An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy

One of the most important features of the architecture of the Internet is the Domain Name System (DNS), which is administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Logically, the DNS is organized into Top Level Domains (such as .com), Second Level Domains (such as amazon.com), and third, fourth, and higher level domains (such as www.amazon.com). The physically infrastructure of the DNS consists of name servers, including the Root Server System which provides the information that directs name queries for each Top Level Domain to the appropriate server. ICANN is responsible for the allocation of the root and the creation or reallocation of Top Level Domains. The Root Server System and associated name space are scarce resources in the economic sense. The root servers have a finite capacity and expansion of the system is costly. The name space is scarce, because each string (or set of characters) can only be allocated to one Registry (or operator of a Top Level Domain). In addition, name service is not a public good in the economic sense, because it is possible to exclude strings from the DNS and because the allocation of a string to one firm results in the inability of other firms to use that name string. From the economic perspective, therefore, the question arises: what is the most efficient method for allocating the root resource? There are only five basic options available for allocation of the root. (1) a static root, equivalent to a decision to waste the currently unallocated capacity; (2) public interest hearings (or beauty contests); (3) lotteries; (4) a queuing mechanism; or (5) an auction. The fundamental economic question about the Domain Name System is which of these provides the most efficient mechanism for allocating the root resource? This resource allocation problem is analogous to problems raised in the telecommunications sector, where the Federal Communications Commission has a long history of attempting to allocate broadcast spectrum and the telephone number space. This experience reveals that a case-by-case allocation on the basis of ad hoc judgments about the public interest is doomed to failure, and that auctions (as opposed to lotteries or queues) provide the best mechanism for insuring that such public-trust resources find their highest and best use. Based on the telecommunications experience, the best method for ICANN to allocate new Top Level Domains would be to conduct an auction. Many auction designs are possible. One proposal is to auction a fixed number of new Top Level Domain slots each year. This proposal would both expand the root resource at a reasonable pace and insure that the slots went to their highest and best use. Public interest Top Level Domains could be allocated by another mechanism such as a lottery and their costs to ICANN could be subsidized by the proceeds of the auction

Spectrum Policy and Management

This project provides an examination of the FCC’s policies towards spectrum reallocation. The project examines the National Broadband Plan and how the FCC has approached the goals described within it. The demand for broadband communications has increased dramatically in recent years and has resulted in a predicted spectrum deficit in the near future. In addition to a number of spectrum auctions and their winners the project examines how the redistribution of spectrum impacts the broadband community. The project also provides an examination of spectrum reallocation and policy in other countries, to provide a broader view of spectrum policy. Finally the project examines new spectrum technologies and spectrum usage policies to further examine how the US’s spectrum policies should evolve

Overweight Vehicle Permitting Alternatives

Overweight vehicles exceed the federal and/or state statutory limits for either the gross vehicle weight (GVW) or the weight of individual axles or axle groups. National and state limits on vehicle weights were established to preserve the highway infrastructure. Past research has shown that overweight operations, while causing significant damage to roads and bridges, can enhance the trucking industry productivity, and thus yield economic benefits both regionally and nationally. In the United States, individual states administer oversize and overweight vehicle permit programs to regulate and collect revenues from overweight operations. Differences in the truck size and weight limits and overweight permit programs across the states inhibit seamless and efficient truck travel across the country. Agencies responsible for maintaining the highway infrastructure realize that the cost of consumption of the infrastructure far exceeds the collected revenues. The current study examines four options to improve overweight vehicle permitting systems: multiobjective optimization of traditional mechanisms, incentives for infrastructure-friendly vehicles, application of an auction-based quota for overweight vehicle operations, and opportunities for harmonizing the regulations covering overweight vehicle operations that differ across the states. The first three options are qualitatively and quantitatively applied to a case study involving Indiana\u27s newly-established overweight commodity permits for vehicles carrying metal (up to 120,000 lbs), and agricultural (up to 97,000 lbs) goods. An incremental approach to harmonization of truck size and weight regulations and overweight vehicle permitting systems is qualitatively described, including available tools and data needs to promote harmonization. The four options are not mutually exclusive; collectively, they provide opportunities for transportation decision makers to improve overweight vehicle permitting. Each option contributes to the ongoing discussion about how to address the issue of uncompensated consumption of highway infrastructure assets attributable to overweight vehicles. The multiobjective optimization formulated herein better reflects actual decisions made by both the agency and carriers than limited previous quantitative research. The quantification of willingness to pay for investment informs state agencies about the extent to which incentives for infrastructure-friendly vehicles can be adopted. The quota framework contained herein is an extension of strategies used previously to mitigate demand into a tool for controlling the amount of allowable infrastructure damage while collecting necessary revenues to protect infrastructure from undue damage. Finally, the harmonization of overweight vehicle permitting programs can streamline interstate overweight operations for both state agencies and carriers. The combination of several options can result in greater improvements to both the trucking industry\u27s productivity and the preservation of highway infrastructure than any option alone

