Design of Public Voluntary Environmental Programs for Nitrate Pollution in Agriculture: An Evolutionary Approach

The joint evolution of participation and compliance of farmers in a public VA, along with the evolution of the pollution stock is examined. Replica- tor dynamics, modeling participation and compliance, are combined with pollution stock dynamics. Fast-slow selection dynamics are used to capture the fact that distinct decisions to participate in and comply with the public VA evolve in di¤erent time scales. Conditions for evolutionary equilibria and evolutionary stable strategies regarding participation and compliance are derived. Depending on the structure of the legislation and auditing probability, polymorphic equilibria indicating partial participation and par- tial compliance or monomorphic equilibria of full (or non) compliance could be the outcome of the evolutionary processes. Multiple equilibria and irre- versibilities are possible, while convergence to evolutionary equilibria could be monotonic or oscillating. Full participation and compliance can be at- tained if the regulator is pre-committed to certain legislation and inspection probabilities, or by appropriate choices of the legislatively set emission level and the non-compliance …ne. Budget constraints associated with monitoring costs seem to produce polymorphic equilibria.Voluntary agreements, participation, compliance, evolution-

Evolution of Tax Evasion

In this paper we analyze a tax evasion game with taxpayer learning by imitation. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the existing literature that yields full compliance of audited taxpayer who are rational, have a lot of information and thus do not need to interact. When the authority adjusts auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs. Thus, the real life phenomenon of compliance fluctuations is explained within the model rather than by exogenous parameter shifts.tax evasion; imitation; learning

Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

The paper jointly models the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock, by combining replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence, in long run equilibrium, of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome for compliance and the biomass stock. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.Common pool resources (CPR), harvesting, regulation, replicator dynamics, compliance

Choosing an organisational form: the case of collaborative procurement initiatives

This paper deals with different organisational forms of collaborative procurement and provides insight into when to use which form. Different forms from the literature are compared with empirical examples to give an overview of forms, which are then described in terms of strategy, skills and organisation. Whilst acknowledging variations, the paper distinguishes between two main forms: virtual networks and third-party organisations. Using empirical data and four theoretical perspectives (transaction cost economics, resource-based view, contingency theory, agency theory), the paper reflects on when which form can be used and presents an overall framework to help choose an organisational for

Regulation and Evolution of Harvesting Rules and Compliance in Common Pool Resources

The present paper models jointly the evolution of compliance to regulation and the evolution of the CPR stock in the context of an evolutionary process emerging from combining replicator dynamics, which describe the adoption of harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach characterizes the emergence of steady-state equilibrium harvesting rules or compliance levels under regulation, and the corresponding behavior of the steady-state equilibrium resource stock. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. It is shown that stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities, could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome for the level of compliance and the biomass stock. It is also shown that it is possible to modify regulation, by modifying penalties for regulatory violations, in order to attain full compliance equilibria and take the system out of low stock traps. It shown it might be easier for the regulator to obtain the full compliance if there is precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.Common pool resources, harvesting, regulation, replicator dynamics, compliance

Nonlinear and chaotic patterns in Japanese video game console sales and consequences for management control

This paper investigates the behaviour of weekly hardware sales in the Japanese video game sector. It is found that weekly hardware sales exhibit significant linear and non-linear behaviours during the product cycle. We are going to analyse the implications of our findings for management control in the video game sector.forecasting, marketing, time series, systems dynamics, chaos theory

Fraud cycles

Fraud is an ancient crime and one that annually causes hundreds of billions of dollars in losses. We examine the behavioral patterns over time of different types of frauds, which illustrate cyclical frequencies. We develop an evolutionary theory that suggests cyclic behavior in frauds should be common.fraud, cycle, steady state