\u3ci\u3eYersinia pestis\u3c/i\u3e VIRULENCE FACTOR YopM UNDERMINES THE FUNCTION OF DISTINCT CCR2\u3csup\u3e+\u3c/sup\u3eGr1\u3csup\u3e+\u3c/sup\u3e CELLS IN SPLEEN AND LIVER DURING SYSTEMIC PLAGUE

Yersinia pestis, the infective agent of bubonic and pneumonic plague, is classified as a category A agent of bioterrorism. YopM, a protein toxin of Y. pestis, is necessary for full virulence in a systemic plague mouse model with ambient-temperature grown bacteria. We used this model to identify the cells undermined by YopM. Natural killer (NK) cells were previously reported to be lost in spleen and blood in a YopM-associated way; however, NK cell depletion was found not to occur in liver, and ablation of NK cells had no effect on bacterial growth, indicating that NK cells are redundant for the YopM-mediated virulence mechanism. In mice either ablated for Gr1+ cells or lacking the chemokine receptor CCR2, wildtype growth was at least partially restored to the ΔyopM Y. pestis in both spleen and liver. In a mouse model of bubonic plague, CCR2 also was shown to be required for the ΔyopM Y. pestis to show wildtype growth in skin. These data pointed towards Gr1+CCR2+ cells, which include polymorphonuclear leukocytes (PMNs), inflammatory monocytes and inflammatory dendritic cells (iDCs), as key cellular components in controlling the in vivo growth of the ΔyopM Y. pestis. Recruitment of Gr1+CCR2+ cells into both organs was not YopM-dependent, except iDCs, whose influx from blood into spleen was blocked by the YopM-producing Y. pestis parent strain, but not the ΔyopM mutant. Ablation of PMNs, another main subset of Gr1+CCR2+ cells, relieved the growth limitation of the ΔyopM Y. pestis in liver, but not in spleen. Taken together, the data imply that YopM disables the recruitment of CCR2+Gr1+ iDCs into spleen but compromises the function of CCR2+Gr1+ PMNs in liver. These results were recapitulated when the infecting ambient-temperature-grown bacteria received 3 hours of incubation at 37°C. However, the appearance of the ΔyopM mutant phenotype was postponed at least 24 hours, indicating that some virulence property of Y. pestis that was induced by the temperature transition compensated for the loss of YopM in the ΔyopM strain at an early stage of the infection. In general, these findings provide a framework for focusing future research to identify YopM’s direct molecular targets

Opinionated Software

Information security is an important and urgent priority in the computer systems of corporations, governments, and private users. Malevolent software, such as computer viruses and worms, constantly threatens the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of digital information. Virus detection software announces the presence of a virus in a program by issuing a virus alert. A virus alert presents two conflicting legal issues. A virus alert, as a statement on an issue of great public concern, merits protection under the First Amendment. The reputational interest of a plaintiff disparaged by a virus alert, on the other hand, merits protection under the law of defamation. The United States Supreme Court has struck a balance by constitutionalizing the common law of defamation in a series of influential decisions. This article focuses on two implications of these decisions, namely that (1) a plaintiff must show that the defamatory statement is objectively verifiable as true or false; and (2) a plaintiff must prove its falsity with convincing clarity, while the defendant may prove the truthfulness of the statement as a defense. The crucial issues in these implications are truth, falsity, and verifiability. This article analyzes the balance between the conflicting legal rights associated with a virus alert. It focuses on the legal meanings of truth, falsity, and verifiability of a virus alert, and the resolution of these issues in the context of the technology involved in a virus alert. The analysis merges perspectives from constitutional law, the law of defamation, and information technology. Insights from theoretical computer science demonstrate, for instance, that the truth of a virus alert may be unverifiable. In such a case the alert would receive full constitutional protection under the Supreme Court\u27s First Amendment defamation jurisprudence

