Value and doubt: the persuasive power of 'authenticity' in the antiquities market

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The ideal of the certainty in law: the skin and the heart of law

The doubt about certainty like an absolute value in law and as an ideal full in legal system (argument about impossibility) is a controversial fact in contemporary legal theory. In this text I examine some contemporary doctrines about the classic understanding (in critical sense) of this ideal. I have selected the most representative doctrines: doctrine about "open texture of Law" (H.L.A. Hart), starting point in this discussion; doctrine about "Il Diritto mite" (G. Zagrebelsky), from the continental European legal tradition at present; and doctrine about "vagueness in Law" (T.A.O. Endicott), this doctrine is the most recent, from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Finally, in Conclusions, I analyze if this doubt (argument about impossibility) contaminates (in some sense) to the concept of law or to the characteristics that describe law in the contemporary Constitutional State

Nuclear Power: a Hedge against Uncertain Gas and Carbon Prices?

High fossil fuel prices have rekindled interest in nuclear power. This paper identifies specific nuclear characteristics making it unattractive to merchant generators in liberalised electricity markets, and argues that non-fossil fuel technologies have an overlooked à ¢à  à  option valueà ¢à  à  given fuel and carbon price uncertainty. Stochastic optimisation estimates the company option value of keeping open the choice between nuclear and gas technologies. This option value decreases sharply as the correlation between electricity, gas, and carbon prices rises, casting doubt on whether private investorsà ¢à  à  fuel-mix diversification incentives in electricity markets are aligned with the social value of a diverse fuel-mix

Scholarly Publishers and Scholarly Publishing in an Electronic World

Argues that the present publishing model is not infinitely sustainable in the emerging electronic environment. Publishers are seen as protectionist and displaying the classic Luddite approach to fundamental revolutions by erecting barriers against innovators and are then a hindrance to scholarly communication. While there is little doubt that publishers can and do add value to the scholarly communication process, it may be that a quite different breed of publishers will emerge

Bi-large neutrino mixing and the Cabibbo angle

Recent measurements of the neutrino mixing angles cast doubt on the validity of the so-far popular tri-bimaximal mixing ansatz. We propose a parametrization for the neutrino mixing matrix where the reactor angle seeds the large solar and atmospheric mixing angles, equal to each other in first approximation. We suggest such bi-large mixing pattern as a model building standard, realized when the leading order value of the reactor angle equals the Cabibbo angle.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figs. v2: matches version appearing in Phys.Rev.D, rapid communication

Finding the Original Meaning of American Criminal Procedure Rights: Lessons from Reasonable Doubt’s Development

[Excerpt] “The prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt for a valid conviction. The Constitution nowhere explicitly contains this requirement, but the Supreme Court in In re Winship1 stated that due process commands it. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that the Court had often assumed that the standard existed, that it played a central role in American criminal justice by lessening the chances of mistaken convictions, and that it was essential for instilling community respect in criminal enforcement. The reasonable doubt standard is fundamental because it makes guilty verdicts more difficult. As Winship said, the requirement “protects the accused against conviction . . . .” Justice Harlan’s eloquent concurring opinion in Winship elaborated by noting that “a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Incorrect factual conclusions can lead either to the acquittal of a guilty person or the conviction of an innocent one. “Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.” Society views the harm of convicting the innocent as much greater than that of acquitting the guilty. Thus, Harlan concluded, “I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal cased as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” The reasonable doubt standard was constitutionalized because of the societal function it now serves. Winship did not find it constitutionally required because the original meaning of a constitutional provision required it. Indeed, the Court indicated that the standard had not fully crystalized until after the Constitution was adopted. Even so, the reasonable doubt standard provides a fertile field for examining the methodology of finding the original meaning of constitutional criminal procedure rights. First, its status seems secure No debate questions the constitutional requirement that an accused can only be convicted if the crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Its original meaning can be explored uncolored by the partisanship often engendered when present seekers of original meaning hope to define a new contour to a constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, serious scholars have studied the reasonable doubt standard’s early development and its original meaning, purposes, and intent. An examination of those scholarly sources, methods, and conclusions provides a number of valuable insights that should affect the search for finding the original meaning of other American criminal procedure guarantees. These are first that the seeker of original meaning of evolved criminal procedure rights has to go beyond traditional legal sources and explore the broader epistemological developments in religion, philosophy, and science that affected the development of the right. Second, conclusions about original meaning drawn primarily from English and other European sources can be misleading without a consideration of American developments. What might seem like a sound conclusion when English sources are examined may look suspect when viewed in the light of American developments. Finally, the reasonable doubt scholarship reveals that definitive conclusions about the original meaning of American constitutional rights will often be impossible to find both because the necessary American record is absent and because evolved rights never really had a definitive original meaning. The starting point here is with the scholars who have concluded that the original purpose of the reasonable doubt standard was not, as the Court now has it, to protect the accused, but instead emerged to make convictions easier.

Reconstructing Advaita in John Thatamanil\u27s The Immanent Divine : Some Questions

The publication of John Thatamanil\u27s The Immanent Divine allows us to ask many questions about projects in comparative theology and where they could lead us. I hope that my response to this interesting work will have the value of probing a little more into the tasks of comparative theology. There is no doubt that The Immanent Divine is a remarkable effort. it is also a book which taxes the academic reader who is probably not a specialist in Tillich and Advaita and the various versions of process theology, especially the distinctive version of Robert Neville. I will break down my response to this wide-ranging effort into several topics