Techniques for the dynamic randomization of network attributes

Critical infrastructure control systems continue to foster predictable communication paths and static configurations that allow easy access to our networked critical infrastructure around the world. This makes them attractive and easy targets for cyber-attack. We have developed technologies that address these attack vectors by automatically reconfiguring network settings. Applying these protective measures will convert control systems into «moving targets» that proactively defend themselves against attack. This «Moving Target Defense» (MTD) revolves about the movement of network reconfiguration, securely communicating reconfiguration specifications to other network nodes as required, and ensuring that connectivity between nodes is uninterrupted. Software-defined Networking (SDN) is leveraged to meet many of these goals. Our MTD approach eliminates adversaries targeting known static attributes of network devices and systems, and consists of the following three techniques: (1) Network Randomization for TCP/UDP Ports; (2) Network Randomization for IP Addresses; (3) Network Randomization for Network Paths In this paper, we describe the implementation of the aforementioned technologies. We also discuss the individual and collective successes for the techniques, challenges for deployment, constraints and assumptions, and the performance implications for each technique

Indirect effects of an aid program: how do liquidity injections affect non-eligibles' consumption?

Aid programs in developing countries are likely to affect both the treated and the non-treated households living in the targeted areas. Studies that focus on the treatment effecton the treated may fail to capture important spillover effects. We exploit the unique designof an aid program's experimental trial to identify its indirect effect on consumption for non-eligible households living in treated areas. We find that this effect is positive, and that itoccurs through changes in the insurance and credit markets: non-eligible households receivemore transfers, and borrow more when hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock, because of theprogram liquidity injection; thus they can reduce their precautionary savings. We also testfor general equilibrium effects in the local labor and goods markets; we find no significantchanges in labor income and prices, while there is a reduction in earnings from sales ofagricultural products, which are now consumed rather than sold. We show that this classof aid programs has important positive externalities; thus their overall effect is larger thanthe effect on the treated. Our results confirm that a key identifying assumption - that thetreatment has no effect on the non-treated - is likely to be violated in similar policy designs. Aid programs in developing countries are likely to affect both the treated and the non-treated households living in the targeted areas. Studies that focus on the treatment effecton the treated may fail to capture important spillover effects. We exploit the unique designof an aid program's experimental trial to identify its indirect effect on consumption for non-eligible households living in treated areas. We find that this effect is positive, and that itoccurs through changes in the insurance and credit markets: non-eligible households receivemore transfers, and borrow more when hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock, because of theprogram liquidity injection; thus they can reduce their precautionary savings. We also testfor general equilibrium effects in the local labor and goods markets; we find no significantchanges in labor income and prices, while there is a reduction in earnings from sales ofagricultural products, which are now consumed rather than sold. We show that this classof aid programs has important positive externalities; thus their overall effect is larger thanthe effect on the treated. Our results confirm that a key identifying assumption - that thetreatment has no effect on the non-treated - is likely to be violated in similar policy designs

Migrating Away from a Seasonal Famine: A Randomized Intervention in Bangladesh

The rural northwestern districts of Bangladesh, home to 10 million people, experience a preharvest seasonal famine, locally known as Monga, with disturbing regularity. Surprisingly, outmigration from the Monga-prone districts is not all that common. This research tests whether migration could play any role in Monga mitigation. We implemented a randomized intervention that provided monetary incentives to individuals in Monga-prone regions to seasonally outmigrate during the pre-harvest season. We experimentally varied the conditionalities attached to the incentives, such as a requirement to form a group and migrate jointly (as opposed to migrating individually), sometimes assigning migration partners and the destination, and varying group size. This paper reports just the first stage results of this randomized intervention project, where we focus on household responsiveness to our incentive offers in terms of their decision to migrate. Our cash and credit incentives had a very large effect on migration propensity: over 40% of those receiving an incentive choose to migrate, whereas only 13% of control households do. This large effect is consistent with the presence of savings or borrowing constraints for these households, since providing information on wages and employment conditions at destinations only has a negligible 2 percentage point impact on the propensity to migrate relative to the control group.Monga, famine, Bangladesh, migration

Migrating Away from a Seasonal Famine: A Randomized Intervention in Bangladesh

The rural northwestern districts of Bangladesh, home to 10 million people, experience a preharvest seasonal famine, locally known as Monga, with disturbing regularity. Surprisingly, outmigration from the Monga-prone districts is not all that common. This research tests whether migration could play any role in Monga mitigation. We implemented a randomized intervention that provided monetary incentives to individuals in Monga-prone regions to seasonally outmigrate during the pre-harvest season. We experimentally varied the conditionalities attached to the incentives, such as a requirement to form a group and migrate jointly (as opposed to migrating individually), sometimes assigning migration partners and the destination, and varying group size. This paper reports just the first stage results of this randomized intervention project, where we focus on household responsiveness to our incentive offers in terms of their decision to migrate. Our cash and credit incentives had a very large effect on migration propensity: over 40% of those receiving an incentive choose to migrate, whereas only 13% of control households do. This large effect is consistent with the presence of savings or borrowing constraints for these households, since providing information on wages and employment conditions at destinations only has a negligible 2 percentage point impact on the propensity to migrate relative to the control group.Monga, famine, Bangladesh, migration