Pragmatism, Pragma-Dialectics, and Methodology: Toward a More Ethical Notion of Argument Criticism

In this essay, I argue that the pragma-dialectical approach to the analysis of argumentative discourse is limited, or could better serve critics, if it provided a more defined method for the evaluation of arguments based upon goals, purposes, and consequences. Specifically, I argue current conceptions and applications of pragma-dialectical methodology potentially run the risk of amorality in that arguments are deemed ‗good‘ as long as they meet the goals of the speaker, regardless of what those goals or purposes might be. In the following segments of this essay, I will more clearly and specifically identify and investigate the aforementioned ethical deficiencies of the pragma-dialectical method, and out-line a corrective based on the theories of American pragmatists such as John Dewey, William James, and Richard Rorty, that I believe functions to elevate the pragma in this particular approach

Pascal’s wager: tracking an intended reader in the structure of the argument

Pascal’s wager is the name of an argument in favor of belief in God presented by Blaise Pascal in §233 of Thoughts. Ian Hacking (1972) pointed out that Pascal’s text involves three different versions of the argument. This paper proceeds from this identification, but it concerns an examination of the rhetorical strategy realized by Pascal’s argumentation. The final form of Pascal’s argument is considered as a product that could be established only through a specific process of persuasion led with respect to an intended reader with a particular set of initial beliefs. The text uses insights from the pragma‐dialectical approach to argumentation, especially the concept of rhetorical effectiveness of particular choices from the topical potential. The argumentation structure of Pascal’s wager is considered to be a reflection of the anticipated course of dialogue with the reader critically testing the sustainability of Pascal’s standpoint “You should believe in God”. Based on the argumentation reconstruction of three versions of the argument, Pascal’s idea of opponent/audience is identified. A rhetorical analysis of the effects of his argumentative strategy is proposed. The analysis is based on two perspectives on Pascal’s argument: it examines the strategy implemented consistently by all arguments and the strategy of a formulation of different versions of the wager

Towards Computer Support for Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Analysis

Computer tools are increasingly used to support the analysis of argumentative texts. Generic support for argumentation analysis is helpful, but catering to the requirements of specific theoretical approaches has additional advantages. Although the pragma-dialectical method of analyzing argumentative texts is widely used, no dedicated computational support tools exist. An outline is presented for the development of such tools, that starts with the formal approximation of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion

Argumentative Activity Types and the Account of the Empirical Aims of Argumentative Discourse

Institutional contexts influence the argumentative exchanges that occur in them. This paper examines the concept of argumentative activity type as an integration of institutional insights into the pragma-dialectical theory, aimed at depicting such influence. The integration is significant to the pursuit of an empirically adequate account of argumentative discourse. Activity types account for the institutional aims of the arguers and provide tools to trace the influence of these aims on the arguers’ attempt to balance between their dialectical and rhetorical aims, I argue

Reasoning under uncertainty: the role of two informal fallacies in an emerging scientific inquiry

It is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or non-fallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific inquiry, certain traditional fallacies function by conferring epistemic gains upon inquiry. Specifically, I argue that these fallacies facilitate the progression of inquiry, particularly in the initial stages of inquiry when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. The conception of these fallacies that emerges is that of heuristics of reasoning in contexts of epistemic uncertainty