Russian «westerners». the history of the party «Democratic choice of Russia» (1992 – 1999)

The article focused on the Russian liberal-democratic ideas which were widespread in the first years after collapse of the Soviet Union. Traditionally, in the Russian social and political thought supporters of the close relations with the EU and the US, the free market economic reforms, the representative democracy, freedom of speech, press, religion called «Westerners». This publication, based on previously unpublished archival materials and the press of those times, considered the history, the main ideological principles of most consistent in advocating pro-Western vector of development of post-Soviet Russia - the party «Democratic Choice of Russia». Particularly, attention is paid to the DCR participation in parliamentary elections in 1993, 1995 and 1999, the party’s position to the first and second Chechen Wars, foreign policy views of the party leaders, especially on the integration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States. In the article was also analyzed the main reasons for the defeat of the leading liberal-democratic forces in Russia during the 1990s, which led eventually to the collapse of democracy and the gradual introduction of the authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin in the 2000s

Post-Soviet Belarus: The Transformation of National Identity

The paper deals with the formation of a new national identity in Belarus under conditions of post-Soviet transformation. Under the term of "national identity" the author means the identity of the population of the Republic of Belarus that will be adequate to its status of a newly independent state acquired after 1991. Special attention is paid to the existing major research approaches to the problem of constructing this national identity. According to the author's view, both major approaches are inadequate; the author puts forward a new (third) approach that goes beyond discussions on language and national culture, and corresponds to the concept of plurality of identities. The author describes some paradoxes of national identity based on the opposition of "nation" and "people". These correspond to the Western model of the "creation of modern nations", which is not fully applicable to post-Soviet Belarus. All attempts to apply this model to contemporary Belarus lead scholars to several "cultural paradoxes" that can, however, be explained within a new approach

Tatar nation building since 1991: Ethnic mobilisation in historical perspective’

This study analyses the process of ethnic mobilization in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras and assesses the way in which history, memory and the treatment of the Volga Tatars by the Soviet state, especially under Lenin and Stalin, affected their long term desire for greater independence from Moscow. The central argument of this study is that Volga Tatar’s nation building was influenced by changes introduced under Gorbachev and by the weaknesses of the post-Sovietstate particularly during the Yeltsin era of the 1990s. The article assesses the strategies the President of Tatarstan and his advisors utilized during this period,especially after 1985, to successfully negotiate a bilateral treaty with Moscow in February 1994 granting Tatarstan greater autonomy and independence. Within this framework, the article then provides a detailed analysis of the approach taken in Tatarstan to achieve this goal and to renew the treaty in October 2005, despite Putin’s recentralization policies from 2000-2008

The myth of the Great Patriotic War as a tool of the Kremlin’s great power policy. OSW Commentary NUMBER 316 31.12.2019

The sacralised Soviet victory over Nazism is a central element of the politics of memory, as utilised by the Russian state today. It constitutes an important theme in the Kremlin’s ideological offensive that is intended to legitimise Russia’s great-power ambitions. The messianic myth of saving the world from absolute evil is supposed to cover up the darker chapters of Soviet history and to legitimise all subsequent Soviet or Russian wars and military interventions, starting with Hungary, through Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and ending with Ukraine and Syria. According to the current neo-Soviet interpretation, all these military actions were purely defensive and justified by external circumstances. The glorification of the “Yalta order” and the justification of the use of force in foreign policy is intended to legitimise Moscow’s pursuit of its current strategic aims, first and foremost of these being hegemony in the post-Soviet area and revision of the European security architecture. The war mythology and Russia’s great-power ambitions continue to resonate with the wider Russian public; thus contributing to legitimisation of the authoritarian regime in the eyes of a large swathe of society and offsetting the effect of growing socio-economic problems. The myth of a wartime ‘brotherhood of arms’ has a smaller impact on other post-Soviet states, which have increasingly been distancing themselves – especially since 2014 – from Moscow’s neo-imperial historical narrative. The use of historical myths as a form of soft power finds even less resonance in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, low susceptibility in the West to Russian historical propaganda does not diminish the gravity of the challenge posed by Russian information-psychological warfare, resorting to historical falsehoods and specious analogies between the current international situation and political-military tensions of the 1930s

Identity and integration of Russian speakers in the Baltic states: a framework for analysis

Following a review of current scholarship on identity and integration patterns of Russian speakers in the Baltic states, this article proposes an analytical framework to help understand current trends. Rogers Brubaker's widely employed triadic nexus is expanded to demonstrate why a form of Russian-speaking identity has been emerging, but has failed to become fully consolidated, and why significant integration has occurred structurally but not identificationally. By enumerating the subfields of political, economic, and cultural ‘stances’ and ‘representations’ the model helps to understand the complicated integration processes of minority groups that possess complex relationships with ‘external homelands’, ‘nationalizing states’ and ‘international organizations’. Ultimately, it is argued that socio-economic factors largely reduce the capacity for a consolidated identity; political factors have a moderate tendency to reduce this capacity, whereas cultural factors generally increase the potential for a consolidated group identity

From sanctions to summits: Belarus after the Ukraine crisis

Belarus is concerned by Russian actions in Ukraine and is trying to distance itself from Russia, including by not recognising the annexation of Crimea and calling for a peacekeeping mission. It is also suffering the effects of Russia’s economic downturn. President Lukashenka has taken steps to promote the Belarusian language and identity to counter Russian influence. But he is not moving towards greater engagement with the political opposition. The Ukraine crisis has reinforced the risk-averse instincts of the Belarusian people and reduced the likelihood of protests tied to elections scheduled for this year. Minsk is not likely to shift from its broadly proRussian orientation, but it has made tentative diplomatic overtures to the EU. The EU’s pro-democracy sanctions policy toward Belarus has failed to promote political reform and arguably pushed Belarus closer to Russia. Now the EU has to focus not just on fostering democracy but on strengthening Belarusian society, which will help European interests in the long term. The EU should aim to help Belarus with a modernised form of nation building, engaging with civil society, offering assistance on economic reform, lowering the visa barrier, promoting knowledge of the EU and countering Russian propaganda

The Cold Peace: Russo-Western Relations as a Mimetic Cold War

In 1989–1991 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a ‘legacy’ geopolitical contest between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a ‘cold peace’. A cold peace is a mimetic cold war. In other words, while a cold war accepts the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a cold war but suppresses acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while the ‘victory’ of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The ‘universalism’ of the victors is now challenged by Russia's neo-revisionist policy, including not so much the defence of Westphalian notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple systems (the Schmittean pluriverse)