A Simplified Hierarchical Dynamic Quantum Secret Sharing Protocol with Added Features

Generalizing the notion of dynamic quantum secret sharing (DQSS), a simplified protocol for hierarchical dynamic quantum secret sharing (HDQSS) is proposed and it is shown that the protocol can be implemented using any existing protocol of quantum key distribution, quantum key agreement or secure direct quantum communication. The security of this proposed protocol against eavesdropping and collusion attacks is discussed with specific attention towards the issues related to the composability of the subprotocols that constitute the proposed protocol. The security and qubit efficiency of the proposed protocol is also compared with that of other existing protocols of DQSS. Further, it is shown that it is possible to design a semi-quantum protocol of HDQSS and in principle, the protocols of HDQSS can be implemented using any quantum state. It is also noted that the completely orthogonal-state-based realization of HDQSS protocol is possible and that HDQSS can be experimentally realized using a large number of alternative approaches.Comment: 9 pages, 1 figur

Composable Security in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model

We present a simplified framework for proving sequential composability in the quantum setting. In particular, we give a new, simulation-based, definition for security in the bounded-quantum-storage model, and show that this definition allows for sequential composition of protocols. Damgard et al. (FOCS '05, CRYPTO '07) showed how to securely implement bit commitment and oblivious transfer in the bounded-quantum-storage model, where the adversary is only allowed to store a limited number of qubits. However, their security definitions did only apply to the standalone setting, and it was not clear if their protocols could be composed. Indeed, we first give a simple attack that shows that these protocols are not composable without a small refinement of the model. Finally, we prove the security of their randomized oblivious transfer protocol in our refined model. Secure implementations of oblivious transfer and bit commitment then follow easily by a (classical) reduction to randomized oblivious transfer.Comment: 21 page

Classical Cryptographic Protocols in a Quantum World

Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical attackers. If we accept that quantum information processing is the most realistic model of physically feasible computation, then we must ask: what classical protocols remain secure against quantum attackers? Our main contribution is showing the existence of classical two-party protocols for the secure evaluation of any polynomial-time function under reasonable computational assumptions (for example, it suffices that the learning with errors problem be hard for quantum polynomial time). Our result shows that the basic two-party feasibility picture from classical cryptography remains unchanged in a quantum world.Comment: Full version of an old paper in Crypto'11. Invited to IJQI. This is authors' copy with different formattin