Small Is Not Always Beautiful

Peer-to-peer content distribution systems have been enjoying great popularity, and are now gaining momentum as a means of disseminating video streams over the Internet. In many of these protocols, including the popular BitTorrent, content is split into mostly fixed-size pieces, allowing a client to download data from many peers simultaneously. This makes piece size potentially critical for performance. However, previous research efforts have largely overlooked this parameter, opting to focus on others instead. This paper presents the results of real experiments with varying piece sizes on a controlled BitTorrent testbed. We demonstrate that this parameter is indeed critical, as it determines the degree of parallelism in the system, and we investigate optimal piece sizes for distributing small and large content. We also pinpoint a related design trade-off, and explain how BitTorrent's choice of dividing pieces into subpieces attempts to address it

Modeling and Control of Rare Segments in BitTorrent with Epidemic Dynamics

Despite its existing incentives for leecher cooperation, BitTorrent file sharing fundamentally relies on the presence of seeder peers. Seeder peers essentially operate outside the BitTorrent incentives, with two caveats: slow downlinks lead to increased numbers of "temporary" seeders (who left their console, but will terminate their seeder role when they return), and the copyright liability boon that file segmentation offers for permanent seeders. Using a simple epidemic model for a two-segment BitTorrent swarm, we focus on the BitTorrent rule to disseminate the (locally) rarest segments first. With our model, we show that the rarest-segment first rule minimizes transition time to seeder (complete file acquisition) and equalizes the segment populations in steady-state. We discuss how alternative dissemination rules may {\em beneficially increase} file acquisition times causing leechers to remain in the system longer (particularly as temporary seeders). The result is that leechers are further enticed to cooperate. This eliminates the threat of extinction of rare segments which is prevented by the needed presence of permanent seeders. Our model allows us to study the corresponding trade-offs between performance improvement, load on permanent seeders, and content availability, which we leave for future work. Finally, interpreting the two-segment model as one involving a rare segment and a "lumped" segment representing the rest, we study a model that jointly considers control of rare segments and different uplinks causing "choking," where high-uplink peers will not engage in certain transactions with low-uplink peers.Comment: 18 pages, 6 figures, A shorter version of this paper that did not include the N-segment lumped model was presented in May 2011 at IEEE ICC, Kyot

Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy: Lessons from 15 Years of Research and Deployments

Decentralized systems are a subset of distributed systems where multiple authorities control different components and no authority is fully trusted by all. This implies that any component in a decentralized system is potentially adversarial. We revise fifteen years of research on decentralization and privacy, and provide an overview of key systems, as well as key insights for designers of future systems. We show that decentralized designs can enhance privacy, integrity, and availability but also require careful trade-offs in terms of system complexity, properties provided, and degree of decentralization. These trade-offs need to be understood and navigated by designers. We argue that a combination of insights from cryptography, distributed systems, and mechanism design, aligned with the development of adequate incentives, are necessary to build scalable and successful privacy-preserving decentralized systems

Extended Equal Service and Differentiated Service Models for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems have proved to be the most effective and popular file sharing applications in recent years. Previous studies mainly focus on the equal service and the differentiated service strategies when peers have no initial data before their download. In an upload-constrained P2P file sharing system, we model both the equal service process and the differentiated service process when peers' initial data distribution satisfies some special conditions, and also show how to minimize the time to get the file to any number of peers. The proposed models can reveal the intrinsic relations among the initial data amount, the size of peer set and the minimum last finish time. By using the models, we can also provide arbitrary degree of differentiated service to a certain number of peers. We believe that our analysis process and achieved theoretical results could provide fundamental insights into studies on bandwidth allocation and data scheduling, and can give helpful reference both for improving system performance and building effective incentive mechanism in P2P file sharing systems

CORNETO: A Software System for Simulating and Optimizing Optical Networks

In this paper we present a software system that is being developed at the University of Leeds for simulating and optimizing energy efficient optical core networks. The system is called CORNETO, an acronym for CORe NETwork Optimization. The software implements many of the energy saving concepts, methods and computational heuristics that have been produced by the ongoing INTERNET, INTelligent Energy awaRe NETworks, project. The main objective of the software is to help network operators and planners green their networks while maintaining quality of service. In this paper we briefly describe the software and demonstrate its capabilities with two case studies

