorie du choix social. Après avoir rétabli les articulations conceptuelles des deux théories, l'article conclut que celle-ci a représenté un progrès par rapport à celle-là. Il commente aussi, mais plus brièvement, les développements récents de l'économie normative et leur relation avec les deux étapes précédentes.Economie du bien-être;Théorie du choix social;Progrès;Economie normative;Fonction de bien-être social;Théorème d'Arrow;Welfarisme

Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle

This paper analyses the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. An axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, named the Weak Harm Principle, is studied, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty. It is shown that liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for social welfare judgments, in both the finite and the infinite context. In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice. However, a surprisingly strong and general relation is established between liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian principles in the Rawlsian tradition

The impossibility of social evaluations of infinite streams with strict inequality aversion

[EN]We are concerned with the problem of aggregating infinite utility streams and the possible adoption of consequentialist equity principles. We find a virtually universal incompatibility between the Basu–Mitra approach (that advocates for social welfare functions and renounces continuity assumptions) and postulates that capture various forms of strict preference for a reduction in inequality like the Strong Equity Principle, the Pigou–Dalton Transfer principle, or Altruistic Equity. We also prove that the Hara–Shinotsuka–Suzumura–Xu impossibility for semicontinuous social welfare relations remains under the latter distributional postulate