Revenue Sharing, Demand Uncertainty, and Vertical Control of Competing Firms

This paper argues that revenue sharing is a valuable instrument in vertically separated industries when there is intrabrand competition among the downstream firms, demand is stochastic or variable, and downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized. In these environments, the upstream firm would like to simultaneously soften downstream competition and encourage efficient inventory holding. Traditional two-part tariffs cannot achieve both objectives in the presence of downstream competition. Raising the price of the inputs softens price competition but distorts the downstream firms' inventory decisions. We argue that revenue sharing, combined with a low input price, aligns the incentives in the vertical chain. The use of revenue sharing in video rental retailing is discussed. Blockbuster in particular has used revenue sharing in conjunction with heavy marketing of availability to grow significantly in the video rental retail industry. Many other outlets use revenue sharing as well. Some antitrust concerns have been raised by smaller firms suggesting that revenue sharing might be an anticompetitive vertical restraint. Although our model does not address retailer market power, we show that revenue sharing contracts can be used by upstream firms increase inventory holding and consumer welfare.

Vertical Contracting When Competition for Orders Precedes Procurement

This paper reverses the standard order between input supply negotiations and downstream competition and assumes that competition for orders takes place prior to procurement of inputs in a vertical chain. In an environment where procurement negotiations involve no private information and no restrictions on the form of pricing, it is found that oligopolistically competitive outcomes will result despite the presence of an upstream monopolist. It is demonstrated that vertical integration is a means by which the monopolist can leverage its market power downstream to the detriment of consumers. However, it does so, not by foreclosing on independent downstream firms, but by softening the competitive behaviour of its own integrated units. Thus, the paper provides a simple rationale for anti-competitive vertical integration in an environment that respects the usual Chicago school assumptionsvertical contracting, vertical integration, monopolisation, bargaining, competition

Dynamic Common Agency, Vertical Integration, and Investment: The Economics of Movie Distribution

This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on investment and other strategies in a dynamic common agency framework. Movie distribution is used as a motivating example. The model matches several facts about movie distribution; distributors avoid head-to-head new hit releases, hits have longer runs than flops, and distributors receive the lion’s share of value generated by hits. Welfare comparisons show that integration is privately profitable and may improve social welfare even though it reduces industry profits. The e.ects of integration on strategies and welfare depend critically on how integration a.ects the bargaining power of the non-integrated firm.common agency; exclusive dealing; entertainment; film; licensing

The Trade-off Between Static and Dynamic Efficiency in Electricity Markets - A Cross Country Study

This paper is the first to explicitly test for the presence of a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency in a regulated industry, the electricity industry. We show for 16 European countries over the period 1998-2007 that higher electricity end-user prices in a country subsequently lead to higher investments in the capital stock, i.e. in generation, distribution and transmission assets. Moreover, there is a trade-off between vertical economies and competition. Ownership unbundling and forced access to the incumbent transmission grid increase competition but come at the cost of lost vertical economies. Generally, we find that regulation that affect only the market like the establishment of a wholesale market or free choice of suppliers increase investment activity via spurring competition. Regulation, however, that adversely affects the incumbent directly, like ownership unbundling, decreases aggregate investment spending. (author's abstract)Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economic

INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF E-COMMERCE IN AGRIBUSINESS

The emergence of E-commerce in the 1990s heralded the arrival of the New Economy. However, the failure of numerous dotcoms since early 2001 has led to a debate regarding the future direction of E-commerce and its potential relevance for agribusiness. This study examines the economic implications of E-commerce for agribusiness within the framework of New Institutional Economics. The New Institutional Economics implies that E-commerce has the potential to reduce direct transactions costs in agricultural markets, but that it also may add additional indirect transactions costs. Depending upon the tradeoff between these costs, an institutional innovation which reduces the transactions costs may provide the impetus for an alternative marketing channel for agricultural output. Two models of institutional change are explored. The North model of changes in the rules of the game is found to be more consistent with the advent of E-commerce than the model of technological change suggested by Schumpeter.E-commerce, marketing channels, New Institutional Economics, Schumpeter, Agribusiness, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

EVOLVING RESEARCH ON PRICE COMPETITION IN THE GROCERY RETAILING INDUSTRY: AN APPRAISAL

With the end of the Supermarket Revolution in the 1970s, new forms of horizontal, vertical, and geographic competition have appeared to challenge the supremacy of the supermarket format. New retail formats like warehouse stores, supercenters, and fast-food outlets appear to affect local retail supermarket prices. Slotting allowances, coupons, and electronic data gathering have intensified retailer-manufacturing rivalry. Foreign direct investment offers the promise of new European-style management styles in U.S. grocery retailing.Agribusiness, Demand and Price Analysis,

Market integration and network industries

What is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international externalities in consumption ? To address this question, we set up a spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous effect on prices.compatibility; horizontal differentiation; network effect

Market integration in network industries

What is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international network externalities in consumption? To address this question, we set up a spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous effect on prices.compatibility, horizontal differentiation, network effect

Seemingly competitive food retail regulations : who do they really help ?

The food distribution and retail sectors in Quebec are highly concentrated and integrated as large food distributors are also involved in food retailing. As such, they are competing with small grocery and convenience stores they sell inputs to. A review of the industry suggests that there are important economies of size in distribution, but that smaller stores offering convenience face a more inelastic demand. Concerns over the survival of smaller stores in Quebec have motivated two types of regulations. The first type aims at reducing the cost advantage of dominant retailers by restricting the number of employees that they are allowed to use during specific time periods. The second type restricts retail prices. We develop a simple model capturing the main features of the industry to ascertain the impact of these regulations on retail and wholesale prices. Our results suggest that these regulations reduce welfare and may induce both tighter margins and lower surplus for small retailers.