Reason Maintenance - State of the Art

This paper describes state of the art in reason maintenance with a focus on its future usage in the KiWi project. To give a bigger picture of the field, it also mentions closely related issues such as non-monotonic logic and paraconsistency. The paper is organized as follows: first, two motivating scenarios referring to semantic wikis are presented which are then used to introduce the different reason maintenance techniques

Belief revision and computational argumentation: a critical comparison

This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reason ing they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the broad area of defeasible reasoning and on the other hand pointing out open issues and potential directions for future research.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

AGM 25 years: twenty-five years of research in belief change

The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original framework, iterated change, applications of the model, its connections with other formal frameworks, computatibility of AGM operations, and criticism of the model.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Ontology Revision on the Semantic Web: Integration of belief revision theory

Ontology is used to define terms and relations on the Semantic Web to form well-structured semantics of Web resources. Ontology revision refers to the process of updating ontology to ensure changes are made in a consistent manner. Belief revision theory deals with approaches to ensure consistency in the belief sets is maintained when beliefs need to be revised. This paper discusses the integration of belief revision theory to the ontology reengineering method as a means to ensure consistency in ontology revision

Revision in networks of ontologies

euzenat2015aInternational audienceNetworks of ontologies are made of a collection of logic theories, called ontologies, related by alignments. They arise naturally in distributed contexts in which theories are developed and maintained independently, such as the semantic web. In networks of ontologies, inconsistency can come from two different sources: local inconsistency in a particular ontology or alignment, and global inconsistency between them. Belief revision is well-defined for dealing with ontologies; we investigate how it can apply to networks of ontologies. We formulate revision postulates for alignments and networks of ontologies based on an abstraction of existing semantics of networks of ontologies. We show that revision operators cannot be simply based on local revision operators on both ontologies and alignments. We adapt the partial meet revision framework to networks of ontologies and show that it indeed satisfies the revision postulates. Finally, we consider strategies based on network characteristics for designing concrete revision operators

Presupozicije, logika i dinamika vjerovanja

In researching presuppositions dealing with logic and dynamic of belief we distinguish two related parts. The first part refers to presuppositions and logic, which is not necessarily involved with intentional operators. We are primarily concerned with classical, free and presuppositonal logic. Here, we practice a well known Strawson’s approach to the problem of presupposition in relation to classical logic. Further on in this work, free logic is used, especially Van Fraassen’s research of the role of presupposition in supervaluations logical systems. At the end of the first part, presuppositional logic, advocated by S.K. Thomason, is taken into consideration. The second part refers to the presuppositions in relation to the logic of the dynamics of belief. Here the logic of belief change is taken into consideration and other epistemic notions with immanent mechanism for the presentation of the dynamics. Three representative and dominant approaches are evaluated. First, we deal with new, less classical, situation semantics. Besides Strawson’s theory, the second theory is the theory of the belief change, developed by Alchourron, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM theory). At the end, the oldest, universal, and dominant approach is used, recognized as Hintikka’s approach to the analysis of epistemic notions.U istraživanju presupozicija u odnosu na logiku i dinamiku vjerovanja razlikujemo dva povezana dijela. Prvi dio se odnosi na presupozicije i logiku koja ne mora biti povezana s intenzionalnim operatorima. Tu se primarno koncentriramo na klasičnu, slobodnu i presupozicijsku logiku. U odnosu na klasičnu logiku razmatramo dobro poznati Strawsonov pristup problemu presupozicija. Nadalje, razmatramo slobodne logike, posebice van Fraassenovo istraživanje uloge presupozicija u supervaluacijskim logičkim sistemima. Na kraju prvog dijela razmatramo izvornu Thomasonovu izgradnju presupozicijske logike. Drugi dio se odnosi na povezanost presupozicija i logike dinamike vjerovanja. Ovdje razmatramo logiku promjene vjerovanja u okviru epistemičkih pojmova imanentnih mehanizmu dinamičke logike. Tri razmatrana pristupa su situacijska semantika (Barwise, Perry), teorija promjene vjerovanja, odnosno, Alchourron/Gärdenfors/Makinsonova (AGM) teorija, te na kraju Hintikkin pristup u izgradnji epistemièke logike

Presuppositions, Logic, and Dynamics of Belief

In researching presuppositions dealing with logic and dynamic of belief we distinguish two related parts. The first part refers to presuppositions and logic, which is not necessarily involved with intentional operators. We are primarily concerned with classical, free and presuppositonal logic. Here, we practice a well known Strawson’s approach to the problem of presupposition in relation to classical logic. Further on in this work, free logic is used, especially Van Fraassen’s research of the role of presupposition in supervaluations logical systems. At the end of the first part, presuppositional logic, advocated by S.K. Thomason, is taken into consideration. The second part refers to the presuppositions in relation to the logic of the dynamics of belief. Here the logic of belief change is taken into consideration and other epistemic notions with immanent mechanism for the presentation of the dynamics. Three representative and dominant approaches are evaluated. First, we deal with new, less classical, situation semantics. Besides Strawson’s theory, the second theory is the theory of the belief change, developed by Alchourron, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM theory). At the end, the oldest, universal, and dominant approach is used, recognized as Hintikka’s approach to the analysis of epistemic notion

Belief revision and incongruity: is it a joke?

Incongruity often makes people laugh. You have to be smart to say stupid things. It requires to be even smarter for understanding them. This paper is a shameless attempt to formalize this intelligent behavior in the case of an agent listening to a joke. All this is a matter of revision of beliefs, surprise and violation of norms.Comment: A special paper on/in humor/honor for/of Philippe Besnar

A Kripke-Lewis semantics for belief update and belief revision

We provide a new characterization of both belief update and belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Lewis semantics. We consider frames consisting of a set of states, a Kripke belief relation and a Lewis selection function. Adding a valuation to a frame yields a model. Given a model and a state, we identify the initial belief set K with the set of formulas that are believed at that state and we identify either the updated belief set or the revised belief set, prompted by the input represented by formula A, as the set of formulas that are the consequent of conditionals that (1) are believed at that state and (2) have A as antecedent. We show that this class of models characterizes both the Katsuno-Mendelzon (KM) belief update functions and the AGM belief revision functions, in the following sense: (1) each model gives rise to a partial belief function that can be completed into a full KM/AGM update/revision function, and (2) for every KM/AGM update/revision function there is a model whose associated belief function coincides with it. The difference between update and revision can be reduced to two semantic properties that appear in a stronger form in revision relative to update, thus confirming the finding by Peppas et al. (1996) that, "for a fixed theory K, revising K is much the same as updating K"Comment: 37 page