15,436 research outputs found
Security in transnational interoperable PPDR communications: threats and requirements
The relevance of cross border security operations
has been identified as a priority at European level for a long time.
A European network where Public Protection and Disaster Relief
(PPDR) forces share communications processes and a legal
framework would greatly enforce response to disaster recovery
and security against crime. Nevertheless, uncertainty on costs,
timescale and functionalities have slowed down the
interconnection of PPDR networks across countries and limited
the transnational cooperation of their PPDR forces so far. In this
context, the European research project ISITEP is aimed at
developing the legal, operational and technical framework to
achieve a cost effective solution for PPDR interoperability across
European countries. Inter alia, ISITEP project is specifying a
new Inter-System-Interface (ISI) interface for the
interconnection of current TETRA and TETRAPOL networks
that can be deployed over Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity.
This approach turns communications security as a central aspect
to consider when deploying the new IP ISI protocol between
PPDR national networks. Ensuring that threats to the
interconnected communications systems and terminals are
sufficiently and appropriately reduced by technical, procedural
and environmental countermeasures is vital to realise the trusted
and secure communication system needed for the pursued PPDR
transnational cooperation activities. In this context, this paper
describes the framework and methodology defined to carry out
the development of the security requirements and provides a
discussion on the undertaken security risk and vulnerability
analysis.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR FARM-LEVEL RISK MANAGEMENT
This study examines the risks associated with adoption of biotech crops and discusses their implications for risk management at the farm level. We develop an analytical risk evaluation matrix framework to illustrate changes in production and marketing risks of biotech and non-biotech crops. Price uncertainty generated by consumer concerns is the major risk facing biotech farmers, while cross-pollination with biotech crops and preservation of non-biotech status are major concerns for non-biotech farmers. Improved market infrastructure to handle biotech products and modification of the current risk management tools to accommodate new risks are essential in reducing the farm-level risks.biotechnology, genetically modified organisms, marketing risks, production risks, risk evaluation matrix, risk management, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Risk and Uncertainty,
A Risk Management Process for Consumers
Simply by using information technology, consumers expose themselves to considerable security risks. Because no technical or legal solutions are readily available, the only remedy is to develop a risk management process for consumers, similar to the process executed by enterprises. Consumers need to consider the risks in a structured way, and take action, not once, but iteratively. Such a process is feasible: enterprises already execute such processes, and time-saving tools can support the consumer in her own process. In fact, given our society's emphasis on individual responsibilities, skills and devices, a risk management process for consumers is the logical next step in improving information security
Complete Insecurity of Quantum Protocols for Classical Two-Party Computation
A fundamental task in modern cryptography is the joint computation of a
function which has two inputs, one from Alice and one from Bob, such that
neither of the two can learn more about the other's input than what is implied
by the value of the function. In this Letter, we show that any quantum protocol
for the computation of a classical deterministic function that outputs the
result to both parties (two-sided computation) and that is secure against a
cheating Bob can be completely broken by a cheating Alice. Whereas it is known
that quantum protocols for this task cannot be completely secure, our result
implies that security for one party implies complete insecurity for the other.
Our findings stand in stark contrast to recent protocols for weak coin tossing,
and highlight the limits of cryptography within quantum mechanics. We remark
that our conclusions remain valid, even if security is only required to be
approximate and if the function that is computed for Bob is different from that
of Alice.Comment: v2: 6 pages, 1 figure, text identical to PRL-version (but reasonably
formatted
Public realm toolkit
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