Threats and challenges to the scientific representation of semantics: Carnap, Quine, and the Lessons of Semantic Skepticism

We will approach the problem of semantic skepticism by comparing Quine's view with Carnap's strategy for finding intensional equivalences that guarantee a solution to the paradox of analysis; and then we will consider how the Intensionalists use these possible solutions to save the scientificity of semantics. Quine disagrees with Carnap that plausible solutions to the question of intensional equivalence provide us with explanations for the difficult problems. These are ones where, in contrast to mere extensional indistinguishability of expressions, we need a stronger determination to choose the right interpretation. And then he has a skeptical answer to which the semanticist-linguist cannot remain insensitive. The problem is that a semanticist can only say that he has an "object" of inquiry if a normative property can be reconstructed, but that is not guaranteed by the mathematical theory used to infer intensional values. Finally, we would like to point out the relevance of skeptical doctrines about semantics that go beyond the mere haunting of relativism or quietism about meaning. Without a skeptical approach, we argue, we lose sight of the unique nature of language and its peculiar property of being an object shaped by pressures on its own ability to be theorized. &nbsp

Semantic integration of geospatial concepts - a study on land use land cover classification systems

In GI Science, one of the most important interoperability is needed in land use and land cover (LULC) data, because it is key to the evaluation of LULC's many environmental impacts throughout the globe (Foley et al. 2005). Accordingly, this research aims to address the interoperability of LULC information derived by different authorities using different classificatory approaches. LULC data are described by LULC classification systems. The interoperability of LULC data hinges on the semantic integration of LULC classification systems. Existing works on semantically integrating LULC classification systems has a major drawback in finding comparable semantic representations from textual descriptions. To tackle this problem, we borrowed the method of comparing documents in information retrieval, and applied it to comparing LULC category names and descriptions. The results showed significant improvement comparing to previous works. However, lexical semantic methods are not able to solve the semantic heterogeneities in LULC classification systems: the confounding conflict - LULC categories under similar labels and descriptions have different LULC status in reality, and the naming conflict - LULC categories under different labels represent similar LULC type. Without confirmation of their actual land cover status from remote sensing, lexical semantic method cannot achieve reliable matching. To discover confounding conflicts and reconcile naming conflicts, we developed an innovative method of applying remote sensing to the integration of LULC classification systems. Remote sensing is a means of observation on actual LULC status of individual parcels. We calculated parcel level statistics from spectral and textural data, and used these statistics to calculate category similarity. The matching results showed this approach fulfilled its goal - to overcome semantic heterogeneities and achieve more reliable and accurate matching between LULC classifications in the majority of cases. To overcome the limitations of either method, we combined the two by aggregating their output similarities, and achieve better integration. LULC categories that post noticeable differences between lexical semantics and remote sensing once again remind us of semantic heterogeneities in LULC classification systems that must to be overcome before LULC data from different sources become interoperable and serve as the key to understanding our highly interrelated Earth system

Development of a model of machine hand eye coordination and program specifications for a topological machine vision system

A unified approach to computer vision and manipulation is developed which is called choreographic vision. In the model, objects to be viewed by a projected robot in the Viking missions to Mars are seen as objects to be manipulated within choreographic contexts controlled by a multimoded remote, supervisory control system on Earth. A new theory of context relations is introduced as a basis for choreographic programming languages. A topological vision model is developed for recognizing objects by shape and contour. This model is integrated with a projected vision system consisting of a multiaperture image dissector TV camera and a ranging laser system. System program specifications integrate eye-hand coordination and topological vision functions and an aerospace multiprocessor implementation is described

Recursion in cognition: a computational investigation into the representation and processing of language

La recursividad entendida como auto-referencia se puede aplicar a varios constructos de las ciencias cognitivas, como las definiciones teóricas, los procedimientos mecánicos, los procesos de cálculo (sean éstos abstractos o concretos) o las estructuras. La recursividad es una propiedad central tanto del procedimiento mecánico que subyace a la facultad del lenguaje como de las estructuras que esta facultad genera. Sin embargo, tanto las derivaciones sintácticas de la gramática, que constituyen un proceso computacional abstracto, como las estrategias de procesamiento del parser, que son un proceso en tiempo real, proceden de forma iterativa, lo cual sugiere que la especificación recursiva de un algoritmo se implementa de forma iterativa. Además, la combinación de la recursividad con las unidades léxicas y las imposiciones de los interfaces con los que la facultad del lenguaje interactúa resulta en un conjunto de estructuras sui generis que no tienen parangón en otros dominios cognitivos.Recursion qua self-reference applies to various constructs within the cognitive sciences, such as theoretical definitions, mechanical procedures (or algorithms), (abstract or real-time) computational processes and structures. Recursion is an intrinsic property of both the mechanical procedure underlying the language faculty and the structures this faculty generates. However, the recursive nature of the generated structures and the recursive character of the processes need to be kept distinct, their study meriting individual treatment. In fact, the nature of both the syntactic derivations of the grammar (an abstract computational process) and the processing strategies of the parser (a real-time process) are iterative, which suggests that recursively-defined algorithms are implemented iteratively in linguistic cognition. Furthermore, the combination of recursion, lexical items and the impositions of the interfaces the language faculty interacts with results in a sui generis set of structures with which other domains of the mind bear the most superficial of relations