Defense in Depth of Resource-Constrained Devices

The emergent next generation of computing, the so-called Internet of Things (IoT), presents significant challenges to security, privacy, and trust. The devices commonly used in IoT scenarios are often resource-constrained with reduced computational strength, limited power consumption, and stringent availability requirements. Additionally, at least in the consumer arena, time-to-market is often prioritized at the expense of quality assurance and security. An initial lack of standards has compounded the problems arising from this rapid development. However, the explosive growth in the number and types of IoT devices has now created a multitude of competing standards and technology silos resulting in a highly fragmented threat model. Tens of billions of these devices have been deployed in consumers\u27 homes and industrial settings. From smart toasters and personal health monitors to industrial controls in energy delivery networks, these devices wield significant influence on our daily lives. They are privy to highly sensitive, often personal data and responsible for real-world, security-critical, physical processes. As such, these internet-connected things are highly valuable and vulnerable targets for exploitation. Current security measures, such as reactionary policies and ad hoc patching, are not adequate at this scale. This thesis presents a multi-layered, defense in depth, approach to preventing and mitigating a myriad of vulnerabilities associated with the above challenges. To secure the pre-boot environment, we demonstrate a hardware-based secure boot process for devices lacking secure memory. We introduce a novel implementation of remote attestation backed by blockchain technologies to address hardware and software integrity concerns for the long-running, unsupervised, and rarely patched systems found in industrial IoT settings. Moving into the software layer, we present a unique method of intraprocess memory isolation as a barrier to several prevalent classes of software vulnerabilities. Finally, we exhibit work on network analysis and intrusion detection for the low-power, low-latency, and low-bandwidth wireless networks common to IoT applications. By targeting these areas of the hardware-software stack, we seek to establish a trustworthy system that extends from power-on through application runtime

ICT aspects of power systems and their security

This report provides a deep description of four complex Attack Scenarios that have as final goal to produce damage to the Electric Power Transmission System. The details about protocols used, vulnerabilities, devices etc. have been for obvious reasons hidden, and the ones presented have to be understood as mere (even if realistic) simplified versions of possible power systems.JRC.DG.G.6-Security technology assessmen

Malaysia\u27s Computer Crimes Act 1997 Gets Tough on Cybercrime But Fails to Advance the Development of Cyberlaws

Malaysia is in the process of developing the Multimedia Super Corridor ( MSC ), a high-tech zone sometimes called the Silicon Valley of the East. As a way of attracting investors to the MSC, Malaysia is adopting business-friendly policies and comprehensive cyberlaws designed to assure MSC participants that they and their technology will be protected. One of Malaysia\u27s many goals is to be a leader in the development of cyberlaws. However, the Computer Crimes Act 1997 is too flawed to place Malaysia in that role. The Computer Crimes Act is designed to prevent computer crimes such as hacking, virus planting and the cracking of passwords. Although the Act contains some progressive provisions that appear in recommendations adopted by organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, some provisions lack clarity and can be interpreted in ways which make them overly broad and unenforceable. Other provisions seem to ignore the needs of corporate victims of computer crimes, thus failing to meet the goal of assuring potential MSC investors that their technology will be protected. By modifying some of the statutory language to clarify the meaning and by adopting provisions which offer more progressive solutions to the problem of computer crime, the Computer Crimes Act 1997 could contribute to Malaysia\u27s standing as a leader in the development of cyberlaws

Montana Kaimin, February 6, 2002

Student newspaper of the University of Montana, Missoula.https://scholarworks.umt.edu/studentnewspaper/10619/thumbnail.jp

Tight Arms Race: Overview of Current Malware Threats and Trends in Their Detection

Cyber attacks are currently blooming, as the attackers reap significant profits from them and face a limited risk when compared to committing the "classical" crimes. One of the major components that leads to the successful compromising of the targeted system is malicious software. It allows using the victim's machine for various nefarious purposes, e.g., making it a part of the botnet, mining cryptocurrencies, or holding hostage the data stored there. At present, the complexity, proliferation, and variety of malware pose a real challenge for the existing countermeasures and require their constant improvements. That is why, in this paper we first perform a detailed meta-review of the existing surveys related to malware and its detection techniques, showing an arms race between these two sides of a barricade. On this basis, we review the evolution of modern threats in the communication networks, with a particular focus on the techniques employing information hiding. Next, we present the bird's eye view portraying the main development trends in detection methods with a special emphasis on the machine learning techniques. The survey is concluded with the description of potential future research directions in the field of malware detection