Two Notions of Justification in Science

The sciences are not only the most sophisticated human enterprise of knowledge gathering, they are at the same time epistemically self-conscious to a considerable degree. Assessments of the epistemic status of data, inferences and theories play an important role in the very practice of science, which therefore includes a wealth of epistemic notions, norms and considerations. In one sense of the expression "epistemology of science�, some sort of an epistemology is thus included in scientific practice. This epistemology is usually captured under the heading of methodology, and its explication – e.g. concerning the standards of confirmation or theory choice – has also been a central business of the philosophy of science. Still, there are further epistemological questions about scientific knowledge claims that are typically not addressed within scientific practice. These include topics such as the underdetermination of theories by all evidence, the nomiracle argument, or the theory-dependence of observations. In the present paper, I will discuss the notion of justification that is operative in science and thus try to shed some light on the relation between the two epistemologies

The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in the Courtroom

Epistemology is important in the debate about science and technology in the courtroom. The epistemological issues and the arguments about them in the context of scientific and technical evidence are now well developed. Of equal importance, though, is an understanding of norms of persuasion and how those norms may differ across disciplines and groups. Norms of persuasion in the courtroom and in legal briefs differ from norms at a scientific conference and in scientific journals. Here, Kritzer examines the disconnect between science and the courtroom in terms of the differing norms of persuasion found within the scientific community and within the legal community

Ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive

Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti 2005 have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive – that is, of how the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti 2005 and define two evidence gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life and in science

Rationalism, Empiricism, and Evidence-Based Medicine: A Call for a New Galenic Synthesis

Thirty years after the rise of the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement, formal training in philosophy remains poorly represented among medical students and their educators. In this paper, I argue that EBM’s reception in this context has resulted in a privileging of empiricism over rationalism in clinical reasoning with unintended consequences for medical practice. After a limited review of the history of medical epistemology, I argue that a solution to this problem can be found in the method of the 2nd-century Roman physician Galen, who brought empiricism and rationalism together in a synthesis anticipating the scientific method. Next, I review several of the problems that have been identified as resulting from a staunch commitment to empiricism in medical practice. Finally, I conclude that greater epistemological awareness in the medical community would precipitate a Galenic shift toward a more epistemically balanced, scientific approach to clinical research

Falsification Test of The National Resilience Concept as Indonesian Geostrategic Doctrine

This study aims to prove the truth of national resilence concept by using deductive phenomenological interpretive qualitative methods with epistemology of geostrategy as a main objective. Popper’s falsification test is intended to gather evidence on which the geostrategic peripheral is applied to the national resilience concept, rather than reject the conception. The required data includes the national resilience concept and an epistemology of geostrategy to explain geostrategic realities in a sistematic hierarchy, using historical documents, scientific publications and also interviews. This study has shown that the national resilience concept sits outside the geostrategic periphery, despite some evidence of geostrategic validity. The evidence indicating the applicability of geostrategy includes (1) Formulation of national objectives and; (2) Consideration of geography and geopolitical condition

Ethics and evidence-based practice

Evidence-based practice is roughly the use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of patients (Sackett et al. 1996). At first it seems hard to imagine how such practice could raise ethical concerns; and yet it has. These concerns are set out in the first section of this chapter. Much of the past discussion of these problems has focused on the epistemology of evidence, with critics suggesting that EBP is based on an overly narrow definition of evidence and knowledge. This chapter tacks differently, focusing instead on the epistemology of practice; in other words, what type of evidence or knowledge is needed in deciding how to act? Using the distinction drawn by Aristotle between practical and scientific knowledge it is suggested that evidence in the form of scientific knowledge, no matter how widely defined, cannot form the basis for practice because it cannot provide the goals that action requires; for EBP these must be provided from within practice itself, for example, nursing or surgery. However, ultimately the goals are provided by wider personal and social goals, in particular, human flourishing. Once this is accepted, it is possible to resolve the ethical concerns that have been raised about EBP, drawing on Aristotle's account of reasoning in the practice areas of craft knowledge and of practical wisdom

Reformed Epistemology, Clairvoyance, and the Role of Evidence

Reformed epidemiologists like Alvin Plantinga and William Alston are well known for their view that one can rationally believe that God exists without believing on the basis of any evidence - scientific, philosophical, or otherwise. I defend reformed epistemology from objections (including one having to do with clairvoyance), and I develop a view about the role that evidence should play in the rationality of theistic belief

Developing a Measure of Scientific Literacy for Middle School Students

Scientific literacy reflects “a broad and functional understanding of science for general education purposes” (DeBoer, 2000, p. 594). Herein, we present the ongoing development of the Scientific Literacy Assessment (SLA), a work‐in‐progress measure to assess middle school students\u27 (ages 11–14) scientific literacy. The SLA includes a selected response measure of students’ demonstrated scientific literacy (SLA‐D) and a motivation and beliefs scale based on existing measures of self‐efficacy, subjective task value, and personal epistemology for science (SLA‐MB). Our theoretical conceptualization of scientific literacy guided the development of our measure. We provide details from three studies: Pilot Study 1 (n = 124) and Pilot Study 2 (n = 220) describe the development of the SLA‐D by conducting iterative item analyses of the student responses, think‐aloud interviews with six students, and external expert feedback on the items in the SLA‐D. Study 3 describes the testing of our prototype measure (n = 264). We present a validity argument including reliability evidence that supports the use of the current version of the SLA to provide an evaluation of middle school students’ scientific literacy. Our resulting SLA includes the SLA‐D in two versions, each with 26 items and the SLA‐MB with 25 items across three scales: value of science, scientific literacy self‐efficacy, and personal epistemology

Do We See Facts?

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception