7,132 research outputs found

    Coalition theories: empirical evidence for dutch municipalities

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    The paper analyzes coalition formation in Dutch municipalities. After discussing the main features of the institutional setting, several theories are discussed, which are classified as size oriented, policy oriented and actor oriented models. A test statistic is proposed to determine the predictive power of these models. The empirical analysis shows that strategic positions as well as some of the distinguished preferences are important in the setting of Dutch municipalities. Especially, the dominant minimum number principle yields highly significant results for coalition formations in the period 1978–1986

    The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game

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    bargaining;cooperative games

    The interest function approach.

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    On some approximately balanced combinatorial cooperative games

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    A model of taxation for cooperativen-person games is introduced where proper coalitions Are taxed proportionally to their value. Games with non-empty core under taxation at rateɛ-balanced. Sharp bounds onɛ in matching games (not necessarily bipartite) graphs are estabLished. Upper and lower bounds on the smallestɛ in bin packing games are derived and euclidean random TSP games are seen to be, with high probability,ɛ-balanced forɛ≈0.06

    A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces

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    We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in "simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives maylead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters become-arbitrarily patient

    Network Capital and Cooperation Patterns in the Working Groups of the Council of the EU

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    This working paper presents findings from a study of network capital and cooperation patterns in the working groups of the Council of the European Union. Two successive rounds of telephone interviews with Council working group representatives from all member states were conducted in 2003 and 2006. It is demonstrated that some member states have a consistently higher stock of network capital (having close ties to a large number of powerful cooperation partners) than others, over time and across policy fields. Size explains a lot of this variation, but there is also room for actor-based factors. For small states in particular inter-personal trust seems to have a positive effect. The findings also indicate that cooperation patterns in the Council working groups follow geographical patterns. The dominant North-South dimension is consistent across policy fields. Rather than having one 'core' the EU15 Council revolved around a North (the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) and a South (France, Italy, Spain) center, connected by Germany. The 2004 enlargement did not change this pattern, but only added new groups of countries to the periphery around the two main centers. There is evidence to suggest that the geographical cooperation patterns are mainly driven by cultural factors, rather than economic interests or political ideologies.political science; COREPER; Council of Ministers; enlargement; power analysis; networks

    Agenda Control in Coalition Formation

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    Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.Agenda Control; Cabinet Formation; Simple Games

    A Note on Shapleys Convex Measure Games

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    L. S. Shapley, in his paper Cores of Convex Games, introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players.supermodularity, multilinear extension, convex cooperative games, directional convexity

    How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

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    Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral parties obtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different European party configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter- institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European Political Groups.Political parties, coalitions, power indices, political institutions, European Union
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