Fodor on imagistic mental representations

Abstract: Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic representation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a particular kind of functional role in certain types of deliberative tasks. The second says that images are solely restricted to the borders of perception, and act as a sort of medium for the fixing of conceptual reference. I argue, against the first proposal, that a broad-scope computationalism such as Fodor’s renders images in principle functionally redundant. I argue, against the second proposal, that empirical evidence suggests that non-discursive representations are learned through perceptual learning, and directly inform category judgments. In each case, I point out extant debates for which the arguments are relevant. The upshot is that there is motivation for limited scope computationalism, in which some, but not all, mental processes operate on discursive mental representations.Keywords: Computational Theory of Mind; Mental Representation; Perception; Mental Image; Jerry Fodor  Fodor e le rappresentazioni mentali come immaginiRiassunto: La concezione della mente di Fodor è rigorosamente computazionale, ossia le entità mentali di base sono rappresentazioni mentali “discorsive”. Le operazioni su queste rappresentazioni hanno un fine architettonico ampio, che va fino ai confini della percezione e del sistema motorio. In periodi diversi del suo lavoro, Fodor ha proposto due modi per definire un ruolo funzionale per la rappresentazione non-discorsiva come immagine. Tratterò criticamente entrambi. Per il primo, le immagini giocano un particolare tipo di ruolo funzionale in certi tipi di compiti deliberativi, mentre, per il secondo, sono relegate unicamente ai confini della percezione, agendo come medium per fissare il riferimento concettuale. Contro il primo sosterrò che un computazionalismo così ampio come quello di Fodor rende le immagini in principio funzionalmente ridondanti. Contro il secondo sosterrò che l’evidenza empirica suggerisce che le rappresentazioni non-discorsive vengono apprese percettivamente, agendo direttamente sui giudizi di categorizzazione. In entrambi i casi considererò gli argomenti più rilevanti nel dibattito corrente. Si vedrà che ci sono buone ragioni in favore di un computazionalismo più limitato, in cui alcuni processi mentali (ma non tutti) operano su rappresentazioni mentali discorsive.Parole chiave: Teoria computazionale della mente; Rappresentazione mentale; Percezione; Immagine mentale; Jerry Fodo

Translating Translations: A study of Ngā Rūpaiaha o Oma Kaiama, a Māori translation of the English version of the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám

Omar Khayyám, a Persian poet who died in 1131, wrote a number of quatrains in Farsi which are regarded by some as representing the very summit of Sufism (that is, of the mystical dimension of Islamic thought) and by others as being essentially agnostic and hedonistic in nature. Those who are of the latter view are often strongly influenced by the ‘translation’ into English of some of these quatrains by Edward Fitzgerald, a British poet and writer whose first edition of the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám appeared in 1859, at the height of the Victorian era. Although there have been several other translations of Khayyám’s quatrains, none has been as popular or, perhaps, as highly regarded as an artistic work as that of Fitzgerald. It has rarely, however, been regarded as a work that is faithful to the intent of the original. In deciding to translate into Māori Fitzgerald’s rendering into English of some of Khayyám’s Farsi quatrains (5th version), Pei Jones was faced with a peculiarly complex set of problems (linguistic, literary, cultural and religious). Pei Jones’ translation, a translation of a translation, is generally regarded as being faithful to Fitzgerald’s version of the Rubáiyát. It would appear, therefore, that he decided to treat Fitzgeralds’s text, in spite of the reference in its title to the original text, as his source text. This gives rise to a number of questions, including questions about what it means for a translator to be faithful or unfaithful to a source text. With particular reference to Pei Jones’ translation of Fitzgerald’s Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, this thesis explores the concept of ‘fidelity’, a concept that, it is argued here (see Chapter 3), is often treated in the literature on translation in a way that belies its extremely complex nature. The thesis proposes a new approach to the concept of fidelity, one that is based on nine fidelity types: grammatical, lexical, informational, metrical, imagistic, rhetorical, historical, didactic and functional fidelity. In terms of this nonagonal analytical model, twenty-five of Pei Jones’ quatrains are analysed in relation to the equivalent quatrains in Fitzgerald’s version (Chapter 4). The analysis indicates that Pei Jones’ translation has neither metrical fidelity (a consequence of the very different nature of the source and target languages) nor functional fidelity (a consequence of the very different expectations and sensibilities that a Māori audience has in relation to the verbal arts). Metre and function are both, however, fundamental to the enduring appeal of Fitzgerald’s quatrains. The overall conclusion is that since it is often impossible to achieve all nine types of fidelity, translators need to carefully consider what their primary aim is in undertaking the translation of artistic works and be prepared to sacrifice certain types of fidelity (e.g. historical and informational fidelity) in order to create a work that fulfils the aesthetic expectations of the target audience. Pei Jones was undeniably successful in achieving those types of fidelity that were possible. However, the work may have had more widespread appeal if he had sacrificed some of them in order to create a work that was more closely aligned with the aesthetic expectations of Māori readers

