The Cost of Social Agents

In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks

Strategy-Proof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions

We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function of his distance to the nearest facility. Departing from previous work, that mostly considers the identity cost function, we are interested in mechanisms without payments that are (group) strategyproof for any given cost function, and achieve a good approximation ratio for the social cost and/or the maximum cost of the agents. We present a randomized mechanism, called Equal Cost, which is group strategyproof and achieves a bounded approximation ratio for all k and n, for any given concave cost function. The approximation ratio is at most 2 for Max Cost and at most n for Social Cost. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for instances with k > 2 facilities and any number of agents. Our result implies an interesting separation between deterministic mechanisms, whose approximation ratio for Max Cost jumps from 2 to unbounded when k increases from 2 to 3, and randomized mechanisms, whose approximation ratio remains at most 2 for all k. On the negative side, we exclude the possibility of a mechanism with the properties of Equal Cost for strictly convex cost functions. We also present a randomized mechanism, called Pick the Loser, which applies to instances with k facilities and n = k+1 agents, and for any given concave cost function, is strongly group strategyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for Social Cost

A Faithful Distributed Implementation of Dual Decomposition and Average Consensus Algorithms

We consider large scale cost allocation problems and consensus seeking problems for multiple agents, in which agents are suggested to collaborate in a distributed algorithm to find a solution. If agents are strategic to minimize their own individual cost rather than the global social cost, they are endowed with an incentive not to follow the intended algorithm, unless the tax/subsidy mechanism is carefully designed. Inspired by the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and more recent algorithmic mechanism design theory, we propose a tax mechanism that incentivises agents to faithfully implement the intended algorithm. In particular, a new notion of asymptotic incentive compatibility is introduced to characterize a desirable property of such class of mechanisms. The proposed class of tax mechanisms provides a sequence of mechanisms that gives agents a diminishing incentive to deviate from suggested algorithm.Comment: 8 page

Spatial Mobility in the Formation of Agent-Based Economic Networks

We extend the model of spatial social network formation of Johnson and Gilles (Review of Economic Design, 2000, 5, 273-299) by situating each economic agent within one of a set of discrete spatial locations and allowing agents to maximise the utility that they gain from their direct and indirect social contacts by relocating, in addition to forming or breaking social links. This enables the exploration of scenarios in which agents are able to alter the distance between themselves and other agents at some cost. Agents in this model might represent countries, firms or individuals, with the distance between a pair of agents representing geographical, social or individual differences. The network of social relationships characterises some form of self-organised persistent interaction such as trade agreements or friendship patterns. By varying the distance-dependent costs of relocation and maintaining social relationships we are able to identify conditions that promote the formation of spatial organisations and network configurations that are pairwise stable and efficient. We also examine the associated patterns in individual and aggregate agent behaviour. We find that both relative location and the order in which agents are allowed to act can drastically affect individual utility. These traits are found to be robust to random perturbations

The diplomat's dilemma: Maximal power for minimal effort in social networks

Closeness is a global measure of centrality in networks, and a proxy for how influential actors are in social networks. In most network models, and many empirical networks, closeness is strongly correlated with degree. However, in social networks there is a cost of maintaining social ties. This leads to a situation (that can occur in the professional social networks of executives, lobbyists, diplomats and so on) where agents have the conflicting objectives of aiming for centrality while simultaneously keeping the degree low. We investigate this situation in an adaptive network-evolution model where agents optimize their positions in the network following individual strategies, and using only local information. The strategies are also optimized, based on the success of the agent and its neighbors. We measure and describe the time evolution of the network and the agents' strategies.Comment: Submitted to Adaptive Networks: Theory, Models and Applications, to be published from Springe

Optimal Assignment of Durable Objects to Successive Agents

This paper analyzes the assignment of durable objects to successive generations of agents who live for two periods. The optimal assignment rule is stationary, favors old agents and is determined by a selectivity function which satisfies an iterative functional differential equation. More patient social planners are more selective, as are social planners facing distributions of types with higher probabilities for higher types. The paper also characterizes optimal assignment rules when monetary transfers are allowed and agents face a recovery cost, when agents' types are private information and when agents can invest to improve their types.Dynamic Assignment ; Durable Objects ; Revenue Management ; Dynamic Mechanism Design ; Overlapping Generations ; Promotions and Intertemporal Assignments