17,538 research outputs found
Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study
Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social
behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on
networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local
network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and
general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results
are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main
insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in
social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.Comment: preprint submitted to IJMP
Evolutive equilibrium selection I: symmetric two player binary choice games
The aim of the paper is the construction of a distributional model which enables
the study of the evolutionary dynamics that arise for symmetric games, and the equilibrium
selection mechanisms that originate from such processes. The evolution of probability
distributions over the state variables is studied using the Fokker-Planck diffusion
equation. Equilibrium selection using the ��basin of attraction�� approach, and a selection
process suggested by Pontryagin are contrasted. Examples are provided for all generic
2-person symmetric binary choice games
Evolutionary game dynamics in phenotype space
Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations.
Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of
individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new
type of space to evolutionary game dynamics: phenotype space. The population is
well-mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with
everyone else, but the behavioral strategies depend on distance in phenotype
space. Individuals might behave differently towards those who look similar or
dissimilar. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes. We study the `phenotypic
space walk' of populations. We present analytic calculations that bring
together ideas from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. As a
particular example, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in phenotype
space. We obtain a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators
over defectors: for a one-dimensional phenotype space and large population size
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b/c=1+2/sqrt{3}. We derive the
fundamental condition for any evolutionary game and explore higher dimensional
phenotype spaces.Comment: version 2: minor changes; equivalent to final published versio
Dynamics of growth factor production in monolayers of cancer cells and evolution of resistance to anticancer therapies
Tumor heterogeneity is well documented for many characters, including the production of growth factors, which improve tumor proliferation and promote resistance against apoptosis and against immune reaction. What maintains heterogeneity remains an open question that has implications for diagnosis and treatment. While it has been suggested that therapies targeting growth factors are robust against evolved resistance, current therapies against growth factors, like antiangiogenic drugs, are not effective in the long term, as resistant mutants can evolve and lead to relapse. We use evolutionary game theory to study the dynamics of the production of growth factors by monolayers of cancer cells and to understand the effect of therapies that target growth factors. The dynamics depend on the production cost of the growth factor, on its diffusion range and on the type of benefit it confers to the cells. Stable heterogeneity is a typical outcome of the dynamics, while a pure equilibrium of nonproducer cells is possible under certain conditions. Such pure equilibrium can be the goal of new anticancer therapies. We show that current therapies, instead, can be effective only if growth factors are almost completely eliminated and if the reduction is almost immediate
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