Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

Method and Approach Mapping of Fair and Balanced Risk and Value-added Distribution in Supply Chains: A Review and Future Agenda

This paper proposes a fair and balanced risk and value-added distribution as a novel approach for collaborative supply chain. The objective of this article is to analyze the existing methods and approaches for risk management, value-adding, risk and revenue sharing to develop a new framework for balancing risk and value-adding in collaborative supply chains. The authors reviewed and synthesized 162 scientific articles which were published between 2001 and 2017 and. The reviewed articles were categorized into supply chain management and performance, risk management, value-added, fair risk and value-added distribution and supply chain negotiation. The potentials identified for future research were the importance of decision-making and sustainability for effectiveness of supply chain risk management. Most previous authors have applied an approach of revenue and risk-- sharing with both decentralized and centralized supply chains to achieve the fair risk and value-added distribution. The dominant methods we found in literature were game theory and complex mathematical formulation. Most literature focused on operation research techniques. We identified a lack of discussion of the intelligent system approach and a potential for future exploration. This paper guide future research and application agenda of fair risk and value-added distribution in supply chain collaboration. We developed a new framework for a fair and balanced risk and value-added distribution model. For a future agenda, we point towards the development of a systematic intelligent system applying soft-computing techniques and knowledge transfer for maintaining sustainable supply chains.Keywords Supply chain collaboration, Fair risk and value-added distribution, Revenue sharing, Risk management, Risk sharin

An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

[EN] In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer's direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.This research was funded by Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de Espana grant number BIA2017-87573-C2-2-P.Arshad, M.; Khalid, QS.; Lloret, J.; León Fernández, A. (2018). An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management. Sustainability. 10(10). https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103433S101

Sustainability in Supply Chains with Behavioral Concerns

Environmental sustainability has received considerable attention in industry and academia. Many firms have begun to adopt sustainability practices, such as investing in cleaner technology and using organic or recyclable materials, to enhance sustainability in supply chains. Such sustainability practices affect corporate social responsibility and business performance. On the other hand, when consumers and supply chain managers make decisions, they may be constrained by behavioral concerns. Behavioral concerns can significantly influence optimization in supply chains. Thus, it is critical to consider the impacts of behavioral concerns on sustainability in supply chains. In this paper, we concisely examine studies in sustainability issues in supply chains with behavioral concerns and introduce the papers featured in this Special Issue

Differential game model and coordination model for green supply chain based on green technology research and development

The purpose of this paper is to establish a green supply chain differential game model for green technology research and development based on a secondary green supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. It compares the differential game equilibrium solutions under centralized and decentralized decision-making. The green supply chain members are coordinated through the dynamic wholesale price mechanism, and numerical simulation is used as a methodology, to verify and explain the results. The study found that compared to decentralized decision-making, the level of green technology and the total profit of green channels are higher under centralized decision-making. When the coordination parameters are within a certain range, the dynamic wholesale price mechanism can coordinate the behavior of manufacturers and retailers. The result also discovers that under the dynamic wholesale price mechanism, with the increase of investment cost coefficient, or the increase of price sensitivity or the decrease of consumer's environmental awareness, the green technology level, product green degree, price, retailer's profit, and the total profit of green channel is decreased. In contrast, the wholesale price and manufacturer's profits are increased

Analysis of the Project Supply Chains: Coordination and Fair Allocation

This research investigates how project contracts can coordinate the supply chain between a project manager and contractor and if the solutions can be ensured as equitable. The main features of this type of supply chain are the trade-offs between the selection of a higher rate of resource consumption with a consequent higher cost to the contractor and a lower rate of resource consumption leading to later delivery and a reduction of the project-reward to the project manager. This broader problem could lead to a coordination problem for the overall supply chain. This research proposed a solution to this broader problem in two different scenarios: Take it or leave it scenario and negotiation scenario. Finally, the fair allocation of the risks and benefits and the related decision-making issues are addressed as one of the behavioural barriers to the supply chain coordination. The coordination issues in a take it or leave it scenario are addressed using time-based and fixed price project contracts using Stackelberg games. Models of coordination were proposed with time-based contracts, but the fixed price contracts failed to coordinate. The coordination problems in negotiation scenario are addressed with the Nash's bargaining, the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, and the utilitarian approach. A cost plus contract has been found to dominate the solutions over any cost sharing contract and fixed price contract for Nash's bargaining and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining cases. Finally, the issues of fairness of allocation of risks and benefits as one of the challenges of supply chain coordination, have been investigated. The fixed price contracts were found to coordinate the supply chain under consideration alongside the time-based contracts if the members had fairness concern. Some of the key features of this research include the incorporation of various probability distributions for the project completion time and cost, the inclusion of various forms of risk preference, and addressing the challenges of fair allocation in project supply chains