IRRIGATION EFFICIENCY, WATER STORAGE, AND LONG RUN WATER CONSERVATION

A spreadsheet-based simulation model is used to illustrate the complex relationships between irrigation efficiency, water banking and water conservation under the prior appropriation doctrine. Increases in irrigation efficiency and/or establishment of water banks do not guarantee water conservation. Conservation requires reduction in the quantity of water consumptively used by agriculture.Land Economics/Use,

Market power in an exhaustible resource market: The case of storable pollution permits

Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to a large polluting agent and a competitive fringe. A large agent selling permits in the market exercises market power no differently than a large supplier of an exhaustible resource. However, whenever the large agent’s endowment falls short of its efficient endowment –allocation profile that would exactly cover its emissions along the perfectly competitive path– the market power problem disappears, much like in a durable-good monopoly. We illustrate our theory with two applications: the carbon market that may eventually develop under the Kyoto Protocol and beyond and the US sulfur market.Exhaustible resources, market power, pollution markets, durable-good monopoly

Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments

This paper considers the relationship between agent-based modeling and economic decision-making experiments with human subjects. Both approaches exploit controlled ``laboratory'' conditions as a means of isolating the sources of aggregate phenomena. Research findings from laboratory studies of human subject behavior have inspired studies using artificial agents in ``computational laboratories'' and vice versa. In certain cases, both methods have been used to examine the same phenomenon. The focus of this paper is on the empirical validity of agent-based modeling approaches in terms of explaining data from human subject experiments. We also point out synergies between the two methodologies that have been exploited as well as promising new possibilities.agent-based models, human subject experiments, zero- intelligence agents, learning, evolutionary algorithms

Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Allocation Rules: Gainers, Losers and the Spectre of Market Power

Stemming from politically given market imperfections in a tradable permits system, this paper develops a Stackelberg game with two types of non-cooperative agents to describe how a large -potentially dominant- agent may exercise market power at the expense of a competitive fringe. In a dynamic framework with full forward and backward temporal flexibility (i.e. 1:1 Intertemporal Trading Ratio), this intra-industry model then suggests an optimal allocation criterion for grandfathered permits based on recent emissions. This paper contributes to the permit trading literature by shedding some light on the decision to allow banking and borrowing, a debate which is typically overlooked by the debate to introduce the permits market itself among other environmental regulation tools. Provisional results are presented under perfect information.emissions trading;banking;borrowing;market power;differential game

Market Power in a Storable-Good Market: Theory and Applications to Carbon and Sulfur Trading

We consider a market for storable pollution permits in which a large agent and a fringe of small agents gradually consume a stock of permits until they reach a long-run emissions limit. The subgame-perfect equilibrium exhibits no market power unless the large agent’s share of the initial stock of permits exceeds a critical level. We then apply our theoretical results to a global market for carbon dioxide emissions and the existing US market for sulfur dioxide emissions. We characterize competitive permit allocation profiles for the carbon market and find no evidence of market power in the sulfur market.

Flat tax reforms in the U.S.: A boon for the income poor

In this article we quantify the aggregate, distributional and welfare consequences of two revenue neutral flat-tax reforms using a model economy that replicates the U.S. distributions of earnings, income and wealth in very much detail. We find that the less progressive reform brings about a 2.4 percent increase in steady-state output and a more unequal distribution of after-tax income. In contrast, the more progressive reform brings about a -2.6 percent reduction in steady-state output and a distribution of aftertax income that is more egalitarian. We also find that in the less progressive flat-tax economy aggregate welfare falls by -0.17 percent of consumption, and in the more progressive flat-tax economy it increases by 0.45 percent of consumption. In both flattax reforms the income poor pay less income taxes and obtain sizeable welfare gains

Optimal Exploitation of Groundwater and the Potential for a Tradable Permit System in Irrigated Agriculture

A great challenge facing future agricultural water policy is to explore the potential for transition from the current myopic competitive (common) exploitation of groundwater resources to a long-term efficient and sustainable allocation. A number of economic and/or command and control instruments can be used by the relevant water authority in order to deal with the economic and environmental problems generated by competitive exploitation. However, according to previous experience in both developed and developing countries, tradable permits seem as one of the most effective and efficient instruments, especially under conditions of limited water availability. On this account, the aim of the current study is to explore the feasibility and implementation of a tradable permit system in irrigated agriculture. To this end, two distinct optimization models are applied and compared: (a) an individual farmer’s model (representing the myopic non-cooperative exploitation of groundwater) and (b) a social planner’s model (representing the cooperative and sustainable allocation). The deviation of their results shows the rationale for using a tradable permit system, while the final allocation of the social planner’s model, solved as an optimal control problem that maximizes the social welfare under specific water policy objectives, denotes the equilibrium state of this system. The two models are then applied in a typical rural area of Greece where groundwater is the only source of irrigated agriculture. The derived time paths for water consumption and water availability illustrate the significant environmental benefits from the future implementation of a tradable permit system.Tradable Water Permits, Sustainable Water Use, Irrigated Agriculture

Water Scarcity and Water Markets: A Comparison of Institutions and Practices in the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia and the Western US

Water markets in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) and the US west are compared in terms of their ability to allocate scarce water resources among competing uses. Both locations have been in the forefront of the development of water markets with defined water rights and conveyance structures to assist in the reallocation of water across competing demands. They also share the challenge of managing water with climate variability and climate change. As these two markets occur in developed, wealthy countries, their experiences in water markets with different water rights (appropriative, riparian and statutory rights) provide ‘best-case’ scenarios of what institutional arrangements work best, indicate which are less effective, and demonstrate what might be possible for greater use of water markets elsewhere in the world. The paper finds that the gains from trade in the MDB is worth hundreds of millions of dollars in per year, total turnover in water rights exceeds $2 billion per year and the volume of trade accounts for over 20$4.3 billion (2008 $) spent or committed by urban buyers between 1987 and 2008. Despite the clear benefits of water markets in both locations, there are on-going restrictions to trade that limit the potential gains and also third-party effects from use that require resolution.

Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence

This paper analyzes the political economy of regulatory and judicial appointment rules. I study a model of price-setting by a political principal faced with a firm with unknown costs, and endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency rises with the effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set-up captures the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that reforms toward election rather than appointment of regulators are more likely the less efficient is the information-gathering technology, the less stringent are the investment concerns of society, the stronger are regulators’ revolving-door motivations, and the closer is political competition. These predictions are consistent with US electric power market data. Moreover, in accordance with the model, electricity rates are lower and respond less to shock in input costs in states that elect their regulators or their High Court judges.Election, Agency, Judges, Regulation, Electricity

Oil Security Short- and Long-Term Policies

Increasing oil security represents one of the most important policy actions, especially within IEA countries. Short and long term mechanisms could help such goal. On the short term side, revision of IEA emergency response oil stock system has been discussed. The attention is mainly focused on three issues: the high costs of stock management for private industries, the possible use of strategic reserves to smooth price when no high supply disruption has taken, the extension of IEA emergency system to non-OECD countries. The main actions specifically proposed by the European Commission are: an harmonisation of national storage systems, with the institution of public and private agency, a wider co-ordinated use of security stocks, and an increase in the physical amount of oil stocks. Long term measures for enhancing oil supply security can be seen on the demand-side and the supply-side. Main demand-side policies could be the following: energy saving and efficiency, investments in research and technology, and reduction of oil price inelasticity especially for transport sector. Main supply-side policies can be summarized into co-operation and institutional promotion for supply diversification of suppliers/routes. Main factors that could affect described policies could be the liberalization of international trade even in the energy sector and the increasing role of oil demand from developing countries.Oil, Security, Energy