434 research outputs found
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A General Analysis of the Security of Elastic Block Ciphers
We analyze the security of elastic block ciphers in general to show that an attack on an elastic version of block cipher implies a polynomial time related attack on the fixed-length version of the block cipher. We relate the security of the elastic version of a block cipher to the fixed-length version by forming a reduction between the versions. Our method is independent of the specific block cipher used. The results imply that if the fixed-length version of a block cipher is secure against attacks which attempt key recovery then the elastic version is also secure against such attacks
The Security of Elastic Block Ciphers Against Key-Recovery Attacks
We analyze the security of elastic block ciphers against key-recovery attacks. An elastic version of a fixed-length block cipher is a variable-length block cipher that supports any block size in the range of one to two times the length of the original block. Our method for creating an elastic block cipher involves inserting the round function of the original cipher into a substitution-permutation network. In this paper, we form a polynomial-time reduction between the elastic and original versions of the cipher by exploiting the underlying network structure. We prove that the elastic version of a cipher is secure against a given key-recovery attack if the original cipher is secure against such an attack. Our analysis is based on the general structure of elastic block ciphers (i.e., the network‘s structure, the composition methods between rounds in the network and the keying methodology) and is independent of the specific cipher
Elastic Block Ciphers: Method, Security and Instantiations
We introduce the concept of an elastic block cipher which refers to stretching the supported block size of a block cipher to any length up to twice the original block size while incurring a computational workload that is proportional to the block size. Our method uses the round function of an existing block cipher as a black box and inserts it into a substitution- permutation network. Our method is designed to enable us to form a reduction between the elastic and the original versions of the cipher. Using this reduction, we prove that the elastic version of a cipher is secure against key-recovery attacks if the original cipher is secure against such attacks. We note that while reduction-based proofs of security are a cornerstone of cryptographic analysis, they are typical when complete components are used as sub-components in a larger design. We are not aware of the use of such techniques in the case of concrete block cipher designs. We demonstrate the general applicability of the elastic block cipher method by constructing examples from existing block ciphers: AES, Camellia, MISTY1, and RC6. We compare the performance of the elastic versions to that of the original versions and evaluate the elastic versions using statistical tests measuring the randomness of the ciphertext. We also use our examples to demonstrate the concept of a generic key schedule for block ciphers
Best Effort and Practice Activation Codes
Activation Codes are used in many different digital services and known by
many different names including voucher, e-coupon and discount code. In this
paper we focus on a specific class of ACs that are short, human-readable,
fixed-length and represent value. Even though this class of codes is
extensively used there are no general guidelines for the design of Activation
Code schemes. We discuss different methods that are used in practice and
propose BEPAC, a new Activation Code scheme that provides both authenticity and
confidentiality. The small message space of activation codes introduces some
problems that are illustrated by an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (CPA-2) on
a general 3-round Feis- tel network of size 2^(2n) . This attack recovers the
complete permutation from at most 2^(n+2) plaintext-ciphertext pairs. For this
reason, BEPAC is designed in such a way that authenticity and confidentiality
are in- dependent properties, i.e. loss of confidentiality does not imply loss
of authenticity.Comment: 15 pages, 3 figures, TrustBus 201
XDIVINSA: eXtended DIVersifying INStruction Agent to Mitigate Power Side-Channel Leakage
Side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks pose a major threat to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. Realising SCA resilient cryptographic algorithms on embedded systems under tight intrinsic constraints, such as low area cost, limited computational ability, etc., is extremely challenging and often not possible. We propose a seamless and effective approach to realise a generic countermeasure against SCA attacks. XDIVINSA, an extended diversifying instruction agent, is introduced to realise the countermeasure at the microarchitecture level based on the combining concept of diversified instruction set extension (ISE) and hardware diversification. XDIVINSA is developed as a lightweight co-processor that is tightly coupled with a RISC-V processor. The proposed method can be applied to various algorithms without the need for software developers to undertake substantial design efforts hardening their implementations against SCA. XDIVINSA has been implemented on the SASEBO G-III board which hosts a Kintex-7 XC7K160T FPGA device for SCA mitigation evaluation. Experimental results based on non-specific t-statistic tests show that our solution can achieve leakage mitigation on the power side channel of different cryptographic kernels, i.e., Speck, ChaCha20, AES, and RSA with an acceptable performance overhead compared to existing countermeasures.This work has been supported in part by EPSRC via grant EP/R012288/1, under the RISE (http://www.ukrise.org) programme.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Multi-operation data encryption mechanism using dynamic data blocking and randomized substitution
