Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin

Bitcoin is a protocol promoted as the first peer-to-peer institution, an alternative to a central bank. The decisions made through this protocol, however, involve no judgment. Could a peer-to-peer protocol underpin an institution that makes normative decisions? Indeed, an extension to the Bitcoin protocol could allow a cryptocurrency to make law. Tacit coordination games, in which players compete to identify consensus issue resolutions, would determine currency ownership. For example, an issue might be whether a cryptocurrency-based trust should disburse funds to a putative beneficiary, and the game’s outcome would resolve the question and result in gains or losses for coordination game participants. A cryptocurrency can also be used to generate rules or other written codes. Peer-to-peer law might be useful when official decisionmakers are corrupt or when agency or transactions costs are high. A modest starting point for cryptocurrency-based governance would be as a replacement for Bitcoin’s centralized system for changing its source code. A cryptocurrency incorporating tacit coordination games could serve as a foundation for other projects requiring peer-to-peer governance, ranging from arbitration to business associations, which would enjoy inherent limited liability and would lack designated management

Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin

Bitcoin is a protocol promoted as the first peer-to-peer institution, an alternative to a central bank. The decisions made through this protocol, however, involve no judgment. Could a peer-to-peer protocol underpin an institution that makes normative decisions? Indeed, an extension to the Bitcoin protocol could allow a cryptocurrency to make law. Tacit coordination games, in which players compete to identify consensus issue resolutions, would determine currency ownership. For example, an issue might be whether a cryptocurrency-based trust should disburse funds to a putative beneficiary, and the game’s outcome would resolve the question and result in gains or losses for coordination game participants. A cryptocurrency can also be used to generate rules or other written codes. Peer-to-peer law might be useful when official decisionmakers are corrupt or when agency or transactions costs are high. A modest starting point for cryptocurrency-based governance would be as a replacement for Bitcoin’s centralized system for changing its source code. A cryptocurrency incorporating tacit coordination games could serve as a foundation for other projects requiring peer-to-peer governance, ranging from arbitration to business associations, which would enjoy inherent limited liability and would lack designated management

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

This essay reviews the Obama Administration’s civil rights record during its first Administration, with a particular focus on theCivil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The review finds that although the Obama Administration has generally been supportive of progressive causes, particularly in the Supreme Court and among issues relating to gay men and lesbians, its enforcement activities have generally been quite limited. On a quantitative basis, the Obama Administration’s civil rights enforcement typically fall at the same or below levels of the prior BushAdministration, and with a few exceptions (mortgage discrimination and voting) the Administration has brought very few major cases. One interesting development is that the EEOC has become a far more aggressive enforcement agency than the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, as the EEOC has pursued a number of important and innovative issues that would move thelaw forward. At the same time, the EEOC’s actual number of cases filed has dropped significantly for the EEOC, as it is now bringing fewer claims than the agency did under the Bush Administration. Finally, the essay concludes that, while civil rights has not been a priority, the path it has taken follows the principles of the Democratic Party

BLOCKGRID: A BLOCKCHAIN-MEDIATED CYBER-PHYSICAL INSTRUCTIONAL PLATFORM

Includes supplementary material, which may be found at https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/66767Blockchain technology has garnered significant attention for its disruptive potential in several domains of national security interest. For the United States government to meet the challenge of incorporating blockchain technology into its IT infrastructure and cyber warfare strategy, personnel must be educated about blockchain technology and its applications. This thesis presents both the design and prototype implementation for a blockchain-mediated cyber-physical system called a BlockGrid. The system consists of a cluster of microcomputers that form a simple smart grid controlled by smart contracts on a private blockchain. The microcomputers act as private blockchain nodes and are programmed to activate microcomputer-attached circuits in response to smart-contract transactions. LEDs are used as visible circuit elements that serve as indicators of the blockchain’s activity and allow demonstration of the technology to observers. Innovations in networking configuration and physical layout allow the prototype to be highly portable and pre-configured for use upon assembly. Implementation options allow the use of BlockGrid in a variety of instructional settings, thus increasing its potential benefit to educators.Civilian, CyberCorps: Scholarship for ServiceApproved for public release. distribution is unlimite

Bitcoin and the Japanese Retail Investor

The objective of this research is to examine the Bitcoin rally of 2017 as it occurred in Japan and establish a greater context for why it was the Japanese retail investors that propelled the nation to being the largest trader of the cryptocurrency at the end of the year. This dissertation begins with the examination of the technical and economical properties of Bitcoin by classifying it as fulfilling two roles: that of a means of payment and that of an investment commodity. Following that is a description of Bitcoin’s roots and the history of its non-speculative usage. These chapters serve as a base for examining the cryptocurrency’s role in Japan. The third chapter examines the Japanese retail investor and the Japanese retail investment landscape with a focus on the question of the low rates of risk-asset participation in face of a favorable investment environment. Historical context is drawn upon to argue that the present situation, wherein most financial assets are kept as cash, is rather the result of the historical path dependence than the present-day conditions in which Japanese retail investors operate. The final chapter addresses the question of high-risk activities in the form of gambling and margin trading by a group of predominantly middle-aged men and connects this propensity to engage in zero-sum games with Bitcoin’s success in Japan. The author argues that the solitary practice of high-risk financial activities enabled by trusted institutions is separate from the general savings tradition that suffered shocks following the low interest-rate regime and that it was the high-risk gambles that became the primary cause for the popularity of Bitcoin. The dissertation concludes with the argument that the success of Bitcoin in 2017 had been in no small part achieved precisely by inverting the hard-line libertarian values of its creators and making it a centrally-held commodity offered by a banking-like institution with a strong public presence

