Knowability Relative to Information

We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models the topic-sensitivity of information, allowing us to invalidate controversial forms of epistemic closure while validating less controversial ones. Thus, unlike the standard modal framework for epistemic logic, KRI accommodates plausible approaches to the Kripke-Harman dogmatism paradox, which bear on non-monotonicity, or on topic-sensitivity. KRI also strikes a better balance between agent idealization and a non-trivial logic of knowledge ascriptions

On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation

In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I close with some general considerations on the use of revision-theoretic methods in theories of truth

Preserving and documenting the Cultural Heritage

The phenomenon of preservation may be described as a physical process that depends on conceptual facts. When observed from a conceptual point of view, ‘values' cause the divergences in the preservation process, which could be named as the pre-requisites of the construction. Values carry emotional and physical points of view. The emotional context, of course, depends on recognizing and remembering while physical context depends on direction of research. They are indicators of cultural characteristics and historical identity. ‘Cultural values'1, moreover, explains the meanings attributed to the cultural property, which meanings will be preserved, and the reasons for their preservation. On behalf of this context, the preservation process may be defined as the preservation of the cultural heritage within an effective system. This effective system is aimed at attaining the total quality as a result of a synthesis of the technology, technique, and material originally deployed with those of the present. Besides, one of the most important input in the preservation process is the priorities of the intervention to be held, as the latter will determine the decisions and types of intervention during the implementation phase of the preservation project. As a significant paradox, the most important parameter that shapes both a preservation project and its process appears to be the risks that consist of indefinite input preventing the project from a proper definition of its context. Since all physical problems and the social status of the cultural property to be preserved have direct impact upon the design process of the preservation project, these priorities and the risks should be clarified in the course of pre-assessment phase at the beginning of the preservation process

The Sorites Paradox in Practical Philosophy

The first part of the chapter surveys some of the main ways in which the Sorites Paradox has figured in arguments in practical philosophy in recent decades, with special attention to arguments where the paradox is used as a basis for criticism. Not coincidentally, the relevant arguments all involve the transitivity of value in some way. The second part of the chapter is more probative, focusing on two main themes. First, I further address the relationship between the Sorites Paradox and the main arguments discussed in the first part, by elucidating in what sense they rely on (something like) tolerance principles. Second, I briefly discuss the prospect of rejecting the respective principles, aiming to show that we can do so for some of the arguments but not for others. The reason is that in the latter cases the principles do not function as independent premises in the reasoning but, rather, follow from certain fundamental features of the relevant scenarios. I also argue that not even adopting what is arguably the most radical way to block the Sorites Paradox – that of weakening the consequence relation – suffices to invalidate these arguments