Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually

Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence

The relative efficiency of auctions and negotiations is still a puzzle in the literature. While auctions are the prescribed procedures and the most used ones for public procurement, in the private sector, where buyers are free to choose their purchasing method, competitive tendering is far from being their preferred option (Bajari et al. 2009). In addition, recent empirical studies (Estache et al. 2009, Bajari et al. 2009) highlight some failures of auction procedures and identify conditions under which negotiation is more efficient. In particular, they show that auctions perform poorly when projects are complex. In this paper, our aim is to contribute to this debate by providing an empirical analysis of how awarding mechanisms are chosen in public procurement in France. To this end, we examine a comprehensive database of 76,188 observations corresponding to the entire set of public procurement work contracts awarded between 2005 and 2007 in the construction sector. We find empirical regularities regarding the choice of awarding procedures by public buyers. However, most of these regularities do not coincide with what the theoretical literature considers as transaction-cost minimizing behaviours. In particular, the size of the construction projects as well as the length of contracts do not appear as key determinants of the choice of awarding procedures, which translates into costly renegotiations.Auctions; Public Procurement, Contract Theories

Using Similarity Criteria to Make Negotiation Trade-Offs

This paper addresses the issues involved in software agents making trade-offs during automated negotiations in which they have information uncertainty and resource limitations. In particular, the importance of being able to make trade-offs in real-world applications is highlighted and a novel algorithm for performing trade-offs for multi-dimensional goods is developed. The algorithm uses the notion of fuzzy similarity in order to find negotiation solutions that are beneficial to both parties. Empirical results indicate the benefits and effectiveness of the trade-off algorithm in a range of negotiation situations

Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis

Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995-2000. The analysis suggests a number of potential limitations to the use of auctions. Auctions perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, auctions stifle communication between buyers and the sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor's expertise when designing the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed.

FedRR: a federated resource reservation algorithm for multimedia services

The Internet is rapidly evolving towards a multimedia service delivery platform. However, existing Internet-based content delivery approaches have several disadvantages, such as the lack of Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees. Future Internet research has presented several promising ideas to solve the issues related to the current Internet, such as federations across network domains and end-to-end QoS reservations. This paper presents an architecture for the delivery of multimedia content across the Internet, based on these novel principles. It facilitates the collaboration between the stakeholders involved in the content delivery process, allowing them to set up loosely-coupled federations. More specifically, the Federated Resource Reservation (FedRR) algorithm is proposed. It identifies suitable federation partners, selects end-to-end paths between content providers and their customers, and optimally configures intermediary network and infrastructure resources in order to satisfy the requested QoS requirements and minimize delivery costs

Complexity and control: how do they work in PPPs?

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An Investigation of the Negotiation Domain for Electronic Commerce Information Systems

To support fully automatic business cycles, information systems for electronic commerce need to be able to conduct negotiation automatically. In recent years, a number of general frameworks for automated negotiation have been proposed. Application of such frameworks in a specific negotiation situation entails selecting the proper framework and adapting it to this situation. This selection and adaptation process is driven by the specific characteristics of the situation. This paper presents a systematic investigation of there characteristics and surveys a number of frameworks for automated negotiation

Buyer Commitment and Opportunism in the Online Market for IT Services

Companies increasingly outsource IT-related tasks using reverse auction mechanisms embedded into online marketplaces. However, a considerable proportion of auctions at these marketplaces do not result in a contract between buyer and supplier. Extant literature mostly refers to costly bidding and bid evaluation to explain this phenomenon. Another possible explanation is that because of the low entry barriers, buyers with a low commitment to exchange can use the marketplace solely for information gath-ering purposes such as price benchmarking and obtaining free consultations, having little or no intention to contract a supplier. We test this explanation by looking at how different types of costs incurred by the buyer during the sourcing process, are related to the outcome of reverse auctions in terms of contract award. We argue that higher levels of search, preparation and negotiation costs are associated with higher commitment to exchange and find that opportunistic behaviour does indeed play a part in the non-contracted projects, while committed buyers are more likely to enter into a contract with a supplier. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 2,574 reverse auctions at a leading online marketplace for IT services and further verified across projects of different value and different levels of buyer experience. On the practical side, we recommend setting up entry barriers for buyers with a low level of commitment.IT Outsourcing;Online Markets;Opportunism;Reverse Auctions;Transaction Costs