Book Reviews

The Gate of Darkness: Studies on the Leftist Literary Movement in China (Tsi-an Hsia) (Reviewed by Irving Lo, Indiana University)Byron and the Dynamics of Metaphor (W. Paul Elledge) (Reviewed by Robert F. Gleckner, The University of California, Riverside)Fiery Dust: Byron\u27s Poetic Development (Jerome J. McGann) (Reviewed by Robert F. Gleckner, The University of California, Riverside)The Pillar of the World: Antony and Cleopatra in Shakespeare\u27s Development (Julian Markel) (Reviewed by Judd B. Arnold, Pennsylvania State University)Shakespeare and the Outer Mystery (Robert H. West) (Reviewed by Judd B. Arnold, Pennsylvania State University)Henry Fielding and The Language of Irony (Glenn W. Hatfield) (Reviewed by Philip Stevick, Temple University)Fielding and the Nature of the Novel (Robert Alter) (Reviewed by Philip Stevick, Temple University)Melville\u27s Thematics of Form: The Great Art of Telling the Truth (Edgar A. Dryden) (Reviewed by Wendell Glick, University of Minnesota at Duluth)Shaw the Dramatist (Louis Crompton) (Reviewed by Alan P. Barr, Indiana University, Northwest)Bernard Shaw and the Art of Destroying Ideals (Charles A. Carpenter) (Reviewed by Alan P. Barr, Indiana University, Northwest)The Passages of Thought: Psychological Representation in the American Novel 1870-1900 (Gordon O. Taylor) (Reviewed by Motley F. Deakin, University of Florida

Re-Sourcing school: Rethinking education in a connected world

Is school a waste of time? Is learning a waste of time? While for some the answer will be the same to both questions, most will agree that they are different questions and that difference is the heart of the issue that this paper seeks to confront. Over the last few years I have noted a number of things that might be called \u27dead canaries\u27. These are things that have signalled to me the scope of the issues that need to be confronted now and in the years ahead if we are to do our best in resourcing and re-sourcing education in a connected world

Explaining Imagination

Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states

Automated metadata annotation: What is and is not possible with machine learning

Automated metadata annotation is only as good as training dataset, or rules that are available for the domain. It's important to learn what type of data content a pre-trained machine learning algorithm has been trained on to understand its limitations and potential biases. Consider what type of content is readily available to train an algorithm—what's popular and what's available. However, scholarly and historical content is often not available in consumable, homogenized, and interoperable formats at the large volume that is required for machine learning. There are exceptions such as science and medicine, where large, well documented collections are available. This paper presents the current state of automated metadata annotation in cultural heritage and research data, discusses challenges identified from use cases, and proposes solutions.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Māori Orality and Extended Cognition: A cognitive approach to memory and oral tradition in the Pacific

Though philosophers have long held that interpretive anthropology and the cognitive science of religion (CSR) are opposed, this thesis offers an extended empirical assessment of the issues surrounding the implications of utilizing ethnographic material within a cognitive study of religious transmission. Using case studies from the Pacific, I consider a core question arising in both interpretative and cognitive disciplines, namely: how have oral cultures been able to preserve and transmit bodies of sacred knowledge cross-generationally without any external administrative tools (i.e. text)? First, I focus on the historical and ethnographic details of traditional Māori orality. I look at how orally transmitted knowledge was managed through the external cognitive resources associated with religious ritual. Here I find evidence within Pacific oral traditions that the problem of managing knowledge was overcome through tools and strategies that augmented memory and oral skill. I give special attention to the traditional Māori structuring of learning environments. Next I consider how macro-spatial tools – such as landmarks, and place names – helped support working memory and information management, and show that orientations to landscape are vital to ensuring collective memory. This thesis also demonstrates how culturally learned tools and strategies support the stability of religious cultural transmission. The use of external cognitive resources implies the complexity of managing and organizing sacred knowledge. Put simply, focusing on the historical accounts from the Pacific reveals a rich suite of culturally evolved tools and strategies for the transmission of religious knowledge. I show that tools such as ritual, myth, mnemonic techniques, and artifacts enable and stabilise such transmission. I hold, that such cultural environments constitute cognitive tools that are meaningfully described as cultural cognitive systems. Thus, combining descriptive accounts with the theoretical orientations of the cognitive sciences motivates what I call a ‘cognitive ecological’ model of mind. I argue that the cognitive ecological model is important because it orients researchers to the role that culturally evolved tools play in: (1) dramatically extending the human brain’s power to reckon with its surroundings and: (2) coordinating such knowledge across social groups and over time. The cognitive ecological model of mind I propose in this study is important for three reasons: First, it challenges the received view within the CSR – what I call the ‘Standard Internal Model’ (SiM) – which holds that the transmission of religious representations carries low cognitive demands (i.e. it is cognitively optimal). In contrast to SiM, the Pacific materials discussed here suggest that the oral transmission of sacred knowledge is cognitively demanding, culturally costly, and locally contingent. Second, my thesis demonstrates that historical and ethnographic evidence contains information that is vital for progress in the CSR since qualitative resources document how niche specific cultural practices often facilitate the acquisition and coordination of the complex knowledge resources over time. The ethnographic data supports the local optimality contention. Third, my thesis reveals that formulating tractable models for cultural transmission within the CSR is benefitted by an interdisciplinary approach. Such a prospect, I urge, is vital for intellectual progress between the humanities and the CSR. As such, and contrary to received opinion, my thesis shows how the CSR and the cultural anthropology of religion share a common intellectual fate