The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and Economic Perspective

The traditional system of radio spectrum allocation has inefficiently restricted wireless services. Alternatively, liberal licenses ceding de facto spectrum ownership rights yield incentives for operators to maximize airwave value. These authorizations have been widely used for mobile services in the U.S. and internationally, leading to the development of highly productive services and waves of innovation in technology, applications and business models. Serious challenges to the efficacy of such a spectrum regime have arisen, however. Seeing the widespread adoption of such devices as cordless phones and wi-fi radios using bands set aside for unlicensed use, some scholars and policy makers posit that spectrum sharing technologies have become cheap and easy to deploy, mitigating airwave scarcity and, therefore, the utility of exclusive rights. This paper evaluates such claims technically and economically. We demonstrate that spectrum scarcity is alive and well. Costly conflicts over airwave use not only continue, but have intensified with scientific advances that dramatically improve the functionality of wireless devices and so increase demand for spectrum access. Exclusive ownership rights help direct spectrum inputs to where they deliver the highest social gains, making exclusive property rules relatively more socially valuable. Liberal licenses efficiently accommodate rival business models (including those commonly associated with unlicensed spectrum allocations) while mitigating the constraints levied on spectrum use by regulators imposing restrictions in traditional licenses or via use rules and technology standards in unlicensed spectrum allocations.

Research in space commercialization, technology transfer, and communications, volume 2

Spectrum management, models for evaluating communication systems, the communications regulatory environment, expert prediction and consensus, remote sensing, and manned space operations research are discussed

Research in space commercialization, technology transfer and communications, vol. 2

Spectrum management, models for evaluating communications systems, and implications of communications regulations for NASA are considered as major parts of communications policy. Marketing LANDSAT products in developing countries, a political systems analysis of LANDSAT, and private financing and operation of the space operations center (space station) are discussed. Investment requirements, risks, government support, and other primary business and management considerations are examined

The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's 'Big Joke': An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy

In 1959 the Federal Communications Commission invited economist Ronald Coase to testify about his proposal for market allocation of radio spectrum rights. The FCC's first question: 'Is this all a big joke'' Today, however, leading policy makers, including the current FCC Chair, decry the 'spectrum drought' produced by administrative allocation and call for the creation of private bandwidth markets. This essay examines marketplace trends driving regulators' change of humor, and considers the path of spectrum policy liberalization in light of emerging technologies, theories of unlimited bandwidth, reforms such as FCC license auctions, and recent progress in deregulating wireless markets in the U.S. and around the globe.

Comparative Analysis of Spectrum Policy and Mobile Market Structure

Differences in the regulatory framework create specific path dependencies in per mobile market. Correspondingly, there is a need to assess how the mobile markets differ till now as well as the direction of the market evolution in the future. Therefore the systematic assessment of the mobile markets will present the insight of the market dynamics along with rising opportunity to make comparison between multiple mobile markets. As a part of research methodology, we first perform theoretical review regarding the previous research on the analysis of mobile market structures. We observe that most of the research focuses on either the analysis of a single market parameter for multiple mobile markets or comparison of two markets for a set of parameters in a qualitative or quantitative way. In contrast with above we take a systematic approach by taking a set of parameters for multiple mobile markets. We complete our analysis by investigating the market characteristics from spectrum policy and market structure point of view. Based on the evaluation, we assess the state-of- art outlook of the selected mobile markets: Finland, Chile, Turkey, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, China, India, United States, Japan and Sweden. Based on our results, we assess that Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is the explaining factor for the spectrum policy. In this regards, India possesses the most decentralized where China has the most centralized mobile spectrum. Market structure analysis put forward both mobile prices and investments per subscribers as the explaining factor for the market structure. Based on that, India is the most open mobile market where Japan has the most closed mobile market structure. European markets; Finland, Sweden and U.K. have more open market structure than the North American mobile market