104,877 research outputs found

    Why Do Agricultural Cooperative Mergers Not Cross the Finishing Line?

    Full text link
    [EN] Mergers have played a relevant role in the business development of many agri-food cooperatives and have led to the consolidation of large cooperative groups which are leaders in their respective business sectors. However, many of the merger processes undertaken fail: some are aborted at the negotiation stage, and others are not approved by members. These failures entail financial and social costs due to frustrated expectations and the time invested in the negotiation process. The objective of this paper is to establish the economic, socio-cultural, organisational and process management factors that underlie this outcome. A survey was conducted among the directors and administrators of a sample of Spanish agri-food cooperatives that had participated in merger processes which were aborted at the negotiation stage or were not approved by their members. Factor and discriminant analyses established the aspects which had the greatest impact on the failure of the merger processes. Far from being economic factors, these analyses reveal that defensive localisms, a lack of commitment to the merger on the part of members and directors, and communication failures were more significant.Melia-Marti, E.; Lajara-Camilleri, N.; Martínez-García, A.; Julia-Igual, J. (2021). Why Do Agricultural Cooperative Mergers Not Cross the Finishing Line?. Agriculture. 11(11):1-19. https://doi.org/10.3390/agriculture11111173S119111

    Sign, then Ratify : Negotiating under Threshold Constraints

    No full text
    The procedure for implementing any international treaty necessarily involves two steps. The negotiation phase which culminates in the signature of the treaty is followed by a ratification phase. This last phase is governed by a rule which determines how far the ratification process has to advance before the treaty can come into effect. The purpose of this paper is to analyse, using a game theoretical approach, the possible consequences of this minimum participationrule for the ratification phase and for the negotiation phase. I consider the case of International Environmental Agreements in which, during the negotiation phase, the different parties have to decide on the level of a global target and on how to share the efforts necessary to reach it. I use a cooperative approach to define what is called the threshold value (T-value). For a given coalition of parties, the T-value gives the expected outcome of the negotiation oversharing a global target, when the parties take into account the minimum participation rule. Given this T-value, I use a non-cooperative approach to determine which coalition will sign the agreement and what will be its global target. The minimum participation constraint has in fact no impact on the ratification phase because it is always better to refuse to sign rather thanto sign and then refuse to ratify. However, I show that the minimum participation constraint can modify the outcome of the negotiation phase. Indeed, it plays a role in a mechanism which can be used by a coalition to signal its leadership commitment. I analyse the conditions under which, at the equilibrium, the leading coalition can provoke an expansion of the signingcoalition

    Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains

    Full text link
    This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

    Negotiating Relationally: The Dynamics of the Relational Self In Negotiations

    Get PDF
    Although negotiation research is thriving, it has been criticized as having an arelational bias—emphasizing autonomy, competition, and rationality over interdependence, cooperation, and relationality. In this article, we advance a new model of relationality in negotiation. Drawing on research in social psychology, we describe the construct of relational self-construals (RSC) and present a temporal model of RSC and negotiation. After delineating the conditions through which RSC becomes accessible in negotiation and conditions that inhibit its use, we discuss how RSC affects negotiators\u27 pre-negotiation psychological states, early and later tactics, and negotiation outcomes. We illustrate a number of distinct relational dynamics that can occur based on the dyadic composition of RSC, each of which brings distinct benefits and costs to the negotiation table. Implications for the science and practice of negotiation are discussed

    Problem-Solving Negotiation: Northern Ireland\u27s Experience with the Women\u27s Coalition Symposium

    Get PDF
    This paper is part of a Symposium that considered the relevance of domestic conflict resolution theories in broader cultural contexts. The Northern Ireland Women\u27s Coalition (Women\u27s Coalition) participated in the negotiations leading up to the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. Members of the Woman\u27s Coalition responded to thirty years of sectarian violence with a negotiation process based on accommodation, inclusion, and relationship building, concepts that resonate with American-style problem-solving negotiation. Using the Women\u27s Coalition as a case study, this Article suggests that there are procedural aspects of problem-solving negotiation theory that may work across domains, specifically in multi-party, intractable conflict situations, where not all players share the same end game. Topics discussed include: (i) background of the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Troubles , (ii) problem-solving negotiation theory, (iii) strategic approaches of the Women\u27s Coalition during the multi-party negotiations leading to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, (iv) perspectives on comparative dispute resolution, and (v) relevance of inclusion, trust and relationship building

    Worker Rights Consortium Progress Report re Implementation of Russell Athletic/Fruit of of the Loom Remediation Agreements for Operations in Honduras: Findings and Status Report

    Get PDF
    WRC_Progress_Report_re_Russell_Athletic_2_17_10.pdf: 132 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

    What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization

    Get PDF
    What do trade negotiators negotiate about? There are two distinct theoretical approaches in the economics literature that offer an answer to this question: the terms-of-trade theory and the commitment theory. The terms-of-trade theory holds that trade agreements are useful to governments as a means of helping them escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners' Dilemma. The commitment theory holds that trade agreements are useful to governments as a means of helping them make commitments to the private sector. These theories are not mutually exclusive, but there is little direct evidence on the empirical relevance of either. We attempt to investigate empirically the purpose served by market access commitments negotiated in the World Trade Organization. We find broad support for the terms-of-trade theory in the data. We claim more tentatively to find support in the data for the commitment theory as well.

    Online Dispute Resolution Through the Lens of Bargaining and Negotiation Theory: Toward an Integrated Model

    Get PDF
    [Excerpt] In this article we apply negotiation and bargaining theory to the analysis of online dispute resolution. Our principal objective is to develop testable hypotheses based on negotiation theory that can be used in ODR research. We have not conducted the research necessary to test the hypotheses we develop; however, in a later section of the article we suggest a possible methodology for doing so. There is a vast literature on negotiation and bargaining theory. For the purposes of this article, we realized at the outset that we could only use a small part of that literature in developing a model that might be suitable for empirical testing. We decided to use the behavioral theory of negotiation developed by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, which was initially formulated in the 1960s. This theory has stood the test of time. Initially developed to explain union-management negotiations, it has proven useful in analyzing a wide variety of disputes and conflict situations. In constructing their theory, Walton and McKersie built on the contributions and work of many previous bargaining theorists including economists, sociologists, game theorists, and industrial relations scholars. In this article, we have incorporated a consideration of the foundations on which their theory was based. In the concluding section of the article we discuss briefly how other negotiation and bargaining theories might be applied to the analysis of ODR

    Bargaining Practices: Negotiating the Kampala Compromise for the International Criminal Court

    Get PDF
    At the International Criminal Court\u27s (ICC) Review Conference in 2010, the ICC\u27s Assembly of States Parties (ASP) agreed upon a definition of the crime of aggression, jurisdictional conditions, and a mechanism for its entry into force (the Kampala Compromise ). These amendments give the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute political and military leaders of states for planning, preparing, initiating, or executing illegal wars, beginning as early as January 2017. This article explains the bargaining practices of the diplomats that gave rise to this historic development in international law. This article argues that the international-practices framework, as currently conceived, does not adequately capture the role sincerity played in the negotiations. Sincerity was an international practice, but not a performance. It follows that the international practices framework should be adjusted to accommodate the decisive role of sincerity, a special nonperformative international practice, in the face-to-face interactions of international politics and diplomacy. The remainder of the article lays out the international-practices framework and explains the place of performances within it. The article then introduces the concept of sincerity as a social practice. The second half of the article discusses some ways that sincerity played a role in the negotiations. The article concludes that sincerity is a special kind of international practice: It cannot be a performance, but it can be an international practice, and an effective one at that
    • …
    corecore