The Weakest Link

SUMMARY In this article it is argued that the formal/informal dichotomy is not based on a classification of economic activities. It is rather a division between workers according to the nature of the labour contracts under which they work. In a labour?surplus economy, the logic of the market place can be kept at bay for some groups who have ‘political visibility’ and therefore political support, and these groups constitute the formal sector. However, modern technology permits transfers of economic activities from one of these sectors to another. At the same time, some specially vulnerable groups like the women workers of India, constrained to stagnate in the informal sector, form a pool of cheap labour. This undermines the strength of the working class movement as a whole, including those currently in the formal sector. RESUME Le maillon le plus faible Dans cet article, l'auteur soutient que la dichtomie formel/in formel ne se fonde pas sur une classification des activités économiques. Il s'agit plutôt d'une division entre les travailleurs suivant le type de contrat de travail régissant leur emploi. Dans une économie à main?d'oeuvre excédentaire, certains groupes sont protégés du jeu de la concurrence par leur “visibilité politique” et le soutien qu'ils en tirent. Ces groupes constituent le secteur formel. Toutefois la technologie permet le passage d'une activité économique de l'un à l'autre de ces secteurs. Par ailleurs, certains groupes particulièrement vulnérables comme les ouvrières indiennes, contraintes de stagner dans le secteur informel, constituent une source de main?d'oeuvre bon marché dont l'existence réduit la force du mouvement ouvrier, notamment des travailleurs du secteur formel. RESUMEN El vínculo más débil En este artículo se señala que la dicotomía de oficial y no oficial no se basa en una clasificación de las actividades económicas, sino más bien en una división entre los trabajadores de acuerdo con el carácter de los contratos de trabajo en virtud de los cuales trabajan. En una economía de mano de obra excedentaria, se puede compensar la lógica de las condiciones del mercado para algunos grupos que tienen “visibilidad política” y, por lo tanto, apoyo político, y estos grupos constituyen el sector oficial. No obstante, la tecnología moderna permite el movimiento en las actividades económicas du uno de estos sectores a otro. Al mismo tiempo, algunos grupos especialmente vulnerables como las trabajadoras de la India, obligadas a estancarse en el sector no oficial, constituyen una reserva de mano de obra barata. Esto socava la resistencia del movimiento obrero en su totalidad, incluidos los que estén en ese momento en el sector oficial

Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link

In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.conflict, suicide terrorism, weakest link, Colonel Blotto

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single random target is attacked — more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single random target is attacked — more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments.

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed .We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy - in which a single random target is attacked - more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments

THE WEAKEST LINK HYPOTHESIS FOR ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

Yohe and Tol (2001) built an indexing method for vulnerability based on the hypothesis that the adaptive capacity for any system facing a vector of external stresses could be explained by the weakest of eight underlying determinants – the so-called “weakest link” hypothesis. Subsequent work supported the hypothesis by analogy from other contexts, but we now offer perhaps the first attempt to explore its validity through empirical means. We estimate a structural form designed to accommodate the full range of possible interactions across determinants. The perfect complement case of the pure “weakest-link” formulation lies on one extreme, and the perfect substitute case where each determinant can compensate for all others at constant rates is the other limiting case. For vulnerability to natural disasters, infant mortality and drinking water treatment, we find qualified support for a modified weakest link hypothesis: the weakest indicator plays an important role, but is not essential because other factors can compensate (with increasing difficulty). For life expectancy, sanitation and nutrition, we find a relationship that is close to linear – the perfect substitute case where the various determinants of adaptive capacity can compensate for each other. Moreover, we find another source of diversity in the assessment of vulnerability, since the factors from which systems draw to create adaptive capacity are different for different risks.Adaptive capacity, vulnerability, weakest-link hypothesis, substitution

THE WEAKEST LINK HYPOTHESIS FOR ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

Yohe and Tol (2001) built an indexing method for vulnerability based on the hypothesis that the adaptive capacity for any system facing a vector of external stresses could be explained by the weakest of eight underlying determinants – the so-called “weakest link” hypothesis. Subsequent work supported the hypothesis by analogy from other contexts, but we now offer perhaps the first attempt to explore its validity through empirical means. We estimate a structural form designed to accommodate the full range of possible interactions across determinants. The perfect complement case of the pure “weakest-link” formulation lies on one extreme, and the perfect substitute case where each determinant can compensate for all others at constant rates is the other limiting case. For vulnerability to natural disasters, infant mortality and drinking water treatment, we find qualified support for a modified weakest link hypothesis: the weakest indicator plays an important role, but is not essential because other factors can compensate (with increasing difficulty). For life expectancy, sanitation and nutrition, we find a relationship that is close to linear – the perfect substitute case where the various determinants of adaptive capacity can compensate for each other. Moreover, we find another source of diversity in the assessment of vulnerability, since the factors from which systems draw to create adaptive capacity are different for different risks.Adaptive capacity, vulnerability, weakest-link hypothesis, substitution

The Attack-and-Defense Group Contests: Best-shot versus Weakest-link

This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest-link whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best-shot impact function. We fully characterize the Nash and coalition-proof equilibria and show that with symmetric valuation the coalition-proof equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation it is always an equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case that the highest valuation players in the attacker group free-ride completely on a group-member with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and exert the same effort. We also characterize the Nash and coalition-proof equilibria for the case in which one group follows either a best-shot or a weakest-link but the other group follows an additive impact function

The Weakest Link - A Field Experiment in Rational Decision Making

We analyze the BBC TV game show "The Weakest Link", using data from 77 episodes, covering 13,380 questions. We focus on the banking decision, where a contestant chooses to secure an amount of money for the eventual winner, or to risk it on a general knowledge question. In the latter case, should he answer correctly, the amount at stake increases exponentially. We show that banking decisions are not rational: a crude rule of thumb performs substantially better than the contestants’ strategies. Yet, at least to some extent, contestants do take into account their own ability and the fact that questions are progressively more difficult.Experimental Economics, TV Game Shows, Bounded Rationality

Only as strong as the weakest link

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