Cyberspace, Blockchain, Governance:How Technology Implies Normative Power and Regulation

Technologies and their inherent design choices create normative structures that affect governance. This chapter aims to illustrate how blockchain technology in particular introduces new norms into a legal framework. We first analyze the different forms of governance by distinguishing between old and new governance. With a view to code that functions as legal norms, Blockchain technology is particularly suited to create governance structures and mechanisms. However, one needs to be aware of the norms that are implicitly introduced into the legal system by a specific blockchain technology. We look at the blockchain technology that underlies cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. This blockchain introduces a decentralized, transparent, cryptographically locked and thus immutable shared ledger. In summary, these design choices have normative powers over the user and over user interaction. If this is indeed the case, then regulators have to actively assess newly introduced digital ledger technology and other technologies for their effect on the normative and legal system.</p

Data, Debt & Daemons: Systemic Asymmetries on Spaceship Earth

Day by day, the rate at which we create new data increases exponentially. Our capacity to learn cannot keep up. We are tiny members of a vast universal network, incapable of discerning cause and effect. Instead, we develop simplified narratives, leaving ourselves misguided yet complacent. The information management trade of both physical and intellectual property has become more vital to global economies than ever, replacing physical resources and manufacturing. Through our deepening reliance on specialization, we forfeit agency over our own homes while accruing unprecedented debt. Housing costs have risen dramatically compared to wages, despite reportedly successful economies. Citizens were supposed to have the ability to participate in financial markets using their property as collateral. This seduced many into the ideologies of unregulated capitalism. However, by the 21st century, these systems had become unrecognizable mutilations of their intended designs. The momentum we have gathered in the past century has thrust us on an unsustainable trajectory we have little hope of predicting. We laid the foundation for Western economic dominance with technology, monetary policy, and globalization, but we did so using incentive structures that exacerbated wealth inequality. These systems integrate digital technology into both our physical and virtual spaces, operating on invisible planes that bypass our senses. The radical novelty of computers has entangled us in niche engineered concepts that few understand. They create a lack of accountability in Big Tech that policy-makers are ill-prepared for. We cannot ensure an equitable distribution of the leverage or stakes when we entrust brokers, politicians, traders, and captains of industry to make complex decisions for us without bearing the risks of their consequences. Our long-term welfare, including our future habitation on this planet, is not visceral enough to force effective reform. Both our physical and our digital spaces are designed, built, evaluated, and monitored on asymmetric principles, causing disasters that future generations and the least fortunate always pay for. How did we normalize this moral hazard? How can digital systems born out of frustration with modern policy combat these issues, without disrupting the benefits of a techno-utopia? How can they promote efficiency, security, and transparency in the spaces we call home

Schwerpunkt Blockchain

Neue Medien rufen regelmäßig neue Utopien auf den Plan, die sich untereinander stark ähneln können. Regelmäßig bekommen wir eröffnet, dass, von den Uninformierten noch unbemerkt, eine Medienrevolution im Gange sei, die das Potenzial habe, die Welt grundlegend zu verändern. Diese Erwartungen gelten meistens einem in jeder Hinsicht umwälzenden Zuwachs an Gleichheit und Freiheit Aller. Meistens enden sie jedoch dann in der Feststellung eines Zuwachses an Geld und Macht in den Händen Weniger. So war es beim Radio, beim Video, beim Internet, bei den »sozialen Medien«. Und so ist es auch heute wieder. Eine Medienrevolution finde statt, so hört und liest man, die sich nicht auf kalifornischen Theaterbühnen oder auf Konsumentenelektronik-Messen wie der IFA in Gestalt neuer Gadgets öffentlich präsentiert. Sie spielt sich jenseits der Terminals im unsichtbaren Reich der Vernetzung ab und betrifft subkutan die mediale Instituiertheit der Gesellschaft selbst: die Blockchain

Trust and Money or Value Transfers: A study of the implications of global value conflict generated by UN Security Council Resolution 1373

Trust is a fundamental aspect of any given functional society. However, since late September 2001, the UN approach to global financial governance appears to have been driven by distrust of other less formalized money or value transfer (MVT) systems. At the core of this ‘Global Regulatory Effort’ (GRE) is UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, which mandated that states legislate to regulate all informal MVT systems. In particular, the MVT system known as ‘hawala’ was implicated by US authorities in the funding of the acts of terrorism committed on September 11 in 2001. Although the focus of this multilateral effort was predominantly on the Islamic hawala system, the regime targeted any MVT system not linked to an established commercial banking operation. In this way UNSCR 1373 put a line in the sand between trustworthy and untrustworthy financial service providers. The necessity of this unprecedented step was ostensibly in order to prevent any future global acts of terrorism and maintain international peace and security. However, the regime’s approach implicitly legitimized formal Westernstyle financial systems while delegitimising all others. This study contends that a significant implication of this securitized approach to global financial governance was the creation of a Global Trust Conflict (GTC). The Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 and the adoption of Bitcoin as legal tender by El Salvador emphasize the significance of this Conflict. Moreover, the emergence of blockchain technology, Decentralized Finance (DeFi), and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) represents a new and challenging front in which the implications of the Conflict may be significant. Particularly in terms of the prevailing nature of trust provision services throughout the global economy. As a result, new possibilities for the shape of global order have arisen as state and private interests compete to influence the future of remittances. This research argues that the UNSCR 1373 mandate is anti-competition and served to institutionalize distrust of non-bank MVT systems. This includes traditionally informal remittances and emergent decentralized value transfer systems built on blockchain technology. This thesis concludes that a Global Trust Conflict exists, which constitutes the most significant barrier to regulatory efficacy and compliance aimed at MVT systems