Systems-compatible Incentives

Originally, the Internet was a technological playground, a collaborative endeavor among researchers who shared the common goal of achieving communication. Self-interest used not to be a concern, but the motivations of the Internet's participants have broadened. Today, the Internet consists of millions of commercial entities and nearly 2 billion users, who often have conflicting goals. For example, while Facebook gives users the illusion of access control, users do not have the ability to control how the personal data they upload is shared or sold by Facebook. Even in BitTorrent, where all users seemingly have the same motivation of downloading a file as quickly as possible, users can subvert the protocol to download more quickly without giving their fair share. These examples demonstrate that protocols that are merely technologically proficient are not enough. Successful networked systems must account for potentially competing interests. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how to build systems that give users incentives to follow the systems' protocols. To achieve incentive-compatible systems, I apply mechanisms from game theory and auction theory to protocol design. This approach has been considered in prior literature, but unfortunately has resulted in few real, deployed systems with incentives to cooperate. I identify the primary challenge in applying mechanism design and game theory to large-scale systems: the goals and assumptions of economic mechanisms often do not match those of networked systems. For example, while auction theory may assume a centralized clearing house, there is no analog in a decentralized system seeking to avoid single points of failure or centralized policies. Similarly, game theory often assumes that each player is able to observe everyone else's actions, or at the very least know how many other players there are, but maintaining perfect system-wide information is impossible in most systems. In other words, not all incentive mechanisms are systems-compatible. The main contribution of this dissertation is the design, implementation, and evaluation of various systems-compatible incentive mechanisms and their application to a wide range of deployable systems. These systems include BitTorrent, which is used to distribute a large file to a large number of downloaders, PeerWise, which leverages user cooperation to achieve lower latencies in Internet routing, and Hoodnets, a new system I present that allows users to share their cellular data access to obtain greater bandwidth on their mobile devices. Each of these systems represents a different point in the design space of systems-compatible incentives. Taken together, along with their implementations and evaluations, these systems demonstrate that systems-compatibility is crucial in achieving practical incentives in real systems. I present design principles outlining how to achieve systems-compatible incentives, which may serve an even broader range of systems than considered herein. I conclude this dissertation with what I consider to be the most important open problems in aligning the competing interests of the Internet's participants

Mathematical analysis of scheduling policies in peer-to-peer video streaming networks

Las redes de pares son comunidades virtuales autogestionadas, desarrolladas en la capa de aplicación sobre la infraestructura de Internet, donde los usuarios (denominados pares) comparten recursos (ancho de banda, memoria, procesamiento) para alcanzar un fin común. La distribución de video representa la aplicación más desafiante, dadas las limitaciones de ancho de banda. Existen básicamente tres servicios de video. El más simple es la descarga, donde un conjunto de servidores posee el contenido original, y los usuarios deben descargar completamente este contenido previo a su reproducción. Un segundo servicio se denomina video bajo demanda, donde los pares se unen a una red virtual siempre que inicien una solicitud de un contenido de video, e inician una descarga progresiva en línea. El último servicio es video en vivo, donde el contenido de video es generado, distribuido y visualizado simultáneamente. En esta tesis se estudian aspectos de diseño para la distribución de video en vivo y bajo demanda. Se presenta un análisis matemático de estabilidad y capacidad de arquitecturas de distribución bajo demanda híbridas, asistidas por pares. Los pares inician descargas concurrentes de múltiples contenidos, y se desconectan cuando lo desean. Se predice la evolución esperada del sistema asumiendo proceso Poisson de arribos y egresos exponenciales, mediante un modelo determinístico de fluidos. Un sub-modelo de descargas secuenciales (no simultáneas) es globalmente y estructuralmente estable, independientemente de los parámetros de la red. Mediante la Ley de Little se determina el tiempo medio de residencia de usuarios en un sistema bajo demanda secuencial estacionario. Se demuestra teóricamente que la filosofía híbrida de cooperación entre pares siempre desempeña mejor que la tecnología pura basada en cliente-servidor

Decentralizing indexing and bootstrapping for online applications

https://doi.org/10.1049/blc2.12001Abstract Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks utilize centralized entities (trackers) to assist peers in finding and exchanging information. Although modern P2P protocols are now trackerless and their function relies on distributed hash tables (DHTs), centralized entities are still needed to build file indices (indexing) and assist users in joining DHT swarms (bootstrapping). Although the functionality of these centralized entities are limited, every peer in the network is expected to trust them to function as expected (e.g. to correctly index new files). In this work, a new approach for designing and building decentralized online applications is proposed by introducing DIBDApp. The approach combines blockchain, smart contracts and BitTorrent for building up a combined technology that permits to create decentralized applications that do not require any assistance from centralized entities. DIBDApp is a software library composed of Ethereum smart contracts and an API to the BitTorrent protocol that fully decentralizes indexing, bootstrapping and file storing. DIBDApp enables any peer to seamlessly connect to the designed smart contracts via the Web3J protocol. Extensive experimentation on the Rinkeby Ethereum testnet shows that applications built using the DIBDApp library can perform the same operations as in traditional back-end architectures with a gas cost of a few USD cents.Peer reviewe