Cassirer and structuralism of perception: an application of group theory to Gestalt psychology

Ernst Cassirer's task was to set up an account of perception as objective judgement. We can trace Cassirer's view of perception through three different accounts each of which aimed to give an answer of how perceptual judgements can be possible. These three accounts started from (1900-1923) where he presented his view depending on Functional- Relational analysis of perceptual experience. The second account started from (1923-1933) where he presented his view of perception depending on symbolic analysis of perceptual experience, and finally the third account started from (1933-1945) where the analysis of perceptual phenomena has been made depending on his apprehension of Group Theory. The main target of Cassirer in the third account was to show that there is similarity between geometry and perception with respect to the ways both of these two disciplines build up their objects. Having the same logical base, Cassirer claimed that there is similarity between geometrical determination of the object and perceptual determination of the experienced object. For Cassirer, this similarity is what allows an application of "group theory" to perception. As a result of that claim, Cassirer shifted mathematical terms such as "invariance", "frame of reference" and "transformation" from the province of geometry and reused them in the field of perception for setting up what he called psychology of thought. This thesis discusses Cassirer's first two accounts and focuses on the third account by giving examples of how the mathematical concept of "group" can be used as an analogy to provide an intrinsic explanation of the nature of the objects and their characteristics one experiences during the perceptual situation. The explanations of the perceptual phenomena represented in the perceptual experience, as given by Cassirer, based on Gestalt psychology, reflected this understanding. The ample examples created by the Gestalt psychologists and used by Cassirer indicated how both understood the object of perceptual experience as constructed and not as a thing or hic et nunc. I will show that in these three accounts, there are non-physical elements, which defined here as structural elements, involved in the perceptual experience. By the virtue of these non-physical elements, perceptual judgements are possible. Cassirer and the Gestalt psychologists emphasized that these structural elements are presupposed in every perceptual experience and this understanding will lead to the claim that both Cassirer and the Gestaltists presupposed the constructive unity of mind based on a transcendental analysis of the nature of mind and its cognitive processes

The Elasticity of Perception: Undermining the (Non-)Conceptualism Debate

In the current philosophy of perception, a debate about whether concepts permeate perceptual states in constituting the perceptual object or not has been widely discussed. Analytic philosophers and phenomenologists participate in this debate likewise, but it is also a debate in Kantian scholarship since the conceptualists’ thesis goes back to Kant’s Criticism and neo-Kantians already discussing such theory against any philosophy of immediate experience long before Wilfrid Sellars had started his attack against the so-called myth of the given. In light of this historical panorama, the article reconstructs Ernst Cassirer’s views on perception in order to systematically reject both Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism. It can be shown that both positions are uncritical stances which make claims to either the absoluteness of language or perception and that much-discussed arguments such as the fineness of grain argument rely on a category mistake. The proposed solution is a view that upholds the criticism against the myth of the given, but replaces the idea of a conceptual mediation of perceptual experience with a symbolic mediation. As a consequence, perception must perform a paradoxical feat and has thus to be elastic

Perceptual memory drives learning of retinotopic biases for bistable stimuli.

The visual system exploits past experience at multiple timescales to resolve perceptual ambiguity in the retinal image. For example, perception of a bistable stimulus can be biased toward one interpretation over another when preceded by a brief presentation of a disambiguated version of the stimulus (positive priming) or through intermittent presentations of the ambiguous stimulus (stabilization). Similarly, prior presentations of unambiguous stimuli can be used to explicitly "train" a long-lasting association between a percept and a retinal location (perceptual association). These phenonema have typically been regarded as independent processes, with short-term biases attributed to perceptual memory and longer-term biases described as associative learning. Here we tested for interactions between these two forms of experience-dependent perceptual bias and demonstrate that short-term processes strongly influence long-term outcomes. We first demonstrate that the establishment of long-term perceptual contingencies does not require explicit training by unambiguous stimuli, but can arise spontaneously during the periodic presentation of brief, ambiguous stimuli. Using rotating Necker cube stimuli, we observed enduring, retinotopically specific perceptual biases that were expressed from the outset and remained stable for up to 40 min, consistent with the known phenomenon of perceptual stabilization. Further, bias was undiminished after a break period of 5 min, but was readily reset by interposed periods of continuous, as opposed to periodic, ambiguous presentation. Taken together, the results demonstrate that perceptual biases can arise naturally and may principally reflect the brain's tendency to favor recent perceptual interpretation at a given retinal location. Further, they suggest that an association between retinal location and perceptual state, rather than a physical stimulus, is sufficient to generate long-term biases in perceptual organization

Sound for Fantasy and Freedom

Sound is an integral part of our everyday lives. Sound tells us about physical events in the environ- ment, and we use our voices to share ideas and emotions through sound. When navigating the world on a day-to-day basis, most of us use a balanced mix of stimuli from our eyes, ears and other senses to get along. We do this totally naturally and without effort. In the design of computer game experiences, traditionally, most attention has been given to vision rather than the balanced mix of stimuli from our eyes, ears and other senses most of us use to navigate the world on a day to day basis. The risk is that this emphasis neglects types of interaction with the game needed to create an immersive experience. This chapter summarizes the relationship between sound properties, GameFlow and immersive experience and discusses two projects in which Interactive Institute, Sonic Studio has balanced perceptual stimuli and game mechanics to inspire and create new game concepts that liberate users and their imagination

The epistemic force of perceptual experience

What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that sensory states are individuated by the perceptual capacities employed and that there is an asymmetric dependence between their employment in perception and their employment in hallucination and illusion. Due to this asymmetric dependence, sensory states provide us with evidence. Perceptual experience plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies our beliefs about our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of features that we attribute to the world. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perceptual experience. Epistemology-question: How does perceptual experience justify our beliefs and yield knowledge of our environment given that perceptual experience can be misleading (we may be subject to illusion or hallucination)? Mind-question: How does perceptual experience bring about conscious mental states in which our environment appears or seems a certain way to us (irrespective of the way our environment actually is)