A new approach for designing self-organizing systems and application to adaptive control

There is tremendous interest in the design of intelligent machines capable of autonomous learning and skillful performance under complex environments. A major task in designing such systems is to make the system plastic and adaptive when presented with new and useful information and stable in response to irrelevant events. A great body of knowledge, based on neuro-physiological concepts, has evolved as a possible solution to this problem. Adaptive resonance theory (ART) is a classical example under this category. The system dynamics of an ART network is described by a set of differential equations with nonlinear functions. An approach for designing self-organizing networks characterized by nonlinear differential equations is proposed

Responsible Autonomy

As intelligent systems are increasingly making decisions that directly affect society, perhaps the most important upcoming research direction in AI is to rethink the ethical implications of their actions. Means are needed to integrate moral, societal and legal values with technological developments in AI, both during the design process as well as part of the deliberation algorithms employed by these systems. In this paper, we describe leading ethics theories and propose alternative ways to ensure ethical behavior by artificial systems. Given that ethics are dependent on the socio-cultural context and are often only implicit in deliberation processes, methodologies are needed to elicit the values held by designers and stakeholders, and to make these explicit leading to better understanding and trust on artificial autonomous systems.Comment: IJCAI2017 (International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social Contract

Recent rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning have raised many questions about the regulatory and governance mechanisms for autonomous machines. Many commentators, scholars, and policy-makers now call for ensuring that algorithms governing our lives are transparent, fair, and accountable. Here, I propose a conceptual framework for the regulation of AI and algorithmic systems. I argue that we need tools to program, debug and maintain an algorithmic social contract, a pact between various human stakeholders, mediated by machines. To achieve this, we can adapt the concept of human-in-the-loop (HITL) from the fields of modeling and simulation, and interactive machine learning. In particular, I propose an agenda I call society-in-the-loop (SITL), which combines the HITL control paradigm with mechanisms for negotiating the values of various stakeholders affected by AI systems, and monitoring compliance with the agreement. In short, `SITL = HITL + Social Contract.'Comment: (in press), Ethics of Information Technology, 201

Arguing Machines: Human Supervision of Black Box AI Systems That Make Life-Critical Decisions

We consider the paradigm of a black box AI system that makes life-critical decisions. We propose an "arguing machines" framework that pairs the primary AI system with a secondary one that is independently trained to perform the same task. We show that disagreement between the two systems, without any knowledge of underlying system design or operation, is sufficient to arbitrarily improve the accuracy of the overall decision pipeline given human supervision over disagreements. We demonstrate this system in two applications: (1) an illustrative example of image classification and (2) on large-scale real-world semi-autonomous driving data. For the first application, we apply this framework to image classification achieving a reduction from 8.0% to 2.8% top-5 error on ImageNet. For the second application, we apply this framework to Tesla Autopilot and demonstrate the ability to predict 90.4% of system disengagements that were labeled by human annotators as challenging and needing human supervision

Toward Energetically Autonomous Foraging Soft Robots

© 2016, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. A significant goal of robotics is to develop autonomous machines, capable of independent and collective operation free from human assistance. To operate with complete autonomy robots must be capable of independent movement and total energy self-sufficiency. We present the design of a soft robotic mouth and artificial stomach for aquatic robots that will allow them to feed on biomatter in their surrounding environment. The robot is powered by electrical energy generated through bacterial respiration within a microbial fuel cell (MFC) stomach, and harvested using state-of-the-art voltage step-up electronics. Through innovative exploitation of compliant, biomimetic actuation, the soft robotic feeding mechanism enables the connection of multiple MFC stomachs in series configuration in an aquatic environment, previously a significant challenge. We investigate how a similar soft robotic feeding mechanism could be driven by electroactive polymer artificial muscles from the same bioenergy supply. This work demonstrates the potential for energetically autonomous soft robotic artificial organisms and sets the stage for radically different future robots

A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents

This paper focuses on the research field of machine ethics and how it relates to a technological singularity—a hypothesized, futuristic event where artificial machines will have greater-than-human-level intelligence. One problem related to the singularity centers on the issue of whether human values and norms would survive such an event. To somehow ensure this, a number of artificial intelligence researchers have opted to focus on the development of artificial moral agents, which refers to machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. To date, different frameworks on how to arrive at these agents have been put forward. However, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which framework would likely yield a positive result. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers may contribute to the growing literature on artificial moral agency. While doing so, they could also think about how the said concept could affect other important philosophical concepts

Autonomous Weapons and the Nature of Law and Morality: How Rule-of-Law-Values Require Automation of the Rule of Law

While Autonomous Weapons Systems have obvious military advantages, there are prima facie moral objections to using them. By way of general reply to these objections, I point out similarities between the structure of law and morality on the one hand and of automata on the other. I argue that these, plus the fact that automata can be designed to lack the biases and other failings of humans, require us to automate the formulation, administration, and enforcement of law as much as possible, including the elements of law and morality that are operated by combatants in war. I suggest that, ethically speaking, deploying a legally competent robot in some legally regulated realm is not much different from deploying a more or less well-armed, vulnerable, obedient, or morally discerning soldier or general into battle, a police officer onto patrol, or a lawyer or judge into a trial. All feature automaticity in the sense of deputation to an agent we do not then directly control. Such relations are well understood and well-regulated in morality and law; so there is not much challenging philosophically in having robots be some of these agents — excepting the implications of the limits of robot technology at a given time for responsible deputation. I then consider this proposal in light of the differences between two conceptions of law. These are distinguished by whether each conception sees law as unambiguous rules inherently uncontroversial in each application; and I consider the prospects for robotizing law on each. Likewise for the prospects of robotizing moral theorizing and moral decision-making. Finally I identify certain elements of law and morality, noted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, which robots can participate in only upon being able to set ends and emotionally invest in their attainment. One conclusion is that while affectless autonomous devices might be fit to rule us, they would not be fit to vote with us. For voting is a process for summing felt preferences, and affectless devices would have none to weigh into the sum. Since they don't care which outcomes obtain, they don't get to vote on which ones to bring about

Philosophical Signposts for Artificial Moral Agent Frameworks

This article focuses on a particular issue under machine ethics—that is, the nature of Artificial Moral Agents. Machine ethics is a branch of artificial intelligence that looks into the moral status of artificial agents. Artificial moral agents, on the other hand, are artificial autonomous agents that possess moral value, as well as certain rights and responsibilities. This paper demonstrates that attempts to fully develop a theory that could possibly account for the nature of Artificial Moral Agents may consider certain philosophical ideas, like the standard characterizations of agency, rational agency, moral agency, and artificial agency. At the very least, the said philosophical concepts may be treated as signposts for further research on how to truly account for the nature of Artificial Moral Agents

Uncertainties in the Algorithmic Image

The incorporation of algorithmic procedures into the automation of image production has been gradual, but has reached critical mass over the past century, especially with the advent of photography, the introduction of digital computers and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). Due to the increasingly significant influence algorithmic processes have on visual media, there has been an expansion of the possibilities as to how images may behave, and a consequent struggle to define them. This algorithmic turnhighlights inner tensions within existing notions of the image, namely raising questions regarding the autonomy of machines, author- and viewer- ship, and the veracity of representations. In this sense, algorithmic images hover uncertainly between human and machine as producers and interpreters of visual information, between representational and non-representational, and between visible surface and the processes behind it. This paper gives an introduction to fundamental internal discrepancies which arise within algorithmically produced images, examined through a selection of relevant artistic examples. Focusing on the theme of uncertainty, this investigation considers how algorithmic images contain aspects which conflict with the certitude of computation, and how this contributes to a difficulty in defining images