Automatic indexing of multimedia documents as a starting point to annotation process

Automatic text analysis widened the perspective of work on document contents by opening up the studies on the linguistic productions. In this case, we are using annotation as a case study. In our approach, annotation is defined as textual, graphic or sound information, attached to document source (text, photo, audio sequence or video sequence : multimedia). The source of our corpus is from INA databases (ie. Institut National de l'Audiovisuel, Paris). Our research task consisted of identifying what are the appropriate characteristics of a multimedia document, its context and information retrieval in the context of natural language processing (NLP), automatic indexing and knowledge representation. We discuss the crucial role of annotation process in the Knowledge Extraction tools and Management as well as in the design of Information Retrieval Systems. Our focus is more specifically on the new approach in information system design dedicated to “economic intelligence”

Content Indeterminacy in Egan's Deflationary Account of Mental Representation

This thesis examines the notion of representational content in philosopher Frances Egan’s deflationary account of mental representation (DAMR) for cognitive neuroscience. In particular, this thesis explores to what extent DAMR’s pragmatic account of representational content answers to the content determinacy constraint. The content determinacy constraint is a constraint on an account of mental representation which holds that an account must provide the basis for attributing determinate content to the posited computational states. For example, the constraint requires that an account must specify the conditions under which a given representational content — such a fly — is attributed to a given representational vehicle — such as some particular structures in a frog’s brain. A variety of naturalistic “tracking theories” — broadly, theories which attempt to answer to such a constraint in terms of a privileged naturalistic relation holding between some object and the inner mental state in question — are often held to have thus far failed to satisfactorily meet this constraint. Egan’s deflationary account promises to address this constraint in a way which departs from naturalistic tracking theories (and from several other theories as well). It promises to do this by proffering a notion of representational content which says that such content is fundamentally pragmatic, and that this ultimately allows the account to avoid the problems typically associated with tracking theories. I will examine how DAMR purports to meet the content determinacy constraint via its pragmatic account of content. To this end, I will raise a content indeterminacy concern for one of the pragmatic functions of content DAMR maintains. I will examine several potential lines of response to this indeterminacy concern, some of which I will evaluate as more or less successful. The first chapter introduces the central research aims, methods, and an ethical research statement. The second chapter consists in the theoretical backdrop against which DAMR is situated, in particular, with regard to how the notions of “representation” and “computation” have been employed in cognitive science historically. The third chapter consists in a detailed explication of the components of DAMR, including a careful differentiation between its realist and computational elements and its pragmatic elements. This is followed by an explication of how DAMR purports to meet the content determinacy constraint. The fourth chapter consists in a theoretical concern which suggests some pragmatic elements of DAMR might be vulnerable to a content indeterminacy concern; and, a variety of potential responses to the indeterminacy concern raised. The fifth chapter consists in setting out the central conclusion of the thesis and suggesting four potential areas for future investigation. The central conclusion of this thesis is that DAMR faces a “limited” content indeterminacy concern for at least one of its pragmatic elements. However, I highlight that there are several ambiguities which require resolution prior to consideration if the concern raised extends to other elements of the account. I propose that the results of this thesis demonstrate the need for further clarification with regard to the way in which DAMR is committed to the content determinacy constraint. Ultimately, the concerns raised along with the ambiguities noted should serve to facilitate further philosophical evaluation of DAMR

The Causal Structure of Conscious Agency

This dissertation presents a new approach to modeling the causal structure of conscious agency, with a foundation in the metaphysics of causation and empirical tools for incorporating scientific results into an enriched causal model of agency. I use an interventionist causal analysis and experimental evidence from cognitive science to demonstrate that conscious awareness plays several significant causal roles in action. I then consider metaphysical challenges to this approach, and demonstrate that higher level causes such as awareness are legitimately causal.I expose the flawed understanding of causation required for inferring the causal inertness of awareness from experimental evidence. This leads to a differentiation between metaphysical causal questions, about the nature of causation itself, from empirical questions, which apply causal analysis to actual systems in the world. I challenge the practice of focusing on the awareness of agency in order to address the causal role of awareness in agency on the grounds that it inappropriately internalizes conscious agency. To demonstrate how we ought to incorporate scientific results into philosophical theories of agency, I offer an empirically enriched view of conscious agency. I rely on an interventionist approach to develop an evidentiary framework to ascertain the extent to which conscious awareness is a causal factor in action. Based on results from automatism research, I demonstrate at least three important ways in which awareness is a major causal contributor to human action: conscious intentions or goals; conscious perceptual information relevant to the goal; and conscious execution. I then address the problematic assumption that 'higher level' causes are derivative from lower level ones. I introduce the notion of counterfactual robustness to show how, for single tokens of causation, microphysical explanations are often explanatorily inferior to macrophysical ones, and distort the explanandum. I allay concerns about my variable choice by showing that we cannot, even in principle, replace higher level variables such as awareness with lower level variables such as neuronal processing. I introduce the notion of causal articulation in complex systems as the means by which higher level causes have lower level effects, while avoiding problems encountered by other theories of downward causation