The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strate- gic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.Proportional Election, Strategic Voting, Ideological Voting

Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional institutions. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. Theoretically, they both describe the degree to which the costs of spending decisions are internalized by individual decision-makers. In addition, we evaluate whether constitutional rules for executive and legislation as well as budget rules shape the size of government and how the different rules interact with fragmentation in determining government size. The empirical study of the role of fragmented governments for fiscal policy outcomes is based on a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 period. The results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is negatively associated with fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the fiscal referendum does effectively restrict the fiscal commons problem, but less successfully than the budget rule.Fragmentation, Fiscal Policy, Referendums, Legislative Rules, Budget Rules

Partisan Liberalizations. A New Puzzle from OECD Network Industries?.

We investigate the political determinants of liberalization in OECD network industries, performing a panel estimation over thirty years, through the largest and most updated sample available. Contrary to traditional ideological cleavages, we find that right-wing governments liberalize less than left-wing ones. This result is confirmed when controlling for the existing regulatory conditions that executives find when elected. Furthermore, governments' heterogeneity, proportional electoral rules, and European Union membership all show positive and statistically significant effects on liberalization. Our findings suggest that, despite the conventional wisdom, the political-economic rationale behind liberalization paths in network industries is far from being assessed.Liberalization - Network Industries - Government heterogeneity and Partisanship - Electoral systems - Panel data . JEL Classification D72, L50, P16, C23.

Partisan Liberalizations. A New Puzzle from OECD Network Industries?

We investigate the political determinants of liberalization in OECD network industries, performing a panel estimation over thirty years, through the largest and most updated sample available. Contrary to traditional ideological cleavages, we find that right-wing governments liberalize less than left-wing ones. This result is confirmed when controlling for the existing regulatory conditions that executives find when elected. Furthermore, governments’ heterogeneity, proportional electoral rules, and European Union membership all show positive and statistically significant effects on liberalization. Our findings suggest that, despite the conventional wisdom, the political-economic rationale behind liberalization paths in network industries is far from being assessedLiberalization – Network Industries – Government heterogeneity and Partisanship – Electoral systems - Panel data

Expectations about Coalitions and Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation

In this paper, I suggest that voters may act strategically in proportional representation elections with post-election coalition building. Based on a stylized setup involving three possible coalitions of four parties on a single policy dimension, voters whose preferred coalition is least likely to win are predicted to strategically cast their ballot for a centrist party. By contrast, those who perceive a chance for their preferred coalition to become the next government are predicted to strategically vote for a non-centrist party. I test these predictions against the standard model of sincere proximity voting, using a unique dataset on voter expectations in the Austrian parliamentary election 2006. Analyses show that believing one's preferred coalition is non-viable raises the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party while believing one's preferred coalition to be viable lowers the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party.

The political districting problem: A survey

Computer scientists and social scientists consider the political districting problem from different viewpoints. This paper gives an overview of both strands of the literature on districting in which the connections and the differences between the two approaches are highlighted

Political Bias in Fiscal Policy Formation: an Econometric Analysis of Coalition Systems

This paper provides a comprehensive econometric analysis of some debated issues concerning the political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy outcomes. Several innovative results are obtained. It turns out that a significant effect on fiscal policy formation can be traced back to the ideological orientation of the policymaker, to the degree of cabinet instability, to cross-country differences in electoral and budgetary institutions and to the dispersion of political power within the ruling coalition. Instead, the preferences of the median voter appear to have little importance. The evidence also rejects the theory of fiscal illusion in decision-making.Fiscal Policy, Policy-making, deficit

The executive toolbox:building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism?Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributivepolitics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. Wemerge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also addingcontextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the twopresidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with porkfunctioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Porkexpenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution oflegislative seats.