8,811 research outputs found
The communication complexity of private value single item auctions
In this paper we present a new auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the issue concerning the information revelation requirement of this auction and the associated amount of data that needs to be transmitted. We show that in the truthtelling equilibrium the bisection auction is economical in its demand for information on the valuations of the players. It requires the players to transmit less information bits to the auctioneer than the Vickrey and English auctions. In particular, we prove that for integer valuations uniformly distributed on the interval [0,L) the bisection auction of n players requires in expectation transmission of at most 2n + log L information bits by the players. Compared with the corresponding number in the Vickrey auction which is n log L, and in the English auction which is on average at least (1/3) nL, the bisection auction turns out to be the best performer.mathematical economics;
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and
also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field
influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to
how the major search engines auction off online advertising. There are,
however, some basic problems for which the traditional optimal mechanism design
approach is ill-suited --- either because it makes overly strong assumptions,
or because it advocates overly complex designs. The thesis of this paper is
that approximately optimal mechanisms allow us to reason about fundamental
questions that seem out of reach of the traditional theory.
This survey has three main parts. The first part describes the approximately
optimal mechanism design paradigm --- how it works, and what we aim to learn by
applying it. The second and third parts of the survey cover two case studies,
where we instantiate the general design paradigm to investigate two basic
questions. In the first example, we consider revenue maximization in a
single-item auction with heterogeneous bidders. Our goal is to understand if
complexity --- in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge --- is an
essential feature of good auctions for this problem, or alternatively if there
are simpler auctions that are near-optimal. The second example considers
welfare maximization with multiple items. Our goal here is similar in spirit:
when is complexity --- in the form of high-dimensional bid spaces --- an
essential feature of every auction that guarantees reasonable welfare? Are
there interesting cases where low-dimensional bid spaces suffice?Comment: Based on a talk given by the author at the 15th ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation (EC), June 201
Economic Efficiency Requires Interaction
We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining
approximately efficient allocations. The role of interaction in markets has
received significant attention in economic thinking, e.g. in Hayek's 1945
classic paper.
We consider this problem in the framework of simultaneous communication
complexity. We analyze the amount of simultaneous communication required for
achieving an approximately efficient allocation. In particular, we consider two
settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching)
and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. For both settings we first
show that non-interactive systems have enormous communication costs relative to
interactive ones. On the other hand, we show that limited interaction enables
us to find approximately efficient allocations
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each
bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider
both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication
restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that
the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove
non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal
mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in,
as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are
better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the
communication complexity only by a linear factor
Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies the delicate interplay between
computational efficiency, truthfulness, and optimality. We focus on AMD's
paradigmatic problem: combinatorial auctions. We present a new generalization
of the VC dimension to multivalued collections of functions, which encompasses
the classical VC dimension, Natarajan dimension, and Steele dimension. We
present a corresponding generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma and harness
this VC machinery to establish inapproximability results for deterministic
truthful mechanisms. Our results essentially unify all inapproximability
results for deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions to
date and establish new separation gaps between truthful and non-truthful
algorithms
Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction
We study the necessity of interaction for obtaining efficient allocations in
subadditive combinatorial auctions. This problem was originally introduced by
Dobzinski, Nisan, and Oren (STOC'14) as the following simple market scenario:
items are to be allocated among bidders in a distributed setting where
bidders valuations are private and hence communication is needed to obtain an
efficient allocation. The communication happens in rounds: in each round, each
bidder, simultaneously with others, broadcasts a message to all parties
involved and the central planner computes an allocation solely based on the
communicated messages. Dobzinski et.al. showed that no non-interactive
(-round) protocol with polynomial communication (in the number of items and
bidders) can achieve approximation ratio better than ,
while for any , there exists -round protocols that achieve
approximation with polynomial
communication; in particular, rounds of interaction suffice to
obtain an (almost) efficient allocation.
A natural question at this point is to identify the "right" level of
interaction (i.e., number of rounds) necessary to obtain an efficient
allocation. In this paper, we resolve this question by providing an almost
tight round-approximation tradeoff for this problem: we show that for any , any -round protocol that uses polynomial communication can only
approximate the social welfare up to a factor of . This in particular implies that
rounds of interaction are necessary for
obtaining any efficient allocation in these markets. Our work builds on the
recent multi-party round-elimination technique of Alon, Nisan, Raz, and
Weinstein (FOCS'15) and settles an open question posed by Dobzinski et.al. and
Alon et. al
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