Induction, complexity, and economic methodology

This paper focuses on induction, because the supposed weaknesses of that process are the main reason for favouring falsificationism, which plays an important part in scientific methodology generally; the paper is part of a wider study of economic methodology. The standard objections to, and paradoxes of, induction are reviewed, and this leads to the conclusion that the supposed ‘problem’ or ‘riddle’ of induction is a false one. It is an artefact of two assumptions: that the classic two-valued logic (CL) is appropriate for the contexts in which induction is relevant; and that it is the touchstone of rational thought. The status accorded to CL is the result of historical and cultural factors. The material we need to reason about falls into four distinct domains; these are explored in turn, while progressively relaxing the restrictions that are essential to the valid application of CL. The restrictions include the requirement for a pre-existing, independently-guaranteed classification, into which we can fit all new cases with certainty; and non-ambiguous relationships between antecedents and consequents. Natural kinds, determined by the existence of complex entities whose characteristics cannot be unbundled and altered in a piecemeal, arbitrary fashion, play an important part in the review; so also does fuzzy logic (FL). These are used to resolve two famous paradoxes about induction (the grue and raven paradoxes); and the case for believing that conventional logic is a subset of fuzzy logic is outlined. The latter disposes of all questions of justifying induction deductively. The concept of problem structure is used as the basis for a structured concept of rationality that is appropriate to all four of the domains mentioned above. The rehabilitation of induction supports an alternative definition of science: that it is the business of developing networks of contrastive, constitutive explanations of reproducible, inter-subjective (‘objective’) data. Social and psychological obstacles ensure the progress of science is slow and convoluted; however, the relativist arguments against such a project are rejected.induction; economics; methodology; complexity

A fuzzy hierarchical multiple criteria group decision support system - Decider - and its applications

Decider is a Fuzzy Hierarchical Multiple Criteria Group Decision Support System (FHMC-GDSS) designed for dealing with subjective, in particular linguistic, information and objective information simultaneously to support group decision making particularly on evaluation. In this chapter, the fuzzy aggregation decision model, functions and structure of Decider are introduced. The ideas to resolve decision and evaluation problems we have faced in the development and application of Decider are presented. Two real applications of the Decider system are briefly illustrated. Finally, we discuss our further research in this area. © 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

Agricultural Risk Management - Experiences from an Action Research Approach

A new model for risk management in agriculture is described in the paper. The risk model is constructed as a context dependent process, which includes four main phases. The model is aimed at agricultural advisors, who wish to facilitate and disseminate risk management to farmers. It is developed and tested by an action research approach in an attempt to make risk management more applicable on family farms. Our obtained experiences indicate that farmers don't apply probabilistic thinking and other concepts according to formal decision theory.Risk management, consulting, action research, farm families, Risk and Uncertainty,

Empirical models, rules, and optimization

This paper considers supply decisions by firms in a dynamic setting with adjustment costs and compares the behavior of an optimal control model to that of a rule-based system which relaxes the assumption that agents are explicit optimizers. In our approach, the economic agent uses believably simple rules in coping with complex situations. We estimate rules using an artificially generated sample obtained by running repeated simulations of a dynamic optimal control model of a firm's hiring/firing decisions. We show that (i) agents using heuristics can behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their dynamic returns; (ii) the approach requires fewer behavioral assumptions relative to dynamic optimization and the assumptions made are based on economically intuitive theoretical results linking rule adoption to uncertainty; (iii) the approach delineates the domain of applicability of maximization hypotheses and describes the behavior of agents in situations of economic disequilibrium. The approach adopted uses concepts from fuzzy control theory. An agent, instead of optimizing, follows Fuzzy Associative Memory (FAM) rules which, given input and output data, can be estimated and used to approximate any non-linear dynamic process. Empirical results indicate that the fuzzy rule-based system performs extremely well in approximating optimal dynamic behavior in situations with limited noise.Decision-making. ,econometric models ,TMD ,

Fuzzy group decision making in a competitive situation

In this paper a group decision making problem in a competitive situation with two opponents is considered. Uncertainty in the score assessment for both opponents of any individual of the group as well as between group members is taken into account by means of fuzzy sets. The individual scores can be obtained either direct or via pairwise comparisons of alternatives. The group scores are then mapped into a fuzzy set of preference orderings using the extension principle. By extending metaga7mes to a fuzzy metagame analysis the possible stable symmetric metaequilibria can be found as well as fuzzy ratings for each of the stable metaequilibria. The highest ranking stable metaequilibrium is then obtained by a fuzzy ranking procedure

Induction, complexity, and economic methodology

This paper focuses on induction, because the supposed weaknesses of that process are the main reason for favouring falsificationism, which plays an important part in scientific methodology generally; the paper is part of a wider study of economic methodology. The standard objections to, and paradoxes of, induction are reviewed, and this leads to the conclusion that the supposed ‘problem’ or ‘riddle’ of induction is a false one. It is an artefact of two assumptions: that the classic two-valued logic (CL) is appropriate for the contexts in which induction is relevant; and that it is the touchstone of rational thought. The status accorded to CL is the result of historical and cultural factors. The material we need to reason about falls into four distinct domains; these are explored in turn, while progressively relaxing the restrictions that are essential to the valid application of CL. The restrictions include the requirement for a pre-existing, independently-guaranteed classification, into which we can fit all new cases with certainty; and non-ambiguous relationships between antecedents and consequents. Natural kinds, determined by the existence of complex entities whose characteristics cannot be unbundled and altered in a piecemeal, arbitrary fashion, play an important part in the review; so also does fuzzy logic (FL). These are used to resolve two famous paradoxes about induction (the grue and raven paradoxes); and the case for believing that conventional logic is a subset of fuzzy logic is outlined. The latter disposes of all questions of justifying induction deductively. The concept of problem structure is used as the basis for a structured concept of rationality that is appropriate to all four of the domains mentioned above. The rehabilitation of induction supports an alternative definition of science: that it is the business of developing networks of contrastive, constitutive explanations of reproducible, inter-subjective (‘objective’) data. Social and psychological obstacles ensure the progress of science is slow and convoluted; however, the relativist arguments against such a project are rejected

