8,160 research outputs found

    Can Global Workspace Theory Solve the Frame Problem?

    Get PDF
    The Frame Problem originated as an obstacle for classical, symbolic A.I. that was adopted, expanded, and reformulated by philosophers. The version of the problem that I focus on, the Holism Problem, points out the difficulty in programming systems to recognize and consider mostly relevant information, given that relevance is context-sensitive. My goal in this thesis is to determine whether the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) can solve the holism problem. GWT proposes that distributed parallel processing, global broadcast, and chaotic itinerancy can solve the problem by providing a system with 1) the speed to search through information, 2) access to the information it needs to compute relevance, 3) the ability to synthesize information. I argue that GWT fails to enable a system to recognize any relevant information because it inadequately responds to the Epistemological Holism Problem, which requires successfully determining the norms by which a system can recognize relevance

    Stability and Diversity in Collective Adaptation

    Get PDF
    We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally achieves the best action and memory loss that leads to randomized behavior. We show that, although individual agents interact with their environment and other agents in a purely self-interested way, macroscopic behavior can be interpreted as game dynamics. Application to several familiar, explicit game interactions shows that the adaptation dynamics exhibits a diversity of collective behaviors. The simplicity of the assumptions underlying the macroscopic equations suggests that these behaviors should be expected broadly in collective adaptation. We also analyze the adaptation dynamics from an information-theoretic viewpoint and discuss self-organization induced by information flux between agents, giving a novel view of collective adaptation.Comment: 22 pages, 23 figures; updated references, corrected typos, changed conten

    Conflict-free joint decision by lag and zero-lag synchronization in laser network

    Full text link
    With the end of Moore's Law and the increasing demand for computing, photonic accelerators are garnering considerable attention. This is due to the physical characteristics of light, such as high bandwidth and multiplicity, and the various synchronization phenomena that emerge in the realm of laser physics. These factors come into play as computer performance approaches its limits. In this study, we explore the application of a laser network, acting as a photonic accelerator, to the competitive multi-armed bandit problem. In this context, conflict avoidance is key to maximizing environmental rewards. We experimentally demonstrate cooperative decision-making using zero-lag and lag synchronization within a network of four semiconductor lasers. Lag synchronization of chaos realizes effective decision-making and zero-delay synchronization is responsible for the realization of the collision avoidance function. We experimentally verified a low collision rate and high reward in a fundamental 2-player, 2-slot scenario, and showed the scalability of this system. This system architecture opens up new possibilities for intelligent functionalities in laser dynamics

    Annotated Bibliography: Anticipation

    Get PDF

    Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase.

    Get PDF
    In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the "price system." The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and 52.6billionpaid.Thereformisatextbookexampleofeconomicpolicysuccess.WeexamineCoasesseminal1959paperontwolevels.First,wenotetheimportanceofitsanalyticalsymmetry,comparingadministrativetomarketmechanismsundertheassumptionofpositivetransactioncosts.Thisfundamentalinsighthashadenormousinfluencewithintheeconomicsprofession,yetisoftenlostincurrentanalyses.Thisanalyticalinsighthaditsbeginninginhisacclaimedearlyarticleonthefirm(Coase1937),andcontinuedintohissubsequenttreatmentofsocialcost(Coase1960).Second,weinvestigatewhyspectrumpolicieshavestoppedwellshortofthepropertyrightsregimethatCoaseadvocated,consideringrentseekingdynamicsandtheemergenceofnewtheorieschallengingCoasespropertyframework.Oneconclusioniseasilyrendered:competitivebiddingisnowthedefaulttoolinwirelesslicenseawards.Byruleofthumb,about52.6 billion paid. The reform is a textbook example of economic policy success. We examine Coase‘s seminal 1959 paper on two levels. First, we note the importance of its analytical symmetry, comparing administrative to market mechanisms under the assumption of positive transaction costs. This fundamental insight has had enormous influence within the economics profession, yet is often lost in current analyses. This analytical insight had its beginning in his acclaimed early article on the firm (Coase 1937), and continued into his subsequent treatment of social cost (Coase 1960). Second, we investigate why spectrum policies have stopped well short of the property rights regime that Coase advocated, considering rent-seeking dynamics and the emergence of new theories challenging Coase‘s property framework. One conclusion is easily rendered: competitive bidding is now the default tool in wireless license awards. By rule of thumb, about 17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.

    Taking a “Deep Dive”: What Only a Top Leader Can Do

    Get PDF
    Unlike most historical accounts of strategic change inside large firms, empirical research on strategic management rarely uses the day-to-day behaviors of top executives as the unit of analysis. By examining the resource allocation process closely, we introduce the concept of a deep dive, an intervention when top management seizes hold of the substantive content of a strategic initiative and its operational implementation at the project level, as a way to drive new behaviors that enable an organization to shift its performance trajectory into new dimensions unreachable with any of the previously described forms of intervention. We illustrate the power of this previously underexplored change mechanism with a case study, in which a well-established firm overcame barriers to change that were manifest in a wide range of organizational routines and behavioral norms that had been fostered by the pre-existing structural context of the firm.Strategic Change, Resource Allocation Process, Top-down Intervention
    corecore