Existing cryptosystems deal with static design features such as fixed sized data blocks, static substitution and apply identical set of known encryption operations in each encryption round. Fixed sized blocks associate several issues such as ineffective permutations, padding issues, deterministic brute force strength and known-length of bits which support the cracker in formulating of modern cryptanalysis. Existing static substitution policies are either not optimally fit for dynamic sized data blocks or contain known S-box transformation and fixed lookup tables. Moreover, static substitution does not directly correlate with secret key due to which it has not been shown safer especially for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Data Encryption Standard (DES). Presently, entire cryptosystems encrypt each data block with identical set of known operations in each iteration, thereby lacked to offer dynamic selection of encryption operation. These discussed, static design features are fully known to the cracker, therefore caused the practical cracking of DES and undesirable security pitfalls against AES as witnessed in earlier studies. Various studies have reported the mathematical cryptanalysis of AES up to full of its 14 rounds. Thus, this situation completely demands the proposal of dynamic design features in symmetric cryptosystems. Firstly, as a substitute to fixed sized data blocks, the Dynamic Data Blocking Mechanism (DDBM) has been proposed to provide the facility of dynamic sized data blocks. Secondly, as an alternative of static substitution approach, a Randomized Substitution Mechanism (RSM) has been proposed which can randomly modify session-keys and plaintext blocks. Finally, Multi-operation Data Encryption Mechanism (MoDEM) has been proposed to tackle the issue of static and identical set of known encryption operations on each data block in each round. With MoDEM, the encryption operation can dynamically be selected against the desired data block from the list of multiple operations bundled with several sub-operations. The methods or operations such as exclusive-OR, 8-bit permutation, random substitution, cyclic-shift and logical operations are used. Results show that DDBM can provide dynamic sized data blocks comparatively to existing approaches. Both RSM and MoDEM fulfill dynamicity and randomness properties as tested and validated under recommended statistical analysis with standard tool. The proposed method not only contains randomness and avalanche properties but it also has passed recommended statistical tests within five encryption rounds (significant than existing). Moreover, mathematical testing shows that common security attacks are not applicable on MoDEM and brute force attack is significantly resistive
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Constructing Variable-Length PRPs and SPRPs from Fixed-Length PRPs
We create variable-length pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) and strong PRPs (SPRPs) accepting any input length chosen from the range of b to 2b bits from fixed-length, b-bit PRPs. We utilize the elastic network that underlies the recently introduced concrete design of elastic block ciphers, exploiting it as a network of PRPs. We prove that three and four-round elastic networks are variable-length PRPs and five-round elastic networks are variable-length SPRPs, accepting any input length that is fixed in the range of b to 2b bits, when the round functions are independently chosen fixed-length PRPs on b bits. We also prove that these are the minimum number of rounds required
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Methods for Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis of Elastic Block Ciphers
The elastic block cipher design employs the round function of a given, b-bit block cipher in a black box fashion, embedding it in a network structure to construct a family of ciphers in a uniform manner. The family is parameterized by block size, for any size between b and 2b. The design assures that the overall workload for encryption is proportional to the block size. When considering the approach taken in elastic block ciphers, the question arises as to whether cryptanalysis results, including methods of analysis and bounds on security, for the original fixed-sized cipher are lost or, since original components of the cipher are used, whether previous analysis can be applied or reused in some manner. With this question in mind, we analyze elastic block ciphers and consider the security against two basic types of attacks, linear and differential cryptanalysis. We show how they can be related to the corresponding security of the fixed-length version of the cipher. Concretely, we develop techniques that take advantage of relationships between the structure of the elastic network and the original version of the cipher, independently of the cipher. This approach demonstrates how one can build upon existing components to allow cryptanalysis within an extended structure (a topic which may be of general interest outside of elastic block ciphers). We show that any linear attack on an elastic block cipher can be converted efficiently into a linear attack on the fixed-length version of the cipher by converting the equations used to attack the elastic version to equations for the fixed-length version. We extend the result to any algebraic attack. We then define a general method for deriving the differential characteristic bound of an elastic block cipher using the differential bound on a single round of the fixed-length version of the cipher. The structure of elastic block ciphers allows us to use a state transition method to compute differentials for the elastic version from differentials of the round function of the original cipher
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