Incomparable ω1\omega_1-like models of set theory

We show that the analogues of the Hamkins embedding theorems, proved for the countable models of set theory, do not hold when extended to the uncountable realm of $\omega_1$-like models of set theory. Specifically, under the $\diamondsuit$ hypothesis and suitable consistency assumptions, we show that there is a family of $2^{\omega_1}$ many $\omega_1$-like models of ZFC, all with the same ordinals, that are pairwise incomparable under embeddability; there can be a transitive $\omega_1$-like model of ZFC that does not embed into its own constructible universe; and there can be an $\omega_1$-like model of PA whose structure of hereditarily finite sets is not universal for the $\omega_1$-like models of set theory.Comment: 15 pages. Commentary concerning this article can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/incomparable-omega-one-like-models-of-set-theor

Cardinal arithmetic for skeptics

We present a survey of some results of the pcf-theory and their applications to cardinal arithmetic. We review basics notions (in section 1), briefly look at history in section 2 (and some personal history in section 3). We present main results on pcf in section 5 and describe applications to cardinal arithmetic in section 6. The limitations on independence proofs are discussed in section 7, and in section 8 we discuss the status of two axioms that arise in the new setting. Applications to other areas are found in section 9.Comment: 14 page

Satisfaction is not absolute

We prove that the satisfaction relation $\mathcal{N}\models\varphi[\vec a]$ of first-order logic is not absolute between models of set theory having the structure $\mathcal{N}$ and the formulas $\varphi$ all in common. Two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, for example, and the same standard model of arithmetic $\langle\mathbb{N},{+},{\cdot},0,1,{\lt}\rangle$, yet disagree on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same arithmetic truths, yet disagree on their truths-about-truth, at any desired level of the iterated truth-predicate hierarchy; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree on projective truth; two models of set theory can have the same $\langle H_{\omega_2},{\in}\rangle$ or the same rank-initial segment $\langle V_\delta,{\in}\rangle$, yet disagree on which assertions are true in these structures. On the basis of these mathematical results, we argue that a philosophical commitment to the determinateness of the theory of truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides. The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic structure $\mathbb{N}=\{0,1,2,\ldots\}$ itself, but rather, we argue, is an additional higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justification.Comment: 34 pages. Commentary concerning this article can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/satisfaction-is-not-absolut

The power set function

We survey old and recent results on the problem of finding a complete set of rules describing the behavior of the power function, i.e. the function which takes a cardinal $\kappa$ to the cardinality of its power $2^\kappa$

Classical realizability and arithmetical formul{\ae}

In this paper we treat the specification problem in classical realizability (as defined in [20]) in the case of arithmetical formul{\ae}. In the continuity of [10] and [11], we characterize the universal realizers of a formula as being the winning strategies for a game (defined according to the formula). In the first section we recall the definition of classical realizability, as well as a few technical results. In Section 5, we introduce in more details the specification problem and the intuition of the game-theoretic point of view we adopt later. We first present a game $G_1$, that we prove to be adequate and complete if the language contains no instructions "quote" [18], using interaction constants to do substitution over execution threads. Then we show that as soon as the language contain "quote", the game is no more complete, and present a second game ${G}_2$ that is both adequate and complete in the general case. In the last Section, we draw attention to a model-theoretic point of view, and use our specification result to show that arithmetical formul{\ae} are absolute for realizability models.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1101.4364 by other author

Models of expansions of N with no end extensions

We deal with models of Peano arithmetic (specifically with a question of Ali Enayat). The methods are from creature forcing. We find an expansion of N such that its theory has models with no (elementary) end extensions. In fact there is a Borel uncountable set of subsets of N such that expanding N by any uncountably many of them suffice. Also we find arithmetically closed A with no definably closed ultrafilter on it

Dependent choice, properness, and generic absoluteness

We show that Dependent Choice is a sufficient choice principle for developing the basic theory of proper forcing, and for deriving generic absoluteness for the Chang model in the presence of large cardinals, even with respect to -preserving symmetric submodels of forcing extensions. Hence, not only provides the right framework for developing classical analysis, but is also the right base theory over which to safeguard truth in analysis from the independence phenomenon in the presence of large cardinals. We also investigate some basic consequences of the Proper Forcing Axiom in, and formulate a natural question about the generic absoluteness of the Proper Forcing Axiom in and. Our results confirm as a natural foundation for a significant portion of classical mathematics and provide support to the idea of this theory being also a natural foundation for a large part of set theory

Reduced Perplexity: A simplified perspective on assessing probabilistic forecasts

A simple, intuitive approach to the assessment of probabilistic inferences is introduced. The Shannon information metrics are translated to the probability domain. The translation shows that the negative logarithmic score and the geometric mean are equivalent measures of the accuracy of a probabilistic inference. Thus there is both a quantitative reduction in perplexity, which is the inverse of the geometric mean of the probabilities, as good inference algorithms reduce the uncertainty and a qualitative reduction due to the increased clarity between the original set of probabilistic forecasts and their central tendency, the geometric mean. Further insight is provided by showing that the R\'enyi and Tsallis entropy functions translated to the probability domain are both the weighted generalized mean of the distribution. The generalized mean of probabilistic forecasts forms a spectrum of performance metrics referred to as a Risk Profile. The arithmetic mean is used to measure the decisiveness, while the -2/3 mean is used to measure the robustness.Comment: 21 pages, 5 figures, conference paper presented at Recent Advances in Info-Metrics, Washington, DC, 2014. Accepted for a book chapter in "Recent innovations in info-metrics: a cross-disciplinary perspective on information and information processing" by Oxford University Pres

The universal finite set

We define a certain finite set in set theory $\{x\mid\varphi(x)\}$ and prove that it exhibits a universal extension property: it can be any desired particular finite set in the right set-theoretic universe and it can become successively any desired larger finite set in top-extensions of that universe. Specifically, ZFC proves the set is finite; the definition $\varphi$ has complexity $\Sigma_2$, so that any affirmative instance of it $\varphi(x)$ is verified in any sufficiently large rank-initial segment of the universe $V_\theta$; the set is empty in any transitive model and others; and if $\varphi$ defines the set $y$ in some countable model $M$ of ZFC and y\of z for some finite set $z$ in $M$, then there is a top-extension of $M$ to a model $N$ in which $\varphi$ defines the new set $z$. Thus, the set shows that no model of set theory can realize a maximal $\Sigma_2$ theory with its natural number parameters, although this is possible without parameters. Using the universal finite set, we prove that the validities of top-extensional set-theoretic potentialism, the modal principles valid in the Kripke model of all countable models of set theory, each accessing its top-extensions, are precisely the assertions of S4. Furthermore, if ZFC is consistent, then there are models of ZFC realizing the top-extensional maximality principle.Comment: 16 pages. Commentary can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/the-universal-finite-set. Version 2 makes minor changes, including a footnote concerning the history of the universal algorithm and additional reference

Chains of saturated models in AECs

We study when a union of saturated models is saturated in the framework of tame abstract elementary classes (AECs) with amalgamation. We prove: $\mathbf{Theorem}$ If $K$ is a tame AEC with amalgamation satisfying a natural definition of superstability (which follows from categoricity in a high-enough cardinal), then for all high-enough $\lambda$: * The union of an increasing chain of $\lambda$-saturated models is $\lambda$-saturated. * There exists a type-full good $\lambda$-frame with underlying class the saturated models of size $\lambda$. * There exists a unique limit model of size $\lambda$. Our proofs use independence calculus and a generalization of averages to this non first-order context.Comment: 27 page