Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games

The weighted stable matching problem

We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be NP-hard in general. Our contribution is two fold: a polyhedral characterization and an approximation algorithm. Previously Chen et al. have shown that the stable matching polytope is integral if and only if the subgraph obtained after running phase one of Irving's algorithm is bipartite. We improve upon this result by showing that there are instances where this subgraph might not be bipartite but one can further eliminate some edges and arrive at a bipartite subgraph. Our elimination procedure ensures that the set of stable matchings remains the same, and thus the stable matching polytope of the final subgraph contains the incidence vectors of all stable matchings of our original graph. This allows us to characterize a larger class of instances for which the weighted stable matching problem is polynomial-time solvable. We also show that our edge elimination procedure is best possible, meaning that if the subgraph we arrive at is not bipartite, then there is no bipartite subgraph that has the same set of stable matchings as the original graph. We complement these results with a $2$-approximation algorithm for the minimum weight stable matching problem for instances where each agent has at most two possible partners in any stable matching. This is the first approximation result for any class of instances with general weights.Comment: This is an extended version of a paper to appear at the The Fourth International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP 2017

The Matching Problem in General Graphs is in Quasi-NC

We show that the perfect matching problem in general graphs is in Quasi-NC. That is, we give a deterministic parallel algorithm which runs in $O(\log^3 n)$ time on $n^{O(\log^2 n)}$ processors. The result is obtained by a derandomization of the Isolation Lemma for perfect matchings, which was introduced in the classic paper by Mulmuley, Vazirani and Vazirani [1987] to obtain a Randomized NC algorithm. Our proof extends the framework of Fenner, Gurjar and Thierauf [2016], who proved the analogous result in the special case of bipartite graphs. Compared to that setting, several new ingredients are needed due to the significantly more complex structure of perfect matchings in general graphs. In particular, our proof heavily relies on the laminar structure of the faces of the perfect matching polytope.Comment: Accepted to FOCS 2017 (58th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science