Root optimization of polynomials in the number field sieve

The general number field sieve (GNFS) is the most efficient algorithm known for factoring large integers. It consists of several stages, the first one being polynomial selection. The quality of the chosen polynomials in polynomial selection can be modelled in terms of size and root properties. In this paper, we describe some algorithms for selecting polynomials with very good root properties.Comment: 16 pages, 18 reference

Montgomery's method of polynomial selection for the number field sieve

The number field sieve is the most efficient known algorithm for factoring large integers that are free of small prime factors. For the polynomial selection stage of the algorithm, Montgomery proposed a method of generating polynomials which relies on the construction of small modular geometric progressions. Montgomery's method is analysed in this paper and the existence of suitable geometric progressions is considered

The number field sieve

The number field sieve is an algorithm to factor integers of the form $r^e-s$ for small positive $r$ and $s$. The authors present a report on work in progress on this algorithm. They informally describe the algorithm, discuss several implementation related aspects, and present some of the factorizations obtained so far. They also mention some solutions to the problems encountered when generalizing the algorithm to general integers using an idea of Buhler and Pomerance. It is not unlikely that this leads to a general purpose factoring algorithm that is asymptotically substantially faster than the fastest factoring algorithms known so far, like the multiple polynomial quadratic siev

A kilobit hidden SNFS discrete logarithm computation

We perform a special number field sieve discrete logarithm computation in a 1024-bit prime field. To our knowledge, this is the first kilobit-sized discrete logarithm computation ever reported for prime fields. This computation took a little over two months of calendar time on an academic cluster using the open-source CADO-NFS software. Our chosen prime $p$ looks random, and $p--1$ has a 160-bit prime factor, in line with recommended parameters for the Digital Signature Algorithm. However, our p has been trapdoored in such a way that the special number field sieve can be used to compute discrete logarithms in $\mathbb{F}\_p^*$ , yet detecting that p has this trapdoor seems out of reach. Twenty-five years ago, there was considerable controversy around the possibility of back-doored parameters for DSA. Our computations show that trapdoored primes are entirely feasible with current computing technology. We also describe special number field sieve discrete log computations carried out for multiple weak primes found in use in the wild. As can be expected from a trapdoor mechanism which we say is hard to detect, our research did not reveal any trapdoored prime in wide use. The only way for a user to defend against a hypothetical trapdoor of this kind is to require verifiably random primes