Generic Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government Plan for State-Level Transportation Agencies, Research Report 11-01

The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (HSPD-20) requires all local, state, tribal and territorial government agencies, and private sector owners of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) to create a Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government Plan (COOP/COG). There is planning and training guidance for generic transportation agency COOP/COG work, and the Transportation Research Board has offered guidance for transportation organizations. However, the special concerns of the state-level transportation agency’s (State DOT’s) plan development are not included, notably the responsibilities for the entire State Highway System and the responsibility to support specific essential functions related to the State DOT Director’s role in the Governor’s cabinet. There is also no guidance on where the COOP/COG planning and organizing fits into the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at the local or state-level department or agency. This report covers the research conducted to determine how to integrate COOP/COG into the overall NIMS approach to emergency management, including a connection between the emergency operations center (EOC) and the COOP/COG activity. The first section is a presentation of the research and its findings and analysis. The second section provides training for the EOC staff of a state-level transportation agency, using a hybrid model of FEMA’s ICS and ESF approaches, including a complete set of EOC position checklists, and other training support material. The third section provides training for the COOP/COG Branch staff of a state-level transportation agency, including a set of personnel position descriptions for the COOP/COG Branch members

Australian commercial-critical infrastructure management protection

Secure management of Australia\u27s commercial critical infrastructure presents ongoing challenges to owners and the government. Although managed via a high-level information sharing collaboration of government and business, critical infrastructure protection is further complicated by the lack of a lower-level scalable model exhibiting its various levels, sectors and sub-sectors. This research builds on the work of Marasea (2003) to establish a descriptive critical infrastructure model and also considers the influence and proposed modelling of critical infrastructure dependency inter-relationships.<br /

FEMA's Integration of Preparedness and Development of Robust Regional Offices

In October 2006, Congress enacted major legislation to reform the function and organization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in response to the recognized failures in preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) focused national preparedness responsibilities within FEMA and directed additional resources and responsibilities to FEMA's ten regional offices. Directed by Congress, in October 2008 a National Academy Panel began an independent assessment of FEMA's integration of preparedness functions and progress in development of robust regional offices.Main FindingsOver the past three years, FEMA has taken significant steps in an effort to integrate preparedness and develop more robust regional offices. These efforts, undertaken by both the previous and current Administrations, are documented throughout this report and should be recognized and applauded. However, FEMA has yet to define specific goals and outcomes that would permit it, Congress or the public to determine when preparedness has been fully integrated into all aspects of FEMA's work and whether the development and ongoing operation of robust regional offices has been achieved. In the absence of well-defined, measurable outcome indicators, the National Academy Panel relied upon the assessments of FEMA leaders and staff, documentation provided by FEMA, and a review of secondary sources material to inform its findings and recommendations. Based upon this evidence, the Panel has concluded that, while progress has been made: (1) preparedness is not fully integrated across FEMA, (2) FEMA's regional offices do not yet have the capacity required to ensure the nation is fully prepared, (3) stakeholders are not yet full partners with FEMA in national preparedness, and (4) FEMA has ineffective internal business practices, particularly with regard to human resource management. The Panel made seven recommendations for FEMA:Establish a cross-organizational process, with participation from internal and external stakeholders, to develop a shared understanding of preparedness integrationEstablish a robust set of outcome metrics and standards for preparedness integration, as well as a system to monitor and evaluate progress on an ongoing basisWork to eliminate organizational barriers that are adversely impacting the full integration of preparedness across the agencyContinue to build regional office capacity and monitor implementation consistent with the Administrator's recent policy guidanceUndertake steps to improve the ongoing working relationship between headquarters and the regions in accord with Panel-identified principlesTake steps to improve stakeholder engagement and relationships at all levels in accord with Panel-identified principles; andStrengthen internal business practices, especially in the area of human capital planning

Handbook of Emergency Management For State-Level Transportation Agencies, MTI Report 09-10