Induction, complexity, and economic methodology

This paper focuses on induction, because the supposed weaknesses of that process are the main reason for favouring falsificationism, which plays an important part in scientific methodology generally; the paper is part of a wider study of economic methodology. The standard objections to, and paradoxes of, induction are reviewed, and this leads to the conclusion that the supposed ‘problem’ or ‘riddle’ of induction is a false one. It is an artefact of two assumptions: that the classic two-valued logic (CL) is appropriate for the contexts in which induction is relevant; and that it is the touchstone of rational thought. The status accorded to CL is the result of historical and cultural factors. The material we need to reason about falls into four distinct domains; these are explored in turn, while progressively relaxing the restrictions that are essential to the valid application of CL. The restrictions include the requirement for a pre-existing, independently-guaranteed classification, into which we can fit all new cases with certainty; and non-ambiguous relationships between antecedents and consequents. Natural kinds, determined by the existence of complex entities whose characteristics cannot be unbundled and altered in a piecemeal, arbitrary fashion, play an important part in the review; so also does fuzzy logic (FL). These are used to resolve two famous paradoxes about induction (the grue and raven paradoxes); and the case for believing that conventional logic is a subset of fuzzy logic is outlined. The latter disposes of all questions of justifying induction deductively. The concept of problem structure is used as the basis for a structured concept of rationality that is appropriate to all four of the domains mentioned above. The rehabilitation of induction supports an alternative definition of science: that it is the business of developing networks of contrastive, constitutive explanations of reproducible, inter-subjective (‘objective’) data. Social and psychological obstacles ensure the progress of science is slow and convoluted; however, the relativist arguments against such a project are rejected

A critical analytic literature review of virtue ethics for social work: beyond codified conduct towards virtuous social work

This submission is based on a critical analytical literature review of the moral paradigm of virtue ethics and a specific application of this to social work value discourse in search of lost identity. It echoes the philosophical academy's paradigmatic wars between 'act' and 'agent' appraisals in moral theory. Act appraisal theories focus on a person's act as the primary source of moral value whereas agent appraisal theories - whether 'agentprior' or stricter 'agent-based’ versions - focus on a person’s disposition to act morally. This generates a philosophical debate about which type of appraisal should take precedence in making an overall evaluation of a person's moral performance. My starting point is that at core social work is an altruistic activity entailing a deep commitment, a 'moral impulse', towards the distressed 'other'. This should privilege dispositional models of value that stress character and good motivation correctly applied - in effect making for an ethical career built upon the requisite moral virtues. However, the neo-liberal and neo-conservative state hegemony has all but vanquished the moral impulse and its correct application. In virtue ethical language, we live in 'vicious' times. I claim that social work’s adherence to act appraisal Kantian and Utilitarian models is implicated in this loss. Kantian 'deontic' theory stresses inviolable moral principle to be obeyed irrespective of outcome: Utilitarian 'consequentualist' theory calculates the best moral outcome measured against principle. The withering of social work as a morally active profession has culminated in the state regulator's Code of Practice. This makes for a conformity of behaviour which I call 'proto-ethical' to distinguish it from 'ethics proper'. The Code demands that de-moralised practitioners dutifully follow policy, rules, procedures and targets - ersatz, piecemeal and simplistic forms of deontic and consequentualist act appraisals. Numerous inquiries into social work failures indict practitioners for such behaviour. I draw upon mainstream virtue ethical theory and the emergent social work counter discourse to get beyond both code and the simplified under-theoretisation of social work value. I defend a thesis regarding an identity-defining cluster of social work specific virtues. I propose two modules: 'righteous indignation’ to capture the heartfelt moral impulse, and 'just generosity' to mindfully delineate the scope and legitimacy of the former. Their operation generates an exchange relationship with the client whereby the social worker builds 'surplus value' to give back more than must be taken in the transaction. I construct a social work specific minimal-maximal 'stability standard' to anchor the morally correct expression of these two modules and the estimation of surplus value. In satisficing terms, the standard describes what is good enough but is also potentially expansive. A derivative social work practice of moral value is embedded in an historic 'care and control' dialectic. The uncomfortable landscape is one of moral ambiguity and paradoxicality, to be navigated well in virtue terms. I argue that it is incongruous to speak of charactereological social worker virtues and vices and then not to employ the same paradigm to the client’s moral world. This invites a functional analysis of virtue. The telos of social work - our moral impulse at work - directs us to scrutiny of the unsafe household. Our mandate is the well-being of the putative client within, discoursed in terms of functional life-stage virtues and vicious circumstance. I employ the allegorical device of a personal ethical journey from interested lay person to committed social worker, tracking the character-building moral peregrinations. I focus on two criticisms of virtue ethics - a philosophical fork. It is said that virtue ethical theory cannot of itself generate any reliable, independently validated action guidance. In so far as it does, the theory will endorse an as-given, even reactionary, criterion of right action, making 'virtue and vice' talk the bastion of the establishment power holders who control knowledge. I seek to repudiate these claims. Given that this demands a new approach to moral pedagogy, the practical implications for the suitability and training of social workers are discussed