Stakeholder involvement, motivation, responsibility, communication: How to design usable security in e-Science

e-Science projects face a difficult challenge in providing access to valuable computational resources, data and software to large communities of distributed users. Oil the one hand, the raison d'etre of the projects is to encourage members of their research communities to use the resources provided. Oil the other hand, the threats to these resources from online attacks require robust and effective Security to mitigate the risks faced. This raises two issues: ensuring that (I) the security mechanisms put in place are usable by the different users of the system, and (2) the security of the overall system satisfies the security needs of all its different stakeholders. A failure to address either of these issues call seriously jeopardise the success of e-Science projects.The aim of this paper is to firstly provide a detailed understanding of how these challenges call present themselves in practice in the development of e-Science applications. Secondly, this paper examines the steps that projects can undertake to ensure that security requirements are correctly identified, and security measures are usable by the intended research community. The research presented in this paper is based Oil four case studies of c-Science projects. Security design traditionally uses expert analysis of risks to the technology and deploys appropriate countermeasures to deal with them. However, these case studies highlight the importance of involving all stakeholders in the process of identifying security needs and designing secure and usable systems.For each case study, transcripts of the security analysis and design sessions were analysed to gain insight into the issues and factors that surround the design of usable security. The analysis concludes with a model explaining the relationships between the most important factors identified. This includes a detailed examination of the roles of responsibility, motivation and communication of stakeholders in the ongoing process of designing usable secure socio-technical systems such as e-Science. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

Design as Code: Facilitating Collaboration between Usability and Security Engineers using CAIRIS

Designing usable and secure software is hard with- out tool-support. Given the importance of requirements, CAIRIS was designed to illustrate the form tool-support for specifying usable and secure systems might take. While CAIRIS supports a broad range of security and usability engineering activities, its architecture needs to evolve to meet the workflows of these stakeholders. To this end, this paper illustrates how CAIRIS and its models act as a vehicle for collaboration between usability and security engineers. We describe how the modified architecture of CAIRIS facilitates this collaboration, and illustrate the tool using three usage scenarios

Design as Code: Facilitating Collaboration between Usability and Security Engineers using CAIRIS

Designing usable and secure software is hard with- out tool-support. Given the importance of requirements, CAIRIS was designed to illustrate the form tool-support for specifying usable and secure systems might take. While CAIRIS supports a broad range of security and usability engineering activities, its architecture needs to evolve to meet the workflows of these stakeholders. To this end, this paper illustrates how CAIRIS and its models act as a vehicle for collaboration between usability and security engineers. We describe how the modified architecture of CAIRIS facilitates this collaboration, and illustrate the tool using three usage scenarios

Usable Security: Why Do We Need It? How Do We Get It?

Security experts frequently refer to people as “the weakest link in the chain” of system security. Famed hacker Kevin Mitnick revealed that he hardly ever cracked a password, because it “was easier to dupe people into revealing it” by employing a range of social engineering techniques. Often, such failures are attributed to users’ carelessness and ignorance. However, more enlightened researchers have pointed out that current security tools are simply too complex for many users, and they have made efforts to improve user interfaces to security tools. In this chapter, we aim to broaden the current perspective, focusing on the usability of security tools (or products) and the process of designing secure systems for the real-world context (the panorama) in which they have to operate. Here we demonstrate how current human factors knowledge and user-centered design principles can help security designers produce security solutions that are effective in practice

Integrating security and usability into the requirements and design process

According to Ross Anderson, 'Many systems fail because their designers protect the wrong things or protect the right things in the wrong way'. Surveys also show that security incidents in industry are rising, which highlights the difficulty of designing good security. Some recent approaches have targeted security from the technological perspective, others from the human–computer interaction angle, offering better User Interfaces (UIs) for improved usability of security mechanisms. However, usability issues also extend beyond the user interface and should be considered during system requirements and design. In this paper, we describe Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security (AEGIS), a methodology for the development of secure and usable systems. AEGIS defines a development process and a UML meta-model of the definition and the reasoning over the system's assets. AEGIS has been applied to case studies in the area of Grid computing and we report on one of these

Security and Online learning: to protect or prohibit

The rapid development of online learning is opening up many new learning opportunities. Yet, with this increased potential come a myriad of risks. Usable security systems are essential as poor usability in security can result in excluding intended users while allowing sensitive data to be released to unacceptable recipients. This chapter presents findings concerned with usability for two security issues: authentication mechanisms and privacy. Usability issues such as memorability, feedback, guidance, context of use and concepts of information ownership are reviewed within various environments. This chapter also reviews the roots of these usability difficulties in the culture clash between the non-user-oriented perspective of security and the information exchange culture of the education domain. Finally an account is provided of how future systems can be developed which maintain security and yet are still usable

Finding and Resolving Security Misusability with Misusability Cases

Although widely used for both security and usability concerns, scenarios used in security design may not necessarily inform the design of usability, and vice- versa. One way of using scenarios to bridge security and usability involves explicitly describing how design deci- sions can lead to users inadvertently exploiting vulnera- bilities to carry out their production tasks. This paper describes how misusability cases, scenarios that describe how design decisions may lead to usability problems sub- sequently leading to system misuse, address this problem. We describe the related work upon which misusability cases are based before presenting the approach, and illus- trating its application using a case study example. Finally, we describe some findings from this approach that further inform the design of usable and secure systems

Building need-based systems for complex hostile situations

The concept of need-based systems is that they are not instantiated until they are brought to use. Such systems are either designed, assembled and instantiated for very concrete needs, alternatively built on speculation. They are used for evaluation, training or for real. In most cases they are not instantiated, though possibly brought into use as needed. How should needs be expressed? Needs are expressed in terms of results and effects. They may be simple or complex, where complex needs can be seen as structured compositions of more basic needs. When facing a hostile situation, it is critical to have predicted all needs necessary for resolving the given assignment. The complexity of needs, and of their interdependencies may appear to be overwhelming, and it is important to find optimal solutions to the problem at hand. What is needed is a knowledge-based conceptual model that describes the inter-relation of needs, predictions and effects. This paper proposes a number of viewpoints and tools to be applied to the construction of need-based systems -- viewing needs as a resource economy, as a non-linear dynamical system, making use of game theory, decision theory, and risk management. Models for needs and predictions, and the ways they are utilized, extends current systems engineering methods

Reflecting on the usability of research on culture in designing interaction

The concept of culture has been attractive to producers of interactive\ud systems who are willing to design useful and relevant solutions to users\ud increasingly located in culturally diverse contexts. Despite a substantial body of\ud research on culture and technology, interaction designers have not always been\ud able to apply these research outputs to effectively define requirements for\ud culturally diverse users. This paper frames this issue as one of understanding of\ud the different paradigms underpinning the cultural models being applied to\ud interface development and research. Drawing on different social science theories,\ud the authors discuss top-down and bottom-up perspectives in the study of users‟\ud cultural differences and discuss the extent to which each provides usable design\ud knowledge. The case is made for combining bottom-up and top-down perspectives\ud into a sociotechnical approach that can produce knowledge useful and usable by\ud interaction designers. This is illustrated with a case study about the design of\ud interactive systems for farmers in rural Kenya