The Department of Homeland Security has mandated specific systems and techniques for the management of emergencies in the United States, including the Incident Command System, the National Incident Management System, Emergency Operations Plans, Emergency Operations Centers, Continuity of Government Plans and Continuity of Operations Plans. These plans and systems may be applied to the state-level transportation agency�s disaster response systems to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Specific guidance and management techniques are provided to aid emergency planning staff to create DHS-compliant systems

Food security, risk management and climate change

This report identifies major constraints to the adaptive capacity of food organisations operating in Australia. This report is about food security, climate change and risk management. Australia has enjoyed an unprecedented level of food security for more than half a century, but there are new uncertainties emerging and it would be unrealistic – if not complacent – to assume the same level of food security will persist simply because of recent history. The project collected data from more than 36 case study organisations (both foreign and local) operating in the Australian food-supply chain, and found that for many businesses,&nbsp; risk management practices require substantial improvement to cope with and exploit the uncertainties that lie ahead. Three risks were identified as major constraints to adaptive capacity of food organisations operating in Australia:&nbsp; risk management practices; an uncertain regulatory environment – itself a result of gaps in risk management; climate change uncertainty and projections about climate change impacts, also related to risk management

A framework for evaluating the effectiveness of flood emergency management systems in Europe

Calls for enhancing societal resilience to flooding are echoed across Europe alongside mounting evidence that flood risk will increase in response to climate change amongst other risk-enhancing factors. At a time where it is now widely accepted that flooding cannot be fully prevented, resilience discourse in public policy stresses the importance of improving societal capacities to absorb and recover from flood events. Flood emergency management has thus emerged as a crucial strategy in flood risk management. However, the extent to which emergency management supports societal resilience is dependent on the effectiveness of governance and performance in practice. Drawing from the extensive body of literature documenting the success conditions of so-called effective emergency management more broadly, this study formulates an evaluation framework specifically tailored to the study of Flood Emergency Management Systems (FEMS) in Europe. Applying this framework, this research performs a cross-country comparison of FEMS in the Netherlands, England, Poland, France, and Sweden. Important differences are observed in how FEMS have evolved in relation to differing contextual backgrounds (political, cultural, administrative and socio-economic) and exposures to flood hazard. Whereas the organization and coordination of actors are functioning effectively, other aspects of effective FEMS are relatively under-developed in several countries, such as provisions for institutional learning, recovery-based activities and community preparedness. Drawing from examples of good practice, this paper provides a critical reflection on the opportunities and constraints to enhancing the effectiveness of FEMS in Europe

When organisational effectiveness fails: business continuity management and the paradox of performance

Purpose: The aim of the paper is to consider the nature of the business continuity management (BCM) process and to frame it within wider literature on the performance of socio-technical systems. Despite the growth in BCM activities in organisations, some questions remain as to whether academic research has helped to drive this process. The paper seeks to stimulate discussion within this journal of the interplay between organisational performance and BCM and to frame it within the context of the potential tensions between effectiveness and efficiency. Design/methodology/approach: The paper considers how BCM is defined within the professional and academic communities that work in the area. It deconstructs these definitions in order to and set out the key elements of BCM that emerge from the definitions and considers how the various elements of BCM can interact with each other in the context of organisational performance. Findings: The relationships between academic research in the area of crisis management and the practice-based approaches to business continuity remain somewhat disjointed. In addition, recent work in the safety management literature on the relationships between success and failure can be seen to offer some interesting challenges for the practice of business continuity. Practical implications: The paper draws on some of the practice-based definitions of BCM and highlights the limitations and challenges associated with the construct. The paper sets out challenges for BCM based upon theoretical challenges arising in cognate areas of research. The aim is to ensure that BCM is integrated with emerging concepts in other aspects of the management of uncertainty and to do so in a strategic context. Originality/value: Academic research on performance reflects both the variety and the multi-disciplinary nature of the issues around measuring and managing performance. Failures in organisational performance have also invariably attracted considerable attention due to the nature of a range of disruptive events. The paper reveals some of the inherent paradoxes that sit at the core of the BCM process and its relationships with organisational performance